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The evolution of altruism (costly self-sacrifice in the service of others) has fascinated 
biologists since the origins of evolutionary biology. Why should selection favour altruism 
over self-interest? Nowhere is the problem more striking than in the social insects, where 
large numbers of non-reproductive workers raise the offspring of reproductive queens. For 
over fifty years, the dominant explanation for altruism has been ‘inclusive fitness’ theory and 
an associated principle known as ‘Hamilton’s rule’, which emphasises the role of relatedness: 
altruists help carriers of shared genes. In this thesis, I explore two outstanding problems in 
the evolution of altruism and inclusive fitness theory. First, does altruism evolve differently 
in unpredictable environments? Second, what explains the evolution of altruism by 
Neotropical Polistes wasps to foreign queens, a situation in which ‘drifting’ workers 
paradoxically divert help to distant relatives? To answer the first question, I show that 
altruism in unpredictable environments can be favoured without any effects on the expected 
reproductive success of recipients – and, in principle, can evolve even if both altruist and 
recipient suffer a reduction in expected reproductive success. Instead, altruists can confer 
volatility-suppressing benefits on recipients, stabilising their otherwise uncertain 
reproduction. This extends ‘bet-hedging’ theory to social behaviour, and implies a stochastic 
version of Hamilton’s rule that differs from the interpretation of Hamilton’s rule commonly 
used empirically. To answer the second question, I use field experiments in the paper wasp 
Polistes canadensis in French Guiana and Panama, and Polistes satan in Brazil. Using a 
combination of radio-tagging, queen removals, recognition tests, and a longitudinal study of 
brood development, I explore various hypotheses for ‘drifting’. I argue that two recently 
published hypotheses for cooperative ‘drifting’ in Polistes may be unlikely to provide a 
general explanation for paradoxical altruism. Using longitudinal data, I show strong 
diminishing returns to cooperation in free-living colonies, which may represent an adaptive 
context in which altruism to more distantly-related recipients can evolve. Finally, I discuss 
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 Introduction to social evolution 
1.1 Chapter Summary 
A foundational principle in evolutionary biology is that organisms act like rational agents 
with coherent agendas. In this widely-held view, natural selection shapes all organisms to 
follow a single objective: maximise your ‘inclusive fitness’. First proposed by W. D. 
Hamilton in 1964, inclusive fitness is a measure of an individual’s Darwinian success that 
considers social as well as non-social behaviour. Inclusive fitness theory is used throughout 
this thesis, together with a principle (known as Hamilton’s rule) that is implied by the logic 
of inclusive fitness theory. However, the validity of the theory has recently been challenged 
by high-profile criticism on several fronts. In this chapter, I introduce inclusive fitness and 
Hamilton’s rule, consider the ongoing debate about their utility, and justify the use of 
Hamiltonian logic in the subsequent chapters. 
 
 
“There is no universal design principle.” (Allen, Nowak, et al., 2013) 
“The most salient feature of organisms is adaptation, the seeming goal-directedness that 
makes organisms different from merely physical entities.” (Queller and Strassmann, 2009) 
 
1.2 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to explore two connected questions. First, does cooperation evolve differently 
in unpredictable environments? Second, what explains the evolution of cooperative ‘drifting’ in Polistes 
paper wasps, in which individuals help multiple colonies? At present, the prevailing hypothesis for 
drifting in Polistes invokes a strategy known as ‘evolutionary bet-hedging’ in the face of extreme 
unpredictable risks (Sumner et al., 2007). Both questions concern stochasticity (unpredictable 
fluctuation in either the environment or population size) and social behaviour. Stochasticity has been 
widely discussed in non-social contexts for decades (Gillespie, 1975; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012; Yasui 
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and Garcia-Gonzalez, 2016). However, the influence of stochasticity on social behaviour remains little 
studied (Cockburn and Russell, 2011), despite recent speculation that major empirical links exist 
between social behaviour and stochastic environments (Jetz and Rubenstein, 2011; Rubenstein, 2011; 
Cornwallis et al., 2017; Guindre-Parker and Rubenstein, 2018). 
To explore the two main questions in this thesis, I turn to inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964a; 
Birch, 2017). W. D. Hamilton’s ‘inclusive fitness’ quantifies an individual’s total success at propagating 
copies of its own alleles into the future (Hamilton, 1964a; Abbot et al., 2011; Gardner et al., 2011). 
Before Hamilton (1964a), ‘fitness’ (the measure by which we judge an organism’s Darwinian success) 
was typically understood as simple reproductive success: absolute or relative number of surviving 
offspring. However, organisms influence the reproductive success of others, increasing or decreasing 
the total offspring production of social partners. Hamilton (1964a) realised that a fully causal measure 
of fitness would include these social effects. Relatives share alleles through common descent. 
Accordingly, organisms increasing the reproductive success of relatives – or decreasing the 
reproductive success of non-relatives – may help convey copies of their own alleles into the future. All 
else being equal, the value of others as vehicles for shared alleles is their relatedness (𝑟) to oneself: 
closer relatives (higher 𝑟) carry a higher proportion of shared alleles. 
In general, an interaction may increase a social partner’s reproductive success by the amount 𝐵. The 
total value of the interaction in terms of production of related offspring carrying copies of the focal 
individual’s alleles is then 𝑟𝐵. If the interaction incurs a cost 𝐶 to the focal individual’s reproductive 
success, it is favoured by selection only if 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶. This principle – known as ‘Hamilton’s rule’ (Hamilton, 
1964a; Gardner et al., 2011) – is the basis of the fields of behavioural ecology and social evolution, and 
is widely invoked as an explanation for ‘altruism’ (paying a cost 𝐶 to confer a benefit 𝐵 on a social 
partner; West et al., 2007). The sum of fitness effects 𝑟𝐵 − 𝐶 from all interactions over the organism’s 
life is then its ‘inclusive fitness’ – ‘inclusive’ because it accommodates social as well as non-social 
effects. 
Despite their foundational roles in social evolution (Gardner et al., 2011), Hamilton’s rule and inclusive 
fitness have recently been criticised on theoretical grounds (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson, 2010; Allen, 
Nowak and Wilson, 2013; Nowak et al., 2017; van Veelen et al., 2017). Radically, Doebeli et al. (2017) 
have suggested abandoning the concept of fitness altogether (whether ‘inclusive’ or not). Following 
these critiques, the predictive power of inclusive fitness theory is currently controversial (Birch, 2017). 
By extension, these critics have called into question the fields of behavioural ecology and social 
evolution, leading to a strong defence (Abbot et al., 2011; Gardner et al., 2011) and an ongoing debate 
(de Vladar and Szathmáry, 2017). 
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Inclusive fitness and Hamilton’s rule are used throughout this thesis. The assumption underlying all 
subsequent chapters is that organisms act solely to maximise their inclusive fitness – an assumption 
that is routine in behavioural ecology yet subject to strong criticism from population genetics and game 
theory. In this chapter, I introduce and justify this assumption by briefly describing the current state of 
the debate. In Part 1, I consider the extent to which inclusive fitness is the ultimate ‘objective’ of 
individual organisms (Grafen, 1999; Gardner, 2009; West and Gardner, 2013; Rousset, 2015), and 
evaluate criticisms of this position (Allen, Nowak, et al., 2013; Akçay, 2015; Akçay and Van Cleve, 2016; 
Birch, 2017). In Part 2, I consider objections to Hamilton’s rule as an explanation for social behaviour 
(van Veelen et al., 2017) and argue that it remains valid despite these criticisms. 
1.3 Part 1: Inclusive fitness 
Over 150 years after first publication of The Origin of Species, evolutionary biologists are divided on 
one of the simplest of questions (Birch, 2017): what are organisms trying to do? Most biologists 
advocate an explicitly ‘goal-directed’ view of behaviour (Gardner, 2009; West and Gardner, 2013; 
Grafen, 2014b). In this view, all organisms are shaped by natural selection to strive after the same 
objective, a single quantity known as ‘inclusive fitness’. However, a minority are sceptical that any 
universal agenda exists (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson, 2010; Lehmann et al., 2015), inclusive fitness or 
otherwise. As put by Allen et al. (2013), ‘there is no universal design principle.’ 
Inclusive fitness theory has much in common with economics (Archetti et al., 2011). Like economic 
utility, inclusive fitness allows the benefits and costs of phenotypes to be quantified with a single 
currency. This naturally leads to a view of animals and plants – or their genes (Dawkins, 1976; Gardner 
and Welch, 2011) – as agents: natural selection generates seemingly-rational decision-makers 
optimising a single utility function with the convincing illusion of conscious planning. This view of 
organisms has various names, including the ‘intentional stance’ (Dennett, 2010), the ’individual-as-
maximising-agent analogy’ (Grafen, 1999), the ‘universal design principle’ (Allen, Nowak, et al., 2013), 
‘as-if intentionality’ (Searle, 1991), the ‘agential perspective’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Okasha, 2018a), 
‘design thinking’ (Birch, 2017), and ‘Darwinian paranoia’, the view that biology is the study of ‘little 
agents with agendas’ rather than just the dynamics of allele frequency change (Godfrey-Smith, 2009). 
Two groups oppose this tradition: (1) a group of population geneticists (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 
1978; Schwartz, 2002; Ewens, 2014), for whom detailed models have conclusively shown that selection 
does not maximise any universal quantity (Grodwohl, 2017); and (2) a new group of game theorists who 
find inclusive fitness conceptually confused and empirically underwhelming (Nowak, Tarnita and 
Wilson, 2010; Van Veelen et al., 2010; Allen, Nowak, et al., 2013). In place of inclusive fitness theory, 
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this second group proposes ‘evolutionary dynamics’, a view of populations that emphasises variation 
in population structure and is devoid of fitness-maximisation arguments at the level of individual 
organisms (Allen and Nowak, 2016). 
1.3.1 What does maximisation mean? 
“Anyone who believes a thermostat has a belief about the temperature must be crazy!” 
(Dennett, 2006, paraphrasing criticism of the agential perspective) 
Before Hamilton (1964a), hypotheses of social evolution were focussed on either individual self-
interest or imprecisely-defined forms of group-level benefit (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). To perform field 
studies that make logical sense, it is crucial to define explicitly what we expect organisms to act as if 
maximising: what is the currency by which individuals should be judged in the struggle for existence?  
Part of the controversy over behavioural ecology is attributable to different interpretations of the 
word ‘maximisation’ by different groups (Birch, 2016a). In population genetics, maximisation is largely 
seen as occurring only under very special conditions. The view that selection seeks to maximise the 
average fitness in the population became unfashionable after Moran (1963) criticised the ‘adaptive 
landscape’ view associated with Wright (1967). Given epistasis or frequency-dependence, population 
average fitness can actually decline through the generations (Moran, 1963; Turner, 1969). However, 
population-level maximisation is not the sense in which behavioural ecologists use the term, and the 
semantic confusion between behavioural ecologists and population geneticists has long been 
problematic. Behavioural ecologists pay little attention to the protests of population geneticists when 
invoking fitness maximisation, because the two fields often talk past one another (Grafen, 2009a). 
Amongst population geneticists, scepticism towards maximisation is often associated with the failure 
of either Lyapunov or gradient functions to describe selection in anything other than the simplest of 
idealised populations (Grafen, 2009a). When maximisation is defined according to either of these 
functions, we are asking whether the population, rather than individual organisms, has a maximising 
tendency. Under this definition, maximisation occurs when (1) the space of possible gene frequencies 
is overlaid by a set of real numbers corresponding to fitness and (2) evolution heads to the fitness 
maximum by never allowing a fitness function to decrease in value (Lyapunov function) or tracks the 
maximally-steep route upwards (gradient function). The population ‘strives’ to optimise gene 
frequencies to secure the highest value of the fitness set. By contrast, behavioural ecologists see fitness 
maximisation as something occurring in the lives of individuals (as opposed to the population’s allele 
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frequency): like rational actors in economics, each individual strives to optimise its own phenotype 
under constraints (Grafen, 1999). 
The individual maximisation view invokes three things – an instrument, a maximand, and constraints 
(Grafen, 2008, 2009b): 
𝑥max𝑢(𝑥)        subject to     𝑥 ∈ 𝐱 (1.1) 
A strategy choice (𝑥) that the agent can vary (the ‘instrument’) generates values of the fitness 
‘maximand’ 𝑢(𝑥), such that 𝑥 should be chosen to generate the highest possible value of 𝑢(𝑥), subject 
to the ‘constraint’ that 𝑥 can only be chosen from a set of possible strategies 𝐱. The crucial criterion for 
showing that individuals target a universal maximand 𝑢(𝑥) is that it should be possible always to predict 
the result of selection simply by asking which phenotype 𝑥 achieves the highest value of 𝑢(𝑥): in other 
words, when we run the evolutionarily process (whether by simulation or analytically), we should find 
that a population fixed for phenotype 𝑥 is robust from invasion by any mutant phenotype (Lehmann et 
al., 2015). 
The most explicit attempt to justify inclusive fitness as a universal maximand is the ‘Formal Darwinism’ 
project led by Alan Grafen (Gardner and Grafen, 2009; Grafen, 2009b; Batty et al., 2014; Crewe et al., 
2018). To reach the right maximand, the Formal Darwinism project is founded on four proposed links 
between selection and organism-level optimisation (Grafen, 2006b). Informally, these can be 
summarised as the following two statements. 
1. A necessary and sufficient condition for the population to be at an equilibrium is that everyone is 
playing an optimum strategy (where an ‘equilibrium’ is when there is no expected change due to 
selection).  
2. Selection happens when individuals optimise their objective functions with different degrees of 
success. The resulting change in allele frequency is given by the selection covariance of the Price 
equation when the right fitness function covaries with breeding value. (‘Breeding value’ is a 
numerical value that can be placed on the individual to represent its specific combinations of 
alleles. In the simplest case, where individuals are asexual and haploid and differ at only one bi-
allelic locus of interest, the breeding values might, for instance, be set at 0 and 1.) 
The Price equation is the most general statement of evolution (Price, 1970; Gardner, 2008). In words, 
it says that the change over time in average breeding value ?̅? is equal to (1) the change due to selection 
(the ‘selection covariance’) plus (2) the change due to transmission bias (such as distortion of meiosis): 
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Δ?̅? = ℂ𝑖 [
𝑤𝑖
?̅?











Here, 𝑖 denotes the 𝑖th individual, 𝑤𝑖 denotes the absolute fitness (number of surviving adult 
offspring) of the 𝑖th individual, and ?̅? denotes the average of 𝑤𝑖 across all individuals in the population. 
ℂ𝑖[⋅] and 𝔼𝑖[⋅] denote covariances and expectations over 𝑖 respectively. Because we are generally just 
interested in the optimising tendency of selection, in practice we focus only on the selection covariance, 
and ignore the change due to transmission bias (but see Ewens, 2014). A quantity covarying with 
breeding value 𝐺𝑖  in the selection covariance is typically called a ‘target of selection’.  




). Intuitively, if individuals carrying a focal allele (and therefore sharing the same 
breeding value) tend to have a higher relative fitness than all other individuals, the covariance between 
breeding value and relative fitness will be positive, and selection increases the frequency of the allele 
in the population. Accordingly, we only need to know two pieces of information about each individual: 
(a) its genotype (i.e., which alleles it carries; 𝐺𝑖); and (b) its relative fitness (
𝑤𝑖
?̅?
). However, when 
individuals act socially, a fraction of each individual’s relative fitness will not be due to its own 
behaviour, but rather to the behaviour of others. The causal connection between genotype and relative 
fitness is broken. To identify a true maximand, we need to restore the causal connection by finding a 
target of selection which is under the organism’s private control. 
Various rearrangements of the Price equation are possible (Okasha, 2006). Ideally, we want to 
rearrange the selection covariance to obtain a target of selection that means we need only two pieces 
of information about each individual 𝑖: (a) its genotype (𝐺𝑖); and (b) its causal effects on its own relative 
fitness plus its causal effects on the relative fitness of others. The second of these would be individual 
𝑖’s inclusive fitness. Allowing for social behaviour (and an uncertain environment), one target of 
selection is the expectation of 
𝐼𝑖
?̅?
, where 𝐼𝑖 is the sum of additive fitness effects on recipients weighted 
by relatedness (Grafen, 2006b). If environmental states (denoted 𝜋 ∈ Π) occur with frequencies 𝑑𝜋, 












This is the covariate in the first bracket of Equation 6 in Grafen (2006b) expressed in the notation of 
this thesis, where 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 denotes 𝑖’s social partner and 𝑏𝑗,𝜋 denotes the additive effect on absolute 
fitness conferred by individual 𝑖 on recipient 𝑗, related by 𝑟𝑗, in environmental state 𝜋. Equation 1.3 is 
22 
 
called ‘expected relative inclusive fitness’ by Grafen (2006b), and – because all the fitness effects are 
now under one individual’s control – it is a strong candidate for the organism’s private maximand. 
Expected relative inclusive fitness (Equation 1.3) is the expectation of absolute ‘inclusive fitness’ over 
?̅?. Because the proposed maximand is a relative fitness concept (and therefore subject to frequency 
dependence), some authors are sceptical that it can be clearly maximised by organisms, because it is 
‘cognitively implausible’ (Huneman and Martens, 2017) for organisms to adjust their behaviour to 
match population-wide frequencies. However, no cognitive capacity is needed for an individual 
maximand to exist: ‘as if’ maximands can exist for daffodils as much as they can for chimpanzees. More 
generally, psychological ‘maximands’ are only relevant as proximate and short-term devices for 
pursuing the real (evolutionary) maximand, and it is important to keep the distinction clear.  
1.3.1.a Where the maximand argument is heading 
Most of the series of papers that comprise the Formal Darwinism project take a function of additive 
effects on expected relative fitness as the target of selection (leading to Equation 1.3). Recently, 
however, Crewe et al. (2017) develop the approach of Grafen (2006a) and express fitness purely in 
terms of reproductive value, which offers an alternative perspective on fitness under stochasticity. 
Informally, reproductive value measures expected contribution to the gene pool of the population in 
the distant future (elderly grandmothers and young eunuchs, as classes of individuals in the population, 
have very low reproductive values). Likewise, reproducing in a famine has a higher reproductive value 
than reproducing in a bonanza: in poor years, an individual who reproduces more than the (unusually 
low) population average secures a higher proportion of the total gene pool than if the same number of 
offspring were produced in a good year (when the relative distance between its own success and the 
population average is lower). Offspring in different years then carry different reproductive values. A 
similar approach to stochasticity is taken by Lehmann and Rousset (2014). This context-dependence is 
easily generalised to spatial as well as temporal fluctuations. 
Expressed in terms of the expected change in population average 𝑝-value (ploidy-weighted breeding 
values for a trait of interest), the selection covariance of Equation 1.2 appears as Crewe et al.’s (2017) 
Equation 14 (in my notation here): 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = ℂ[𝑝, 𝔼𝜋[ℱ]] (1.4) 
Here, ℱ denotes the additional share of reproductive value enjoyed by an actor 𝑖 above the 
reproductive value 𝑣𝑥𝑖 of its class 𝑥𝑖, as a proportion of class reproductive value (
𝑊𝑖−𝑣𝑥𝑖
𝑣𝑥𝑖
). Classes may 
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be defined by sex, status, location, age, and so on. Crewe et al. (2017) have not yet extended this 
argument to social behaviour, but it seems likely that future claims of inclusive fitness maximands will 
replace the target of selection in Equation 1.3 by the sum of social and non-social effects on 
reproductive value. 
1.3.2 Challenges to the argument from the Price equation 
Several assumptions limit the generality of the argument from the Price equation to the inclusive 
fitness maximand. First, Grafen (2006b) restricts the scope of Formal Darwinism to ‘universal strategic 
equivalence’: all organisms are confronted with the same proximate optimisation problem. Second, the 
inclusive fitness maximand remains undefined for demographic stochasticity in small or subdivided 
populations: there is no established maximand for metapopulations of small demes with local 
competition. To see this, note that Grafen (2006b) assumes no single individual having an appreciable 
effect on ?̅?: ‘it is like a central limit theorem assumption, that no individual should be very important, 
even in just one situation’ (Grafen, 2006b). Third, the maximand assumes that fitness effects are 
additive (Akçay and Van Cleve, 2016; Allen and Nowak, 2016; Birch, 2017), where individuals interacting 
socially are not more than the sum of their parts (I return to this contentious assumption below). 
A fourth proposed limitation concerns the definition of ‘equilibrium’ (Okasha and Paternotte, 2014; 
Birch, 2016a). In simple cases, an equilibrium is unambiguous: at equilibrium, allele frequencies cannot 
change because no phenotype has a higher fitness than the one that dominates the population. 
Maximisation and equilibria are naturally linked: the best solution to a given problem is an equilibrium, 
because there is no incentive for any individual to change its strategy (Creedy, 1994). However, various 
authors have objected to the way in which equilibria are defined by the Formal Darwinism project. This 
objection largely focuses on heterozygote advantage (Okasha and Paternotte, 2014; Birch, 2016a), 
which leads to the stable persistence of imperfect phenotypes at equilibrium: carriers of the fittest 
phenotype (i.e., the heterozygotes) inevitably produce offspring with suboptimal phenotypes (i.e., the 
homozygotes). In this case, genetic constraints lead to an equilibrium populated by organisms that 
seem to be acting irrationally (failing to maximise their inclusive fitness). How, then, can we say that 
selection inevitably leads to inclusive fitness maximisers?  
In the view of critics of Formal Darwinism, the problem here is that Grafen’s (2006b) definition of 
equilibria conveniently excludes these scenarios in which genetic constraint leads to irrational 
organisms (Okasha and Paternotte, 2014; Birch, 2016a). In Formal Darwinism, these apparent equilibria 
are not true equilibria because there is still ‘scope for selection’ (Grafen, 2006b). Informally, scope for 
selection means that individuals with different alleles are responsible for the production of different 
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numbers of offspring (Grafen, 2006b). Critics of Formal Darwinism argue that this provides no 
guarantee that selection will produce a world populated by inclusive fitness maximisers, leaving 
‘considerable distance’ (Okasha and Paternotte, 2014) between inclusive fitness theory and the 
assumptions of behavioural ecologists doing fieldwork. Heterozygote advantage and other forms of 
genetic constraint may be common empirically (Sellis et al., 2011). Practically, then, biologists must 
instead commit the ‘phenotypic gambit’ (Grafen, 1984) – the optimistic assumption that unknown 
genetic constraints do not lead to otherwise unknowable equilibria. 
There may also be a (less severe) problem with linking maximisation and equilibria in general, which 
is that equilibria are typically defined by zero expected change in allele frequencies (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 0) over 
stochasticity (states 𝜋 ∈ Π). Taken to extremes, zero expected change can occur in highly unstable 
situations that nobody would consider to be real equilibria. Consider a diallelic population currently at 
50:50 allele frequencies. Let the environment switch equally at random between two states: in state 1, 
allele 𝐴 carriers fail to reproduce; in state 2, allele 𝐵 carriers fail to reproduce. In any single generation, 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 0, even though it is guaranteed that one allele will immediately fixate. This is an artificial 
situation, but can be made realistic by considering smaller step changes in allele frequency. Now, a 
chance correlated run of one state over several generations will take the population to fixation (see 
Lande, 2007). For a stable equilibrium, then, we also need 𝕍𝜋[Δ?̅?] ≈ 0. If selection is optimising, it is 
optimising in the average (expected) sense – even if the single allele-frequency change that 
corresponds to this average sense is not actually possible in a fluctuating environment.  
1.3.2.a Does it matter if relatedness is not fixed? 
Relatedness (𝑟) is generally interpreted as the degree to which individuals with similar genotypes 
(measured by breeding values) assort in the population (Foster et al., 2006; Bourke, 2011). This is 





 For some authors, there is a potential problem with the standard view of 𝑟 as the regression of partner 
breeding value on focal breeding value (Okasha, 2018a), which is that relatedness can change over the 
course of selection: 
“…the value of r may change as the population evolves. Thus, in a full evolutionary analysis, 
r needs to be treated as a dynamic variable, not a fixed parameter…” (Okasha, 2018b) 
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Okasha argues that, as a result, 𝑟 cannot be part of the organism’s maximand. There are at least three 
different ways to answer this objection: 
1. We do not need to worry about changes in 𝑟, as 𝑟 is not a dynamic variable when the population 
is at equilibrium – and this is where we should invoke individual maximisation; 
2. We should restrict the generality of the claim that organisms maximise a single quantity to those 
populations where assortment between social partners is frequency-independent (and so 𝑟 is a 
constant). This argument suggests that 𝑟 is unlikely to be frequency-dependent in most cases, so 
it is an essentially fixed parameter of the population; 
3. Over the generations, selection may pull in different directions due to frequency-dependence. In 
any one generation, the individual maximand at the level of organisms can be defined as the 
optimum ‘end goal’ desired by selection; it is just that what ‘selection’ considers the optimum end 
goal changes through time. 
Accordingly, dynamic 𝑟 does not necessarily challenge inclusive fitness as a maximand. A separate 
issue is whether it challenges the usefulness of Hamilton’s rule (which I return to in Part 2). 
1.3.2.b The additivity assumption and 𝜹-weak selection 
The ‘additivity problem’ challenges the generality of inclusive fitness theory. In a non-additive (i.e., 
synergistic) scenario, it is unclear which fitness effects to allocate to which individual. Crucially, a true 
inclusive fitness maximand has to be under the control of the actor – but what is this quantity when 
multiple individuals have to interact together to produce a result? This issue is of particular relevance 
to this thesis, because I argue in Chapter 6 that the production of offspring in Polistes canadensis 
colonies is a diminishing (i.e., nonlinear) function of the worker-to-brood ratio: P. canadensis colonies 
suffer from negative synergistic effects. In other words, a group of individuals is not simply the sum of 
its parts. 
Fortunately, the problem can be eliminated by committing to certain assumptions, such as 𝛿-weak 
selection and small-effect mutations, which are widely believed to justify the inclusive fitness maximand 
view ‘regardless of the complexity and strategic nature of the social interaction’ (Lehmann et al., 2015). 
Recently, Birch (2017) has suggested that the commitment to 𝛿-weak selection is not a coincidence for 
inclusive fitness theory, given the extent to which R. A. Fisher influenced W. D. Hamilton. Fisher’s 
geometric view of adaptation argues that adaptive mutations have infinitesimal fitness effects (Fisher, 
1930): selection scrutinises new mutations that differ only slightly (phenotypically) from a resident 
genotype, to the degree 𝛿. Accordingly, an interaction will generate negligible fitness effects that are 
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proportional to 𝛿2: the first-order terms describing the effect of a social interaction are additive 
(Rousset, 2013). This gradualism justifies a maximand view in which the quantity under the agent’s 
control is the additional fitness increment above that produced by the wild-type.  
Criticism of the necessity of assuming weak selection is not new. Hamilton himself dismissed weak 
selection criticisms as biologically irrelevant in 1996: 
“…it made me tense to see my eldest child challenged but usually I became relaxed soon 
again after noticing some misunderstanding or that my critic was studying cases I had 
not claimed to cover and, as biological reality, didn’t believe in. Usually they were the 
cases with strong selection and/or unconditional gene expression.” (Hamilton, 1996) 
Although Allen and Nowak (2016) concede that 𝛿-weak selection eliminates the additivity problem, 
they resist this argument as a general way to rescue the agential perspective, claiming instead that 
small-effect mutations ’are not the general case of evolution’ and ‘single mutations can have dramatic 
phenotypic effects’. Nonetheless, outside the inclusive fitness controversy it is routinely assumed that 
selection is weak (Lande, 1981; Nagylaki, 1993; Akashi, 1995; Wayne and Simonsen, 1998; Lu and Wu, 
2005; Akashi, Osada and Ohta, 2012; but see Endler, 1986). Even if there is a wide gulf between two 
phenotypes, it is often possible to evolve from one to the other via a gentle series of infinitesimal step-
changes. For instance, the evolution of social nesting from solitary nesting can occur via a series of small 
steps, if each step simply increases the probability of social nesting by an infinitesimal degree. Selection 
is powerful over eons, and often weak within generations. This immense gradualism means we are 
rarely in a world where fitness non-additivity invalidates the maximand view. Invoking 𝛿-weak selection 
also eliminates the problem with equilibria under stochasticity (see above): now, 𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 0 does 
represent a stable equilibrium (in the sense that 𝕍𝜋[Δ?̅?] ≈ 0). 
Conceding that we need weak selection is, however, a step back from the ambitions of Formal 
Darwinism to establish a ‘universal’ and axiomatic maximand. Instead, the appeal to 𝛿-weak selection 
justifies a pragmatic approach in which the maximand view is generally though not universally correct. 
There are two issues:  
1. Having to assume 𝛿-weak selection means that the maximand view is (partly) an empirical 
hypothesis: it is possible to find a population in which 𝛿-weak selection is violated and social 
fitness effects are sufficiently synergistic to leave the inclusive fitness maximand undefined.  
2. When population size is sufficiently small – in bottlenecked populations or structured 
populations consisting of miniature demes – genetic drift may dominate the outcome when 
selection is weak. In this case, individual maximisation would be the hypothetical result of the 
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selective component of allele frequency change were it not for displacement of the population 
by random walks. 
A second answer to the additivity problem is to argue that inclusive fitness is simply an imperfect way 
of expressing something that genuinely is universal: genes are the ultimate units of selection, 
possessing true universal maximands, and individuals are only temporary agents of the genes (Dawkins, 
1976; Bourke, 2014b). Under this view, the additivity problem vanishes, a position taken by Lehmann 
et al. (2015).  
To sidestep the additivity problem entirely, a surprising suggestion has recently been proposed by 
Fromhage and Jennions (2018). A persistent misunderstanding of inclusive fitness is that it is the sum 
of the organism’s own reproductive success and its (relatedness-weighted) effect on the reproductive 
success of others. This mistake – which is perpetuated in a number of textbooks – errs by counting 
offspring twice: a single offspring contributes to the inclusive fitness of multiple individuals (Grafen, 
1982). Fromhage and Jennions (2018), however, suggest that this view is actually the more legitimate. 
If inclusive fitness is an accounting device for modellers, Fromhage and Jennions (2018) are clearly 
wrong: we will attribute single offspring to multiple actors. If inclusive fitness is an individual maximand, 
however, Fromhage and Jennions (2018) suggest a simple solution to the additivity problem: if both 
individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗 are required to work together to produce an offspring 𝑥, then the private maximands 
of 𝑖 and 𝑗 can both claim 𝑥. It is currently unclear whether this would lead to a genuine maximand, 
defined as a maximisation problem that we could solve to identify the phenotype that would dominate 
at an uninvadable equilibrium; the problem of double counting may make this seem unlikely. 
1.3.2.c Are organisms single agents at all? 
Individuals may be inclusive-fitness-maximising agents, but where did individuals come from? What 
was being maximised during the evolution of individuality? Do individuals lose their individuality when 
part of cohesive groups? In this thesis, I treat individual wasps in primitively eusocial colonies as 
inclusive fitness maximisers, but – given the potential for selection at a between-group level in social 
groups (Pruitt and Goodnight, 2014; Pruitt et al., 2017) – is this justified? 
Gardner and Grafen (2009) argue that a group-level maximand exists for groups whose members are 
(a) clonal or (b) subject to mechanisms that completely suppress the ability of group members to pursue 
self-interested strategies. If we accept the logic of the Formal Darwinism project, Gardner and Grafen 
(2009) justify this claim using the multilevel Price equation (Gardner and Grafen, 2009; Gardner, 2015c). 



















When there is no variance in genetic value within groups (i.e., groups are clonal: 𝕍𝑖[𝐺𝑖𝑑] = 0) or there 
is no scope for differential fitness within groups (i.e., 𝛽𝑤𝑖𝑑
?̅?
,𝐺𝑖𝑑
= 0), within-group selection is zero 
(Gardner and Grafen, 2009). All that matters now is between-group selection. Individuals 𝑖 are no longer 
fitness maximisers, and groups 𝑑 of individuals 𝑖 have now become individuals 𝑑 in their own right. This 
upwards shift in individuality is often termed an ‘evolutionary transition in individuality’ (ETI; Clarke, 
2016). Gardner and Grafen’s (2009) argument loosely corresponds to the criterion emphasised by 
Boomsma and Gawne (2018) for identifying whether a social insect colony has become a 
‘superorganism’ (an individual organism in its own right): in Boomsma and Gawne (2018), an 
evolutionarily irreversible transition to a developmental separation between a reproductive germline 
(queens and males) and an obligately-nonreproductive ‘soma’ (sterile workers) is necessary for a social 




= 0 within the colony (differences in fitness are eliminated). Accordingly, individual workers 𝑖 
in colonies 𝑑 dissolve as individual organisms: the new organism is the colony 𝑑, captured by the first 
term of Equation 1.6. 
Some authors are reluctant to surrender group-level adaptation when the second term is low but 
nonzero. Cancer, for instance, is often seen as a case of within-group selection (Michod, 1997; 
Goodnight, 2015): does this invalidate the organism (a group 𝑑 of cells 𝑖) as an individual inclusive 
fitness maximiser? Simple eusocial wasps are structured into breeders and non-obligate non-breeders, 
a glimmer of a potential future superorganism: does the possibility of selection occurring at a whole-
colony level invalidate individual wasps (individuals 𝑖 in colony 𝑑) as individual inclusive fitness 
maximisers? The level at which we identify fitness maximisers is just one level in a hierarchy: there may 
also be nonzero selection covariances occurring at lower and higher levels, at least in the sense that 
the multilevel Price equation would partition a proportion of allele frequency change to selection at 
different levels. 
When both between-group and within-group terms are nonzero, it is generally thought that we 
should emphasise individuals 𝑖 rather than groups 𝑑 as inclusive fitness maximisers. Supporting this 
view, Gardner and Grafen (2009) argue that the concept of a ‘superorganism continuum’1 commits a 
semantic mistake, confusing the terms ‘group-level selection’ and ‘group-level adaptation’ (Gardner, 
                                                          
1 In which a spectrum, rather than a sharp threshold, defines ‘superorganismality’ (Reeve and Holldobler, 2007). 
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2015a). Group-level selection occurs whenever the between-group term in the multilevel Price 
equation is positive; group-level adaptation is much stricter and requires that groups are inclusive 
fitness maximisers in their own right. Group-level adaptation only occurs when the between-group 
term in the multilevel Price equation captures the entirety of selection. 
Significantly, some cases of apparently unambiguous within-group selection turn out not to threaten 
the agential perspective on closer inspection. Above, I pointed to cancer as a phenomenon that is often 
interpreted as within-group selection (Goodnight, 2015). If selection pulls in different directions within 
the organism, the organism is no longer an individual whose lower-level units have fitness interests in 
full alignment. Cancer appears to undermine the individuality of the organism, and therefore reduces 
its agential status; the implication is that cancer compromises inclusive fitness maximisation by splitting 
the individual into two agents with contradictory agendas (tumour versus non-tumour). However, 
Gardner resists this conclusion for (nontransmissible) cancer, on the grounds that alleles in cancer cells 
have no chance of being inherited by the long-term future population (they will die with the organism), 
and so a cancer cell’s reproductive value is zero (Gardner, 2015b). 
The general principle here is that classes of lower-level units with reproductive values of zero cannot 
lead to the dissolution of the higher-level unit as an inclusive fitness maximising agent. In a class-
structured population (in which individuals in different classes have different reproductive values), the 
multilevel Price equation can be written by summing over classes 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. Each class is weighted by its 


































Here, relative fitness 
𝑤𝑖
?̅?
 (found by taking the 𝑖th individual’s absolute fitness relative to the whole-
population average absolute fitness ?̅?) has been replaced by class-specific relative fitness: the 𝑖th 
individual’s absolute fitness relative to the population average absolute fitness ?̅?𝑘 for the class 𝑘 to 
which it belongs. For individual 𝑖 in group 𝑑 belonging to class 𝑘, absolute fitness is here denoted 𝑤𝑘,𝑖𝑑, 
and its relative fitness is therefore 
𝑤𝑘,𝑖𝑑
?̅?𝑘
. Although the proliferation of cancer within the body is clearly 
a short-term evolutionary process (Nesse, 2017), 𝑐𝑘 = 0 for a nontransmissible cancer cell. The 
relevant within-group selection term drops from the multilevel Price equation (Gardner, 2015c; Shpak 
and Lu, 2016). This view leads to the surprising conclusion that – at least in an evolutionary sense –
somatic cells undermining the rest of the body do not compromise the integrity of the organism as a 
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unified agent striving to maximise inclusive fitness2. Significantly, a parallel argument was made by 
Hamilton (1964b) at the superorganismal level, where it is tempting to see worker cloning as a form of 
selfish superorganismal cancer, compromising the integrity of the superorganism as a unified agent 
striving to maximise superorganismal fitness: 
“Female-to-female parthenogenesis by workers does occur sporadically in honeybees… In the 
South African race, Apis mellifera capensis Esch., it seems that worker eggs always develop into 
females. But whether this is explicable as a selfish trait is rather doubtful. To be such the laying-
workers would have to try to get their eggs cared for in queen cells.” (Hamilton, 1964b) 
1.3.2.d Do alleles have their own inclusive fitnesses? 
In the previous section, I argued that purely somatic ‘defection’ is not really defection at all, and the 
organism retains its optimisation agenda as an inclusive fitness maximiser (Gardner, 2015c). The same 
is not true when conflict occurs in the germline. Now, the lower-level units (alleles) have positive 
reproductive values, and the organism (or superorganism) can be partially fractured into entities with 
contradictory interests. In general, alleles in the same organism may enjoy aligned fitness interests: 
inheritance is (normally) fair (Leigh, 1977), so every allele has an equal chance of being passed on to 
the organism’s offspring. However, the genome is a temporary collaboration between alleles, and 
opportunities to exploit the collective are taken when they arise – including undermining the normal 
laws of Mendelian segregation to ensure the selfish allele enters a disproportionately large proportion 
of the gametes (Burt and Trivers, 2006; Helanterä, 2006). In short, aspects of the organism’s phenotype 
can be highjacked to serve a minority of the genome (Haig, 2014a, 2014b); where, then, is the coherent 
inclusive fitness maximiser amongst this intragenomic strife?  
One solution is to broaden our concept of inclusive fitness in the context of intragenomic conflict. We 
could picture the ‘inclusive fitness’ of specific alleles whose interests diverge. This view has recently 
been championed by Gardner and Úbeda (2017). At first glance, the Gardner-Úbeda perspective 
appears to be the gene’s-eye-view familiar from The Selfish Gene (i.e., each allele is a self-interested 
agent; Dawkins, 1976). However, Gardner and Úbeda (2017) have in mind a more direct analogy 
between allele behaviour and inclusive fitness maximisation by individual organisms: 
“Whereas Dawkins defines the ‘selfish gene’ as a distributed agent that comprises every copy 
of a particular allele in an evolving lineage, we define the gene as a single, physical scrap of 
nucleic acid… A consequence of our definition is that – just like whole organisms – inclusive-
                                                          
2 Unless, of course, cancer is transmissible or enters the germline, in which case 𝑐𝑘 > 0. 
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fitness-maximising genes may behave altruistically, spitefully and mutually beneficially, rather 
than purely selfishly.” (Gardner and Úbeda, 2017) 
If alleles have their own inclusive fitnesses, does inclusive fitness still exist at the level of the individual 
organism? This is a live question. After Haig (2014b) suggested that intragenomic conflict should be 
incorporated into organismal fitness maximisation arguments, Grafen (2014a) acknowledged that 
assuming unity of purpose within the genome could ‘potentially represent serious problems for the 
formal Darwinism project’ (Grafen, 2014a). It remains to be seen whether a simple maximand argument 
can be made that captures the degree of fitness alignment in the underlying alleles. 
1.4 Part 2: Hamilton’s rule 
Hamilton’s rule (𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶) is the central equation of social evolution (Hamilton, 1964a; Gardner et al., 
2011; Queller, 2011; Smith, 2014): any behaviour is selected if the benefits 𝐵 accruing to a beneficiary, 
multiplied by the relatedness 𝑟 between beneficiary and actor, exceed the cost 𝐶 paid by an actor 
(Bourke, 2014a). It is possible to accept the universality of Hamilton’s rule without accepting the 
universality of inclusive fitness as the organism’s maximand; in essence, this is because fitness effects 
in Hamilton’s rule are defined as regression slopes across the whole population rather than fitness 
changes to specific individuals. In other words, the regression slope fits a least-squares line through the 
scatter of all individuals’ fitnesses (on the y-axis) and the breeding values associated with each relevant 
actor (on the x-axis). The slope of the line therefore represents a population-wide quantity, a measure 
of the association between breeding value and fitness across all individuals, rather than a quantity 
associated with any specific individual. I use Hamilton’s rule extensively in Chapters 3, 4, and 6 of this 
thesis. In this section, therefore, I address the generality of Hamilton’s rule, and discuss recent criticism. 
The following five statements are all part of the textbook interpretation of Hamilton’s rule: 
1. Hamilton’s rule is a falsifiable prediction, which can be – and often is – tested empirically. 
2. Sufficiently increasing 𝑟, decreasing 𝐶, or increasing 𝐵 increases the scope for cooperation. 
3. 𝐵 and 𝐶 capture the causal influences of the actor on its partner and itself. 
4. 𝑟 denotes the degree of genealogical kinship (common sense ‘relatedness’) between social 
partners. 
5. 𝐵 and 𝐶 are simple effects (or average effects) on the partners’ numbers of offspring. 
Strictly, however, none of these statements are entirely correct, although they may be reasonable 
approximations. Taking each claim in turn: 
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1. In its general form, Hamilton’s rule is not falsifiable: it is a mathematical necessity (like 1 + 1 = 2) 
and is therefore true a priori for any bout of selection. In this sense, it is not possible to ‘test’ 
empirically whether it is correct (van Veelen et al., 2017). 
2. In principle, increasing 𝑟 or 𝐵 can select against cooperation, and increasing 𝐶 can select in its 
favour. This seeming paradox arises because the specifics of population structure in any given case 
can make 𝑟, 𝐵, and 𝐶 tightly co-dependent. Changes made to one parameter may then be 
necessarily accompanied by counter-acting or over-compensating changes elsewhere in 
Hamilton’s rule (shifting the sign to 𝑟𝐵 < 𝐶), so individual parameters cannot make guaranteed 
predictions in isolation. 
3. 𝐵 and 𝐶 can still be nonzero when the actor has no causal effect on itself or its partner. 
4. Nonzero relatedness 𝑟 can arise in the absence of genealogical kinship. Regression ‘relatedness’ 
𝑟 measures the extent of simple assortment between strategies in interactions. This may or may 
not be caused by common ancestry (Frank, 1998). Hamilton’s rule makes sense – with 𝑟 ≠ 0 – 
even if familial kin never interact. 
5. 𝐵 and 𝐶 are not effects on absolute numbers of offspring. Instead, they are effects on the 
expectation of relative fitness, averaged over all states of the environment that may occur.  
Points 1–3 are used as criticisms of Hamilton’s rule (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson, 2010; Allen, Nowak, 
et al., 2013; Nowak et al., 2017; van Veelen et al., 2017). In this section, I unpack criticisms based on 
these points in turn, and discuss whether they pose genuine problems for social evolution. I explore the 
surprising implications of point 5 in Chapter 3. 
1.4.1.a Criticism 1: Hamilton’s rule is a tautology 
Perhaps the most striking irony about the controversy arises in the debate over the generality of 
Hamilton’s rule. The strongest critics of Hamilton’s rule are the same authors who argue the most 
emphatically that Hamilton’s rule is always true, in all conditions, at all times, for all adaptation. This 
may sound like a paradox, but the point made by these critics is that a theory that explains everything 
explains nothing at all. 
A shift has taken place in the last decade of controversy over Hamilton’s rule. The initial critique by 
Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson (2010) strongly criticised the form of Hamilton’s rule now known as ‘HRA’ 
(‘Hamilton’s rule additive’), a tractable but not assumption-free approach (assumptions of HRA include 
additive interactions and weak selection). Since 2010, most defences of Hamilton’s rule have 
emphasised the superior generality of a different form of the rule, now known as ‘HRG’ (‘Hamilton’s 
rule general’). First introduced by Queller (1992) and championed by Gardner et al. (2011), HRG 
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redefines benefits and costs as regression slopes, rather than simple increments in fitness, and is ‘as 
general as the genetical theory of natural selection itself’ (Abbot et al., 2011). Accordingly, the debate 
has refocused on HRG. In 2010, critics argued that Hamilton’s rule ‘almost never holds’  (Nowak, Tarnita 
and Wilson, 2010). In 2017, the same school of critics wrote that Hamilton’s rule ‘always holds’ and 
‘always indicates the direction of selection correctly’ (van Veelen et al., 2017). There is no contradiction 
here, and both criticisms are consistent: the debate has simply shifted from HRA to HRG. 
HRG fits the linear least-squares multiple regression through the fitness values (Figure 1.1). This does 
not mean that it assumes that the underlying relationship between breeding value and fitness is linear 
(additive) across the population. Rather, HRG is true under all conditions, and the goodness-of-fit scores 
around the 𝐵 and 𝐶 slopes are free to take any values (a regression slope is still a regression slope 
whether the goodness-of-fit 𝑅2 is 1 or 0.001). An additive regression slope can be fitted to the data, 
even if this means generating highly autocorrelated residuals (reflecting a curved underlying 
relationship). Remarkably, this implies that the simple additive slope is sufficient to capture the action 
of selection even when the true exact relationship between genetic value and expected relative fitness 
is some complicated polynomial. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 | r, B, and C in the ‘HRG’ version of Hamilton’s rule are regression slopes fitted to the whole population. 
Each one uses the actor’s genotype as the predictor. 
 
 
Recent challenges to inclusive fitness theory have argued that the Price equation and HRG are 
tautologies, and are therefore uninformative. On one level, this criticism is correct: HRG is, in an 
important sense, ‘uninformative’. It adds no more information than we already have about the system 
(Doebeli et al., 2017). However, this is not necessarily fatal to Hamilton’s rule: 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶 is still useful 
conceptually. By analogy, the number 1,729 and the sentence ‘the smallest number expressible as the 
sum of two cubes in two different ways’ (Hardy, 1940) would be indistinguishable to a computer that 
sees all logical connections instantly. To a human observer, the fact that these two expressions 
converge on the same numerical value is not obvious. Equivalently, a computer would see 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶 as 
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an uninteresting restatement of the fact that Δ?̅? > 0 (average breeding value is increasing under 
selection), yet 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶 repackages this fact in a form that carries intuitive weight for human observers. 
It makes clear the necessary relationships underlying the response to selection. In short, the value of 
Hamilton’s rule is not in adding new information, but in packaging that information intuitively (Birch, 
2016b). Because it provides no new information, there is no falsifiable content in Hamilton’s rule: it is 
true by definition. 
Not all critics of inclusive fitness arguments from the Price equation are troubled by its apparently 
tautological nature. Ewens (2014), for instance, likens the Price equation to an ANOVA as a potential 
means of partitioning variance, and Van Veelen et al. (2017) acknowledge that the tautologous nature 
of HRG does not mean that kin selection itself is questionable. Despite how the controversy is often 
represented as a debate over the importance of kin selection, the main issue is not with kin selection 
as a mechanism but rather with Hamilton’s rule as a description of the process. 
Accepting that HRG is a priori true leads to a strange conclusion. If Hamilton’s rule is true by definition, 
it does not make sense to try to test it empirically (van Veelen et al., 2017), just as we do not try to test 
1 + 1 = 2 by doing experiments. What, then, are behavioural ecologists doing when they set out to ‘test’ 
Hamilton’s rule? The answer is that – with one bacterial exception (Chuang et al., 2010) – field tests 
using Hamilton’s rule do not aim to ‘test’ the unfalsifiable regression version (HRG), but rather to test 
the looser proposition that simple effects on recipient reproductive success, weighted by relatedness, 
are enough to justify observed costs to the actor’s reproductive success (Bourke, 2014a). The ‘true’ 
benefits and costs may be complicated and inaccessible functions of population structure (Gardner et 
al., 2011), but uncovering these is not the aim of the experiment: instead, the question is whether the 
simple fitness increments are enough, in themselves, to justify altruism. If the answer is ‘no’, then we 
know from HRG that more complex benefit and cost terms may provide the solution. Accordingly, 
additional factors can be tested experimentally. 
1.4.1.b Criticism 2: co-dependence of regression parameters 
The second of the points in the list forms the basis for an argument that HRG is predictively impotent 
– and, more seriously, likely to lead to spurious general predictions (van Veelen et al., 2017). Perhaps 
the most fundamental prediction in social evolution is that higher grades of sociality should be 
associated with higher values of 𝑟. This prediction is routinely tested empirically (Green et al., 2016). 
Yet is it justified by Hamilton’s rule? 
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The common-sense answer is that 𝑟, 𝐵, and 𝐶 will be rarely interwoven in such a way that increasing 
𝑟 automatically decreases 𝐵 or increases 𝐶. This is, however, a testable hypothesis that remains to be 
confirmed. Resolving whether co-dependence genuinely leads to an increase in relatedness leading to 
less cooperation in anything other than a negligible subset of population structures remains an 
outstanding question. One fruitful avenue for analysing population structure is provided by ‘games on 
graphs’, which reinterpret social evolution in terms of interactions on networks (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; 
Nowak and Roch, 2007; Allen et al., 2016). Because millions of permutations of population structure 
can be generated computationally and tested (see Allen et al., 2016, for a powerful demonstration), 
games on graphs should offer a tractable framework in which to address the extent to which the co-
dependence of regression parameters does genuinely lead to flawed predictions. 
1.4.1.c Criticism 3: B and C are not necessarily causal effects 
Critics of HRG argue that it obscures causal relations (Okasha and Martens, 2016). Strictly speaking, 
this is also correct. The most forceful argument against Hamilton’s rule as a causal hypothesis is made 
by Allen et al. (2013), who note that there is no requirement that regression slopes describe causal 
effects. To illustrate the point, Allen et al. (2013) propose an example in which individuals with a so-
called ‘hanger-on’ genotype (with breeding value 𝐺𝑖) associate socially with high-fitness partners but 
have no causal effect on the partner’s fitness. In this case, the ‘benefit’ term 𝐵 is artificially positive for 
the interaction because – if we simply survey the population – individuals have a higher fitness 𝑤𝑗 when 
associated with partners possessing the focal breeding value 𝐺𝑖  (i.e., 𝛽𝑤𝑗,𝐺𝑖 > 0). The ‘benefit’ term has 
no causal meaning. 
However, it is worth returning to Price’s original justification for covariance-based logic in evolution: 
“…at any step in constructing hypotheses about evolution through natural selection – for 
example, about… why parrots mimic, why dolphins play – one can… consider whether the slope 
really would be appreciably non-zero under the assumptions of the theory.” (Price, 1970) 
Although rarely expressed this way, the Price equation provides a plausibility meter for adaptive 
hypotheses. Any hypothesised combination of fitness effects, by definition, must conform to the Price 
equation (and its rearrangement, Hamilton’s rule); otherwise, it is logically inconsistent as an argument 
for Δ?̅? > 0. Claims of mistaken causality misconstrue the ‘plausibility meter’ role provided by HRG: as 
in any experimental study, causality must be determined empirically.  
In this sense, the causality criticism is partly a straw-man. Allen et al. (2013) write: 
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“Variants of this hanger-on behaviour may occur in many biological systems. A bird may 
choose to join the nest of a high-fitness pair, with the goal of eventually inheriting the nest. 
Similarly, a social wasp may be more likely to stay at its parents’ nest if the parent has high 
fitness, also with the goal of eventual inheritance. Applying the regression method to these 
situations would lead one to mistake purely self-interested behaviors for cooperation.“ (Allen, 
Nowak, et al., 2013) 
This is correct, but partly beside the point: Hamilton’s rule is not used in this way empirically. In fact, 
the regression method has essentially never been applied, with no empirical context, directly to real-
world empirical systems (a point that forms part of Allen and coauthors’ criticism elsewhere; van Veelen 
et al., 2017). A rare example is Chuang et al. (2010), who face considerable predictive difficulties. A 
behavioural ecologist observing birds joining nests starts by hypothesising fitness effects (does the 
joiner increase the residents’ fitnesses?) and then aims to identify the direction of causation by 
manipulation (if I remove the joiner experimentally, what happens to the residents’ fitnesses?) or 
observation (do I observe the joiner performing behaviours that increase the recipients’ fitnesses?). They 
then ask if the effects they have identified are sufficient to explain an adaptation of interest (does any 
causal effect on the residents’ fitnesses, weighted by relatedness, justify any costs paid by the joiner?). 
The aim empirically is always to describe causation, and social evolution is no different: if you start by 
empirically identifying additive fitness effects caused by a given behaviour, Hamilton’s rule will be a 
fully causal description, and that is – appropriately – how it is used by empiricists.  
A second defence against the causality criticism is to argue that Hamilton’s rule is just a useful device 
for planning an investigation: it conveniently splits selection into three separate components. In effect, 
Hamilton’s rule provides a road-map for how to approach a puzzling behaviour: 
“Hamilton’s rule tells researchers on the ground where to look first. Then they can move 
beyond it and construct a more precise model that includes ecological parameters relevant to 
the particular case.“ (Jonathan Birch, quoted in Cepelewicz, 2018) 
This abstract quality makes Hamilton’s rule appealing to empiricists (broadly, what parameters should 
we be studying?) and occasionally frustrating to mathematicians (specifically, what parameters are 
important?). 
1.5 Conclusion 
As an ‘accounting method’ for modellers (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson, 2010), inclusive fitness theory 
may well be justifiable in principle but unnecessary in practice. As put by Allen et al. (2013), ‘there is no 
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problem in evolutionary biology that requires an analysis based on inclusive fitness’. I agree with this 
claim. Inclusive fitness may be an overcomplicated approach in many cases. It is perhaps better 
employed in these situations as a ‘universal language’ (Gardner et al., 2011) after the results are known, 
allowing us to place seemingly disconnected findings in a common framework (Birch, 2017). 
However, inclusive fitness serves a more profound role in biology (Gardner, 2009): it is the only 
remaining candidate for the quantity pursued by all organisms (Bourke, 2011). In this sense, it seeks to 
answer an empirical question that is considered irrelevant by some biologists and fundamental by 
others. Similarly, the disagreement between different camps over Hamilton’s rule (Part 2 above) is 
largely due to different aims. Critics want to know how specific traits evolve (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson, 
2010); supporters also want to know, at a fundamental and abstract level, how the action of selection 
works (Gardner, 2010; West and Gardner, 2013; Taylor and Maciejewski, 2014). Nonetheless, for most 
biologists, it is critically important to understand the generality of any proposed universal principle of 
organismal design. In a practical sense, formalising the intentional stance is vital empirically: without a 
fitness concept, it is impossible to know what to measure. 
There are, at present, a series of open questions in inclusive fitness theory. Answering each will be 
crucial to establishing the roles of maximand arguments and Hamilton’s rule in the future of social 
evolution. These include the following general questions: 
1. What is the effect of population structure on cooperation (Nowak, Tarnita and Antal, 2010), and 
can different categories of population structure be captured simply within Hamilton’s rule? 
2. Is there a general solution to the non-additivity problem that holds even in the absence of weak 
selection? 
3. What are the conditions under which a group-level analogue of inclusive fitness can evolve? 
4. What happens to inclusive fitness theory in stochastic populations? As observed by Nowak, 
Tarnita, and Wilson (2010), ‘the stochastic element of evolution, which leads to a distribution of 
possible outcomes rather than a single optimum, is not a part of inclusive fitness theory.’ 
I take up the last of these questions theoretically in this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4): what happens to 
Hamilton’s rule – and altruistic behaviour – in populations subject to environmental and demographic 
fluctuations? In Chapters 5–7, I explore ‘drifting’ behaviour empirically in Neotropical Polistes paper 
wasps, which poses an outstanding paradox to inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et al., 











 Drifting and eusociality 
2.1 Chapter Summary 
Social insect colonies are often seen as ‘fortresses’ – impenetrable, self-contained, and 
mutually aggressive. However, recent studies have revealed surprisingly high levels of 
‘drifting’ behaviour, in which individuals move – temporarily or permanently – to foreign 
colonies. In Chapters 5–7, I explore drifting in Neotropical Polistes paper wasps. In this 
chapter, I introduce drifting in general, and define five general categories of adaptive 
drifting: parasitic ‘egg-dumping’, kleptoparasitism, social cancer, nest inheritance, and 
indirect fitness. Because drifting can offer an alternative route to maximising inclusive 
fitness, I argue that a focus on drifting may be valuable in understanding the origins and 
evolution of eusociality. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2.2 What is drifting? 
Six years before The Origin of Species, Reverend Lorenzo Langstroth of Massachusetts complained 
that ‘arrant rogues’ amongst his honeybees were stealing honey from other colonies (Langstroth, 
1853). ‘Some branches of morals in my little friends,’ he wrote, ‘need very close watching.’ Recently, 
‘very close watching’ has revealed 56% of paper wasp workers (Polistes canadensis; Sumner et al., 2007) 
and 59% of nest-leaving bumblebees (Bombus terrestris; Blacher et al., 2013) visiting foreign colonies, 
a behaviour known as ‘drifting’. In this thesis, I define drifting broadly as movement of individuals (or a 
subset of the colony) to foreign conspecific colonies for reasons other than mating. Drifters can be 
further categorised as either temporary drifters (Sumner et al., 2007) or permanent drifters (e.g., a 
fraction of bees in Blacher et al., 2013). In this chapter, I introduce the known extent of drifting 
behaviour in the social insects (Table 2.1). 
Seemingly accidental drifting has long been known in managed honeybee apiaries (Apis mellifera; 
Free, 1956, 1958), where up to 42% of nest-members may be non-natal drifters (Pfeiffer and Crailsheim, 
1998). However, there is increasing evidence that drifting can serve an adaptive function for drifters 
(Lopez-Vaamonde et al., 2004; Birmingham et al., 2004; Härtel et al., 2006; Sumner et al., 2007; Blacher 
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et al., 2013). Here, I categorise adaptive drifting into five general categories: (1) ‘egg-dumping’, (2) nest-
inheritance, (3) kleptoparasitism, (4) social cancer, and (5) indirect fitness. In principle, drifters may be 
motivated by more than one factor. I define and describe each in turn, with illustrative examples: 
1. Egg dumping 
Egg-dumping drifters attempt to parasitise foreign colonies by laying eggs (e.g., Birmingham et al., 
2004). Egg-dumping rates vary widely across species and studies, for which there is currently little 
explanation. The best-studied cases occur in bumblebees (Bombus spp.), where colonies can face 
approximately fifteen infiltration attempts per week from presumed egg-dumpers, of which fewer than 
one may succeed (Zanette et al., 2014). In one study of B. terrestris, 58.9% of nest-leaving bumblebees 
drifted, of which 32.5% were observed egg-dumping (Blacher et al., 2013). In B. deuteronymus, drifters 
produced 19% of male offspring (Takahashi et al., 2010). However, in a separate population, O’Connor 
et al. (2013) concluded that egg-laying by drifting workers occurs at a low level in wild B. terrestris 
(detecting only six drifters in 14 colonies), finding some evidence of egg-dumping by foreign queens. 
Remarkably, in contrast to Bombus, there is only a single claimed case of egg-dumping in ants, inferred 
from allozymes in a British population of Leptothorax albipennis (Pearson, Raybould and Clarke, 1997; 
see Armitage et al., 2010 for a second potential case, in Atta sextans). Similarly, despite apparently 
optimal conditions for egg dumping (high density nesting and minimal non-nestmate aggression), the 
stingless bee Tetragonilla collina shows surprisingly low levels of drifting (Leonhardt et al., 2011). 
Queenright superorganismal3 colonies are generally protected from egg-dumping drifters as a by-
product of the policing of worker-laid nestmate eggs (Beekman and Oldroyd, 2008). Worker policing 
may remove the need for a specialist ‘first line’ of colony defence targeting foreign drifters (Nanork et 
al., 2007; but see Couvillon et al., 2008). Indeed, when colonies of the Asian honeybee Apis florea were 
made queenless experimentally, the percentage of foreigners in the workforce rose from 2% to 4.5%, 
                                                          
3 As in Chapter 1, I follow Boomsma and Gawne (2018) in defining a ‘superorganism’ as a social group 
with irreversibly-committed adult reproductive castes (a ‘germline’ and a ‘soma’), which represent a 
qualitatively distinct form of social organisation to non-superorganismal species, in which adults retain 
caste flexibility. (Note, however, that even in most superorganismal Hymenoptera taxa, workers are 
able to lay unfertilised eggs, which develop as males.) Superorganismal species include the vespine 
wasps, Macrotermes termites, stingless bees, bumblebees, and the vast majority of ants. A small 
minority of ants (such as Dinoponera quadriceps) have secondarily reverted to castelessness, but can 
be considered derived superorganisms. Non-superorganismal social insects lack irreversible caste 
differentiation, and include the ‘simple’ social wasps (e.g., Polistes, Liostenogaster, Ropalidia, 




and foreigners produced 22.5% of pupae (Nanork et al., 2005). Significantly, the predominant sources 
of A. florea egg-dumping drifters are other queenless colonies (Chapman et al., 2009): queenlessness 
lowers the opportunity cost to a drifter (in lost indirect fitness) from abandoning investment in the 
home nest, whilst egg-dumping in unrelated nests averts local resource competition with related 
nestmates on the queenless natal nest (Chapman et al., 2009). Amongst advanced eusocial wasps, egg-
dumping has been experimentally shown in Vespula vulgaris (Oliveira et al., 2016), where, again, it is 
likely to be restricted to queenless nests in which normal mechanisms of worker policing break down. 
Simple physical constraints may explain much of this interspecific variation. It is presumably easier to 
deposit an egg in a small and accessible simple social wasp colony, with no covering envelope, than it 
is to dump an egg in a large Atta colony with a narrow, closely-guarded entrance. Indeed, A. florea 
shows higher levels of drifting than Apis cerana and A. mellifera, and various authors have explained 
the difference by noting that A. florea has unusually accessible combs that can be less effectively 
guarded (Nanork et al., 2005; Oliveira et al., 2016). There may also broad biogeographical gradients. 
Hypothetically, egg-dumping drifting may fall with latitude: Packer (1986) proposed that egg-dumping 
drifters in Halictus ligatus are more likely to find colonies in the right developmental stage in the 
aseasonal tropics, where multivoltinism is common. 
2. Nest inheritance 
Nest-inheritance drifters attempt to inherit or usurp the queen position (e.g., Klahn, 1988). Drifting 
for nest inheritance is well known amongst foundress and pre-emergence colonies in the non-
superorganismal wasps, where drifters are generally known as ‘joiners’. In Ropalidia marginata, for 
instance, 32.1% (217/676) of wasps joined from foreign nests (Shakarad and Gadagkar, 1995). Post-
emergence queen supersedures also offer opportunities for nest-inheriting drifters: in an RFID study of 
an apiary population of the stingless bee Melipona scutellaris, (Van Oystaeyen et al., 2013), 37.5% (3/8) 
of queen successors were drifter queens. Nest inheritance by drifters is also suspected in post-
emergence colonies in B. hypnorum: Paxton et al. (2001) detected between 5% and 28% of workers as 
possessing ‘alien’ genotypes, and favour an interpretation in which these workers are the offspring of 
a previous (usurped) queen (egg-dumping was considered unlikely, as the ‘alien’ workers did not show 
genotypes typical of neighbour colonies in the laboratory set-up). 
Nest-inheritance drifting has been studied extensively in Polistes wasps. High rates of foundress 
drifting are associated with high brood mortality in P. versicolor and P. ferreri (Tannure and Nascimento, 
1999). In P. fuscatus, Klahn (1988) found that 19.6% of lone foundresses were displaced by drifters 
(dropping to 2.2% in foundress associations. In principle, subordinates may work for non-natal nests in 
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order to join a queue for hopeful nest inheritance (a ‘pay-to-stay’ mechanism; Field and Cant, 2007). 
Recently, direct manipulations in P. dominula have revealed that pre-emergence nests exist in a 
‘market’, where the price of help is determined by supply-and-demand (Grinsted and Field, 2017). In 
this case, when dominants are forced into higher competition to recruit subordinates by experimentally 
providing subordinates with outside options, subordinates invest less in helping effort. The 
interpretation is that subordinates are indeed ‘paying to stay’, and need pay less when subordinates 
are more in demand at a whole population scale (Grinsted and Field, 2017). 
3. Kleptoparasitism 
Kleptoparasitic drifters steal resources from conspecific colonies for their home colony (Couvillon et 
al., 2008), such as food thieving by the Japanese harvester ant (Messor aciculatus; Yamaguchi, 1995). 
In honeybees, the threat from kleptoparasitic drifters (‘robber bees’) can be sufficiently extreme that 
colonies can collapse from the depletion of honey (Langstroth, 1853; Free, 1954; Couvillon et al., 2008). 
This has led to sophisticated strategies by colony guards, optimising their number and acceptance 
thresholds in real time to deal with fluctuations in the threat from drifters (Couvillon et al., 2008). More 
strikingly, the Neotropical ‘thief ant’ Ectatomma ruidum possesses a kleptoparasitic worker caste, 
which specialises in drifting to conspecific nests to steal food items (Jandt et al., 2015; McGlynn et al., 
2015). 
Kleptoparasitic drifters can steal more than food. In Parishnogaster mellyi, ‘marauding’ drifters 
attempt to take nest material (Hansell, 1982). In the ‘slave-making’ ants, pupae are abducted from 
foreign colonies and reared as ‘slave’ workers (D’Ettorre and Heinze, 2001); under the broad definition, 
I consider this raiding to be a form of temporary ‘drifting’. Although victims of interspecific slave-making 
are now known to ‘rebel’ by killing host pupae (Achenbach and Foitzik, 2009), there is currently no 
evidence for slave rebellion against conspecific drifters. Remarkably, however, drifting itself can provide 
an opportunity for the remaining members of the victim colony to respond. In fire ant (Solenopsis 
invicta) colonies that have lost a bout of mutual brood abduction, mass drifting of workers from the 
victim to the abductor colony can ensue. Following this exodus, if the victim queen succeeds in 
burrowing into the abductor nest she appears to have a one-fifth chance of wresting control of the 
colony, aided by her drifted workers (Tschinkel, 2006) – a strategy of turning kleptoparasitism 
victimhood into successful nest inheritance. 
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4. Social cancer 
The most extreme form of exploitative drifting – ‘social cancer’ (Dobata et al., 2011) – is found in 
superorganismal species. Normally, intraspecific parasitism is a secondary avenue to direct fitness. 
However, in the South African fynbos honeybee subspecies A. m. capensis, ‘workers’ drift to colonies 
of the related subspecies A. m. scutellata and parthenogenetically produce clonal diploid offspring (by 
fusing maternal pronuclei; Cole-Clark et al., 2017). The proliferation of parasitic A. m. capensis in South 
Africa is a recent phenomenon following the anthropogenic introduction of A. m. capensis outside the 
Cape. The result has been an epidemic of colony death amongst managed colonies in northern South 
Africa (Beekman and Oldroyd, 2008). A. m. capensis clones show remarkable adaptive behaviour to 
maximise virulence, including dominating A. m. scutellata by producing queen-like pheromones 
(Okosum et al., 2017).  
Parasitic A. m. capensis drifters also target nests of their own subspecies (Härtel et al., 2006): Jordan 
et al. (2008) found that 38% of new queens in A. m. capensis were the clonal progeny of these 
subspecific parasites. It has been suggested that each A. m. capensis colony may specialise in either 
worker policing or drifting, but not both, giving rise to frequency-dependence that maintains a stable 
polymorphism (Sumner and Keller, 2008). A colony with high levels of policing of worker-laid eggs would 
successfully eliminate these foreign infiltrators but also pay the opportunity cost of not being able to 
emit clonal drifters itself (Sumner and Keller, 2008); conversely, colonies with low levels of worker 
policing gain the chance to parasitise foreign colonies, but are at higher risk of subversion. 
As a superorganismal analogue of transmissible cancer (Wenseleers and Van Oystaeyen, 2011), the 
between-colony metastasis of A. m. capensis drifters allows them to evade the evolutionary dead-end 
that meets non-transmissible cancer lineages, permitting the evolution of a lethal parasitism strategy 
(akin to a parasitoid life history) that does not require the preservation of the host. Similar drifting 
‘social cancers’ are known in two ants, Pristomyrmex punctatus and Platythyrea punctata (Wenseleers 
and Van Oystaeyen, 2011). Transmissible cancer is sometimes characterised as a form of instantaneous 
speciation (Ujvari et al., 2016); the same argument has been advanced for drifting social cancers 
(Neumann and Moritz, 2002). It is unclear why transmissible social cancers have never been found in 
non-superorganismal social insects (such as the simple eusocial wasps), especially as the wide 
taxonomic appearance of female parthenogenesis in solitary and social wasps (Rabeling and Kronauer, 




5. Indirect fitness 
Indirect fitness drifters provide helping effort to non-natal colonies in order to maximise their indirect 
fitness (Sumner et al., 2007): for this category of drifter, a higher indirect fitness is achieved by drifting 
than by not drifting. It is important to note that observing drifters cooperating with foreign nests does 
not necessarily imply an indirect fitness motive. Nest-inheritance drifters, for instance, might provide 
helping effort to non-natal colonies as part of a nest inheritance strategy, either by ‘paying to stay’ 
(Grinsted and Field, 2017) or by increasing the group’s productivity in order to increase the size of any 
future nest inheritance payoff (‘group augmentation’; Kokko et al., 2001). Likewise, numerous authors 
have interpreted apparent helping effort on non-natal colonies as accidental (and often associated with 
navigational errors in managed apiaries; Free, 1956; Free and Spencer-Booth, 1958; Smith and Loope, 
2016). In principle, however, drifting could maximise indirect fitness if help can be directed to relatives 
in high need of assistance (Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013) or if drifting 
promotes reciprocal help from non-relatives for the drifter’s closely-related natal colony (a scenario 
recently proposed by Nonacs, 2017). In Chapter 6, I explore these hypotheses for cooperative drifting 
in detail.  
Surprisingly, the literature abounds with examples of foreign-colony helping behaviour, whether 
interpreted by authors to be accidental or not (e.g., Lasioglossum duplex: Sakagami and Hayashida, 
1968; Vespula atropilosa and V. pensylvanica: Akre et al., 1976; Lasioglossum versatum: Michener, 
1966; Polistes jadwigae: Tsuchida and Itô, 1987; Polistes canadensis: Sumner et al., 2007). A study of 
twenty bumblebee colonies in a managed apiary (using RFID tags) revealed that 52% of workers spent 
the majority of their foraging effort working for foreign colonies (Gill et al., 2012), apparently due to 
navigational errors in a small environment. At present, whether drifters observed cooperating in natural 
colonies are doing so by adaptation or by accident is an open question. This is illustrated well by the 
‘supercolonial’ ants (Helanterä et al., 2009; Moffett, 2012; Ellis et al., 2016; Nonacs, 2017) – species in 
which the normal aggression between superorganismal colonies has been completely replaced by 
peaceful and seemingly cooperative traffic of drifting workers and resources. Relatedness within ant 
supercolonies is typically extremely low (Helanterä et al., 2009). Anthropogenic and ecological 
accidents have been proposed to explain high rates of apparently irrational cooperation: ant 
supercolonies may be products of extreme population bottlenecks purging recognition loci, eliminating 
the potential for nepotism, and leading to indiscriminate cooperation with non-relatives on neighbour 
colonies (Tsutsui et al., 2000; but see Giraud et al., 2002). This hypothesis might explain both natural 
and human-mediated invasive supercolonies (Helanterä et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the ultimate 
explanation for ant supercoloniality remains unclear. 
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The current ambiguity over whether cooperative drifting is driven by indirect fitness or accident is 
associated with scepticism that conferring help on neighbour colonies can be evolutionarily stable in 
the long term. Unless some degree of cryptic assortment with relatives can occur within ant 
supercolonies (e.g., Holzer et al., 2009), worker phenotypes will no longer be visible to selection and 
should gradually degrade, potentially leading supercolonies to collapse over evolutionary time 
(Helanterä et al., 2009) and revert to classic aggression towards non-nestmates (‘multicoloniality’). In 
summary, the existence of cooperative drifters poses an outstanding paradox to inclusive fitness theory 
(Giraud et al., 2002), especially in non-superorganismal wasps (Sumner et al., 2007; see below) and 
superorganismal ants (Lester and Gruber, 2012): it is not clear whether drifters cooperating with foreign 
colonies do so by accident or adaptation, and – if the latter – it is not clear what the adaptive purpose 
might be (Lengronne, 2013). 
2.3 Worker drifting in Polistes: an unsolved problem 
Alongside the supercolonial ants, Polistes wasps (non-superorganismal paper wasps) are current 
candidates for indirect fitness drifting (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013; Nonacs, 2017), and are 
the focus of Chapters 5–7 in this thesis. Seemingly non-reproductive workers cooperating with close 
neighbour colonies have been repeatedly documented in Polistes, beginning with P. gallicus in Europe 
by Deleurance (1952) and P. canadensis and P. versicolor in Brazil by Hamilton (1964b). Observing 
drifting in Neotropical Polistes, Hamilton (1964b) remarked that the ‘transference of workers’ between 
conspecific nests was an ‘anomaly’ to inclusive fitness theory (which he introduced in the same paper): 
workers appear to divert help to less-related recipients. Later, Kasuya (1981) detected apparently 
cooperative drifting in post-emergence P. chinensis in Japan: drifters acted ‘as if they were genuine 
workers born in these nests’. Tsuchida and Itô (1987) detected 52.2% (12/23) of marked wasps drifting 
between a pair of post-emergence nests in P. jadwigae, also in Japan. Page et al. (1989) documented 
‘polydomous’ (multiple nest) colonies of P. fuscatus, spread between up to nine nests, which may be 
intermingled with nests of other colonies. Newly-eclosed adults disperse across these polydomous 
networks, and a proportion provide resources to multiple nests. Pickering (1980) detected over 10% of 
individuals drifting in a large sample of 10,000 paint-marked P. canadensis workers over a three-year 
study in Panama.  
The remarkable extent of worker drifting at a whole-population scale that can occur in Polistes has, 
however, only recently become clear. Using radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagging, Sumner et al. 
(2007) found 56.1% (88/157 detected wasps) of P. canadensis workers trafficking between colonies in 
an aggregation of 33 nests, also in Panama; in a similar study, Lengronne (2013) found 30.8% of 
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Panamanian P. canadensis drifting (255/831 detected wasps across eight aggregations). Explaining 
these large amounts of nonreproductive drifting in Polistes by inclusive fitness theory has proven 
difficult: nonreproductive drifters in P. canadensis, for instance, pay an approximately two-fold cost in 
relatedness to the recipients of their altruism (from r = 0.52 on natal nests to r = 0.23 on foreign nests; 
Sumner et al., 2007).  
These apparently paradoxical cases of high levels of nest drifting between post-emergence colonies 
(which I explore in Chapters 5–7) are potentially more difficult to explain than the existence of satellite 
foundress nests (created late in the season in the temperate zone) assisted by drifters emitted from a 
strong post-emergence main nest (e.g., P. exclamans in Texas; Strassmann, 1981). Here, small 
foundress colonies with immediate brood-rearing needs can be given an instant boost in productivity 
by diverting sister workers from their large, saturated, post-emergence parent nests. This hypothesis is 
reviewed favourably by Page et al. (1989). Strassmann (1981) points to the fact that satellite formation 
also successfully partitions related brood into separate nests, so that loss of any single nest to natural 
enemies does not destroy the family group’s entire productivity4. After predation of the main nest, the 
workforce can simply switch to the small satellites, where indirect fitness opportunities are still 
available. Satellites may provide back-up opportunities – with at least some positive return to inclusive 
fitness for workers – in the case of catastrophe elsewhere. Indirect fitness may also be relevant for 
drifting by foundresses: Seppä et al. (2012) document a high degree of movement by foundresses in P. 
carolina in Texas, switching to helping sisters on other foundress nests, potentially doing so when the 
indirect fitness returns elsewhere exceed the likely direct fitness returns on the home nest. 
2.4 Are drifters specialists or opportunists? 
A key unanswered question (Amsalem et al., 2015) is the extent to which drifters are specialists (as 
opposed to accidental drifters who may then opportunistically attempt to capitalise on entering a 
foreign colony). In Western honeybees (A. mellifera), individuals that accidentally drift do not activate 
their ovaries (Smith and Loope, 2016). By contrast, A. m. capensis ‘social cancer’ eggs successfully 
escape cannibalism (Martin et al., 2002), potentially by adopting chemical camouflage to resemble the 
eggs of the A. m. scutellata queen. Likewise, some lines of evidence suggest that bumblebee drifters 
may be specialists: the successful evasion of egg cannibalism in foreign colonies suggest that drifter 
bumblebees may be capable of egg-camouflaging (Amsalem et al., 2015). Bumblebee drifters not only 
appear to target colonies with large pollen reserves and a stronger workforce to be parasitized but also 
                                                          
4 A similar motivation is given for the existence of multiple combs within the same colony in the Amazonian 
range of P. canadensis by Jeanne (1979). 
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preferentially invade during colony phases when the risk of losing eggs to worker policing is low 
(Birmingham et al., 2004). However, these results may also be explained as passive effects of 
changeable acceptance thresholds: colonies receiving a strong influx of returning nestmate foragers 
(and hence having larger pollen reserves) may reduce their rates of per-individual inspection. 
Nonetheless, in principle, specialist drifting allows parasitic effort to be carefully targeted to colonies 
likely to yield the highest return (similar to nest ‘prospecting’ by avian brood parasites; Pöysä, 2006).  
2.5 Should colonies ever accept drifters? 
It is easier to understand why colony members should accept non-reproductive, cooperative drifters 
(Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013). In bumblebees, for instance, sterile non-nestmates are 
admitted by guard bees, despite seemingly being identified as foreign (Blacher, Boreggio, et al., 2013). 
However, should colonies ever accept drifters who are motivated by direct fitness? 
In some cases, colony members may deliberately accept unrelated drifters whose ultimate motivation 
may be maximising their own direct fitness (although different colony members may have different 
preferences; see Cronin and Field, 2007). First, even if non-nestmates are undesirable, the optimum 
amount of effort to invest in excluding non-nestmates depends on the costs of exploitation (Reeve, 
1989): in A. mellifera, queenright colonies willingly accept all foreign arrivals when the cost of tolerance 
is reduced sufficiently (due to improved colony state; Downs and Ratnieks, 2000). Second, even hopeful 
nest-inheritors may be valuable for their helping effort. Vulnerable pre-emergence colonies and small 
post-emergence colonies may require additional help (Pfennig, 1990; Grinsted and Field, 2017), and 
the partial risk of usurpation by the additional helpers may be an acceptable price. Indeed, in 
Mischocyttarus mexicanus (a non-superorganismal wasp), pre-emergence colonies become 
increasingly likely to reject non-nestmates as the colony ages, presumably because the resident 
foundress has less need of drifters as her own pupae approach eclosion as workers (Mora-Kepfer, 
2013). Intriguingly, Arathi et al. (1997) argue that young non-nestmates are preferentially recruited by 
Ropalidia marginata (a non-superorganismal wasp) over older non-nestmates because it is more 
profitable to accept young, behaviourally-multipotent workers. Nonetheless, Arathi et al.’s (1997) 
results might also be explained by young workers lacking clear markers of colony identity. 
Strikingly, orphaned workers on mature post-emergence colonies may permit nest inheritance by 
foreign drifters in order to obtain a temporary emergency queen: experimental removal of queens in 
one colony of Protopolybia exigua and one colony of Metapolybia docilis (non-superorganismal 
epiponines) resulted in a shift from xenophobic aggression to a willingness to accept foreign queens 
(Chavarria-Pizarro et al., 2018). Among the epiponines, surplus queens are regularly evicted by 
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nestmate workers, and may subsequently drift. Accepting an unrelated drifter queen may provide an 
interim solution for workers until a previously-rejected nestmate queen (who has not been evicted) can 
re-take the queenship and restore high relatedness (Chavarria-Pizarro et al., 2018).  
There are paradoxical cases in which colonies appear to acquiesce to parasitism. In the social clonal 
aphid Pemphigus obesinymphae, for instance, clones make little attempt to resist infiltration by a 
specialist ‘intruder’ caste of drifters (Foster, 2002; Abbot and Chhatre, 2007), who appear to exploit the 
host resources. One possibility is that the cost of parasitic drifters is low at the tail end of the season 
(Foster, 2002), such that there is little selective pressure to resist depredations – a eusocial version of 
‘selection shadow’ hypotheses for the evolutionary accumulation of senescent traits after reproductive 
maturity. Available evidence, however, suggests that drifters appear before this eusocial menopause 
(Grogan et al., 2010). An alternative possibility is that resistance is simply too costly. The act of 
challenging foreign parasites may be prohibitively expensive for the host colony. If true, it may be in a 
drifter’s interests to escalate the cost of challenges beyond what is tolerable for hosts by raising the 
threat of aggressive contests. The potential payoff from a single success for the drifter’s genotype is 
sufficiently large that high rates of failure generated by aggressive confrontation may be tolerable. Such 
‘brinksmanship’ behaviour – deliberately raising the risk of mutual harm (Schelling, 1980) – requires a 
credible signal of commitment to carry out a hypothetical threat. Intriguingly, bumblebee drifters show 
high levels of aggression in host colonies (Lopez-Vaamonde et al., 2004), which is difficult to explain if 
drifter parasites are secretive egg-layers. Alternatively, elevated aggression may allow parasitic drifters 
to achieve integration by ‘bluffing’ their dominance status in simple eusocial colonies. 
Last, experiments in Pterotermes occidentis (a non-superorganismal drywood termite) show that, 
surprisingly, lone non-nestmates are not rejected but instead enjoy high levels of grooming by host 
termites (Cooney et al., 2016). Cooney et al. (2016) interpret these results as either a mechanism for 
hosts to ensure uniformity of cuticular hydrocarbons (to permit the successful integration of drifters to 
the colony) or a means of removing incoming pathogens.  
2.6 Outstanding questions 
In this chapter, I have briefly surveyed the known extent of drifting in the social insects. Drifting may 
be both surprisingly widespread and associated with diverse and sophisticated adaptations. One-
hundred-and-sixty-five years after Reverend Langstroth first detected an ‘unmistakable air of roguery’ 
(Langstroth, 1853, p. 307) associated with social insect drifters, a renewed focus on these surprising 
colony members may be valuable for understanding the origin and elaboration of eusocial traits. 
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In Chapters 5–7, I focus on the unsolved problem of drifting in Polistes, following the demonstration 
that extreme levels of apparently cooperative drifting can occur in the Neotropical species Polistes 
canadensis (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013). I focus on three key questions: 
1. Is drifting part of a specialist set of behaviours? 
2. Can inclusive fitness explain drifting? 
3. Can colonies reliably identify drifters? 
In Chapter 5, I use RFID-tagging and queen removal in P. canadensis in French Guiana, in order to test 
whether drifters and non-drifters differ behaviourally. In Chapter 6, I collect longitudinal data on brood 
development in P. canadensis in Panama, in order to quantify the extent of diminishing returns for 
workers (Michener, 1964): can diverting cooperation to a less related neighbour increase indirect 
fitness? Last, in Chapter 7, I use RFID-tagging to ask whether (and to what extent) drifting exists in the 
relatively little-studied paper wasp P. satan in Brazil, and use a combination of recognition and 
















Table 2.1 | Accounts of drifting 




Bombus terrestris Zanette et al. (2014) Natural 3% of workers in 8 colonies  Microsatellites 
 O’Connor et al. (2013) Natural 4 of 14 colonies contained 6 
drifters 
Microsatellites 
 Blacher, Yagound, et al. (2013) Managed 58.9% of 373 nest-leaving bees 




  Lopez-Vaamonde et al. (2004) Natural 100% (32/32) of colonies 
emitted and received drifters. 
Drifters produced 28.1% 




 Bombus occidentalis Birmingham and Winston (2004) Managed 0.3–34.8% of bees drifted (12 
colonies) 
Colour-tags 
 Bombus impatiens 
 
Birmingham and Winston (2004) Managed 0.1–12.2% (32 colonies) Colour-tags 
 Bombus deuteronymus Takahashi et al. (2010) Natural 27% (3/11) of colonies 
contained foreign drifters, 
producing 19% of males 
Microsatellites 
 Lasioglossum calceatum 
 
Davison and Field (2018) Field 
transplant 
At least one successful drifter-
produced female 
Microsatellites 
 Lasioglossum malachurum 
 
Paxton et al. (2002) Natural Foreign pupae in 2/18 nests Microsatellites 
 Halictus scabiosae Brand and Chapuisat (2016) Natural 46% (12/26) of foundresses 
produced offspring in multiple 
nests 
Microsatellites 
 Liostenogaster flavolineate 
 
Cronin and Field (2007) Natural 87% of hour-long observations 
contained 1 or more drifter  
Paint-marked 
 Vespula vulgaris Oliveira et al. (2016) Managed 1.13% (109/9,659) of wasps 
drifted to queenright colonies; 





Social cancer Pristomyrmex punctatus 
 
Dobata et al. (2011) Natural Transmissible social cancer has 
persisted for 200 to 9200 
generations 
Microsatellites 
 Apis mellifera capensis Härtel et al. (2006) Managed 6.41% of worker-laid offspring 




Kleptoparasitism Pemphigus obesinymphae 
(gall aphid) 
 
Abbot et al. (2001) Natural 50% of 72 galls were intruded 
(5 days of observation) 
Paint-marking 




 Xylocopa pubescens Hogendoorn and Velthuis (1993) Natural Pollen theft; percentage 
unrecorded 
X-ray radioscopy 
 Polistes chinensis Kasuya et al. (1980) Natural Foundresses cannibalise 
foreign larvae 
Paint-marked 
 Polistes jadwigae Kasuya et al. (1980) Natural Foundresses cannibalise 
foreign larvae 
Paint-marked 
 Mischocyttarus mexicanus Clouse (1995) Natural Visual account of foundress 
cannibalising foreign larva 
Non-marked 
      
Nest-inheritance Liostenogaster flavolineata Strassmann et al. (1994) Natural 26% (10/39) females drifted Paint-marked 
      
 Mischocyttarus mexicanus Clouse (1995) Natural 6/51 foundress nests usurped Paint-marked 
      
 Polistes fuscatus Klahn (1988) Natural 19.6% of long foundresses 
displaced by drifters 
Paint-marked 
 Polistes carolina Seppä et al. (2012) Natural 87.5% (91/125) ‘behavioural 
choices’ by 104 foundresses 
involved moving to or visiting a 




 Halictus scabiosae Ulrich et al. (2009) Natural 16% of 112 nests contained 
likely drifters 
Microsatellites 
 Melipona scutellaris Van Oystaeyen et al. (2013)   Managed 37.5% (3/8) of queen 
successors were drifter queens 
RFID 
 Bombus hypnorum Paxton et al. (2001) Natural 5–28% of workers in 6/11 
colonies were not offspring of 
the current queen, interpreted 






Polistes canadensis Pickering (1980) Natural 10% of approximately 10,000 
wasps drifted 
Paint-marking 
  Sumner et al. (2007) Natural 56% (88/157) of radio-
detected wasps drifted 
RFID 
  Lengronne (2013) 
 
Natural 30.8% (255/831) drifted RFID 
 Polistes jadwigae Tsuchida and Ito (1987) Natural 52.2% (12/23) of workers from 
two focal nests drifted 
Paint-marking 
 Polistes chinensis 
 
Kasuya (1980) Natural 10 observed drifters Paint-marking 
 Linepithema humile Giraud et al. (2002) Natural No aggression across the 
Mediterranean  
Aggression assays 
 Formica yessensis Higashi (1976) Natural Observations of queens, 
workers, and brood 




Apis mellifera Parasitism by Nosema ceranae 
increases frequency of drifting by 
drifters (Bordier et al., 2017) 
 
Managed 9.37% ± 2.31 of bees normally 
drift 
Optical counters 
Unknown Halictus scabiosae Ulrich et al. (2009) Natural 16% of 122 colonies contained 
drifters. Possibly reducing 
resource competition with kin 
in the natal nest before 
hibernation 
Microsatellites 





 Lasioglossum duplex 
 
Sakagami and Hayashida (1968) Natural 19% (12/63) of marked bees Paint-marked 
 Parishnogaster mellyi Yamane et al. (1978) Natural Unrecorded Presumed paint-
marked 
 Xylocopa virginica Peso and Richards (2010) Natural 70.1% (46/65) females 
switched nests in one season 
Paint-marked 
      
Accident Vespula atropilosa Akre et al. (1976) Managed 2 workers observed 
performing worker tasks in a 
neighbour colony 
Paint-marked 
 Scaptotrigona postica Paxton (2000) Managed 2.2% (4/184) workers Microsatellites 
 
 Bombus terrestris Gill et al. (2012) Managed 52% of foragers spent most of 
their foraging effort working 
for foreign colonies (see Gill et 
al., 2012, Supplementary 
Material) 
RFID 





 A stochastic generalisation of Hamilton’s rule 
This chapter has been published as the following paper: 
Kennedy, P., Higginson, A. D., Radford, A., & Sumner, S. (2018). Altruism in a volatile world. Nature, 
555(7696): 359-362 
Appendices A-C can be found at the end of this thesis. 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
The evolution of altruism – costly self-sacrifice in the service of others – has puzzled biologists since 
The Origin of Species. For half a century, attempts to understand altruism have been built on the insight 
that altruists may help relatives to have extra offspring in order to spread shared genes. This theory – 
known as inclusive fitness – is founded on a simple inequality termed ‘Hamilton’s rule’. However, 
explanations of altruism have typically ignored the stochasticity of natural environments, which will not 
necessarily favour genotypes that produce the greatest average reproductive success. Moreover, 
empirical data across many taxa reveal associations between altruism and environmental stochasticity, 
a pattern not predicted by standard interpretations of Hamilton’s rule. Here, we derive Hamilton’s rule 
with explicit stochasticity, leading to novel predictions about the evolution of altruism. We show that 
altruists can increase the long-term success of their genotype by reducing the variability in the number 
of offspring produced by relatives. Consequently, costly altruism can evolve even if it has a net negative 
effect on the average reproductive success of related recipients. The selective pressure on volatility-
suppressing altruism is proportional to the coefficient of variation in population fitness, and is therefore 
diminished by its own success. Our results formalise the hitherto elusive link between bet-hedging and 
altruism, and reveal missing fitness effects in the evolution of animal societies. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
“While selection on bet-hedging can shape any life-history character, the evolution of 




3.2 Altruistic bet-hedging 
The widespread phenomenon of organisms paying costs to help others (altruism) is a long-standing 
paradox in biology (Hamilton, 1964a; Gardner et al., 2011). Recently, variance-averse investment in 
stochastic environments (bet-hedging) has been suggested as an explanation for a number of major 
puzzles in the evolution of altruism, including: (i) the origins of sociality in birds (Rubenstein, 2011; 
Griesser et al., 2017; Shen et al., 2017), insects (Stevens et al., 2007) and rodents (Ebensperger et al., 
2014); (ii) the altitudinal distribution of eusocial species (Kocher et al., 2014); and (iii) the evolution of 
cooperation between eusocial insect colonies (Sumner et al., 2007). The global distribution of animal 
societies is linked to environmental stochasticity (Cockburn and Russell, 2011). In birds (Jetz and 
Rubenstein, 2011; Griesser et al., 2017), mammals (Lukas and Clutton-Brock, 2017), bees (Kocher et al., 
2014) and wasps (Sheehan et al., 2015), cooperation is more common in unpredictable or harsh 
environments. However, the effects of stochasticity have largely been omitted from social evolutionary 
theory. There are a handful of notable exceptions: for instance, Grafen (2006b) argues that selection 
will maximise expected inclusive fitness under uncertainty, Uitdehaag (2011) shows that mutualism 
between nonrelatives could counteract kin selection by dampening stochasticity, and Lehmann & 
Rousset (2014) explore stochastic effects on reproductive value. However, despite speculation (Koenig 
et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2017), the proposed link between bet-hedging and altruism (Rubenstein, 2011) 
has remained elusive (Cockburn and Russell, 2011). We resolve this link by presenting a stochastic 
generalisation of Hamilton’s rule (‘stochastic Hamilton’s rule’), which predicts when organisms should 
pay a cost to influence the variance in their relatives’ reproductive success. 
We allow environmental state π to fluctuate among the possible states Π; ‘stochasticity’ is the 
condition that states are unpredictable.  We follow the established method of capturing fitness effects 
as regression slopes (Gardner et al., 2011). Both the fitnesses wx of individual organisms and the 
average fitness ?̅? in the population may vary among the states Π. We denote the kth central moment 
of ?̅? as ≪𝑘 ?̅? ≫. The joint distribution of the fitness of individual x (wx) and ?̅? across states Π is 
captured by their mixed moments (covariance k=1, coskewness k=2, cokurtosis k=3, etc.; Appendix A1). 
Altruists may alter not only the expected number of offspring (mean, k=0), but may reduce the variation 
in offspring number (variance, k=1) or increase the likelihood of large numbers of offspring (skew, k=2). 
We denote the actor’s effect on the recipient’s expected number of offspring as the benefit bµ, the 
effect of the actor on its own expected number of offspring as the cost cµ, and relatedness as r. Likewise, 
we denote the actor’s effect on the kth mixed moment defining the recipient’s reproductive success as 
bk, and the actor’s effect on the kth mixed moment of its own reproductive success as ck. The stochastic 
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Empirical tests of Hamilton’s rule have looked for benefits and costs constituting effects on the 
average reproductive success of recipients and actors, using the form rbµ>cµ (henceforth, ‘means-based 
Hamilton’s rule’; Bourke, 2014). However, Inequality 3.1 reveals that bµ is a single component of a 
spectrum of potential benefits of altruism. Conclusions based on mean reproductive success (bµ and cµ) 
overlook effects on the variance of the distribution from which a recipient samples its reproductive 
success. 
Non-social bet-hedging has been analysed extensively (Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012), and is typically 
described in terms of costs and benefits: the cost is a reduction in mean reproductive success, whilst 
the benefit is a reduction in the variance of reproductive success (Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). Following 
speculation that these benefits and costs could be accrued by different partners (Stevens et al., 2007; 
Rubenstein, 2011) – actors pay costs whilst recipient derive benefits (Figure 3.1a) – we refer to 
decoupled benefits and costs as ‘altruistic bet-hedging’. We let bσ and cσ denote, respectively, the 
effects on the recipient and actor’s standard deviation (‘volatility’) in reproductive success (weighted 
by its correlation with population average reproductive success ?̅?; for details see Table 3.1 at the end 




; Figure 3.1b). Where the actor can affect both the mean and the 
volatility (but not higher moments) of the recipient’s reproductive success, Inequality 3.1 simplifies 
(Appendix A2) to: 
𝑟(𝑏𝜇 + 𝑣𝑏𝜎) > 𝑐𝜇 + 𝑣𝑐𝜎                                                              (3.2) 
Reducing the (?̅?-correlated) volatility in the recipient's number of offspring (bσ>0) confers on 
recipients greater relative fitness in poor environmental states: extra offspring are disproportionately 
valuable when competitors produce few offspring (Grafen, 2000), underscoring the principle that the 
ultimate currency for benefits and costs under stochasticity is the expectation of relative fitness 
(Gardner et al., 2011). It is straightforward to derive the established non-social bet-hedging model 
(Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012) by setting r=0 (Appendix A3). 
Formally, we define altruistic bet-hedging as a reduction in a recipient’s reproductive volatility 
(positive bσ) that overcomes an otherwise-deleterious cost to the actor’s mean fecundity (positive cµ). 
Strong benefits can arise when bµ and bσ are both positive. Reductions in the actor’s own reproductive 
volatility (cσ<0) diminish total costs (Figure 3.2a,b). Moreover, when bσ>cσ, increasing stochasticity 
reduces the minimum relatedness (r) required for altruism to evolve (Figure 3.2c). Fluctuations in 
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relatedness (r) alter selection only if they correlate with strong fluctuations in population average 
reproductive success (?̅?) (see Appendix A4). 
 
Figure 3.1 | Environmental stochasticity has been missing from models of social evolution. In the non-stochastic 
application of Hamilton’s rule (rbµ > cµ) to real-world organisms (Bourke, 2014), recipients gain an increase in 
average reproductive success (bµ > 0) whereas actors suffer a decrease in average reproductive success (cµ > 0). 
(a) We derive an explicitly stochastic Hamilton’s rule: r(bµ + vb) > cµ + vc. This shows that benefits can also 
arise by reducing the volatility of the reproductive success of the recipient (b > 0), which depends on the 
magnitude of environmental stochasticity (v). An increase in the reproductive volatility of the actor (c > 0) 
imposes a cost on the actor. Each effect represents a transformation of a probability distribution for 
reproductive success (bottom). Total benefits and costs (B and C) are measured in expected relative fitness 
(Gardner et al., 2011). (b) Environmental stochasticity (v) is highest when spatial patches fluctuate in sync: for 
instance, if drought affects a randomly chosen patch Z, it should be likely that it also affects a randomly chosen 
patch Y (Appendix A6). Here, following Starrfelt and Kokko (2012), we represent patches in a lattice connected 
by dispersal. Colours denote environmental condition on patches at sequential time points t. See Appendix A. 
Image of wasp reproduced with permission from Z. Soh. 
 
We note four predictions of the stochastic Hamilton’s rule that differ from standard expectations:   
1. Selection can favour altruism (C>0) with zero increase to the recipient’s mean fecundity (bµ=0). 
Such a seemingly paradoxical lack of benefits is observed where additional helpers appear 
redundant(Dickinson and Hatchwell, 2004). Paradoxical helpers can be selected for by reducing the 




+ 𝑐𝜎 (3.3) 
2. Actors may be selected to harm the average reproductive success of their relatives (bµ<0, cµ>0). 




+ 𝑐𝜎 (3.4) 
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3. Altruists that reduce their recipients’ reproductive volatility can be favoured by selection in the 
absence of environmental stochasticity, but only when population size (N) is low: in very small 
populations (Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012) or in small demes with negligible dispersal (Lehmann and 
Balloux, 2007). Effects on variance, σ2, not volatility, are used here for notational convenience 
(Appendix A5): 
𝑟 (𝑏𝜇 +
   𝑏𝜎2
𝑁𝔼𝜋[?̅?]




4. Very strong altruistic effects (bσ ≫ 0) can undermine the success of the altruist genotype (Figure 
3.3; Appendix B1–4). Altruists that substantially reduce their recipients’ reproductive volatility spread 
rapidly. As successful altruists reach high frequencies, the coefficient of variation in average 
reproductive success (v = 
𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
) tends towards zero (Figure 3.4). When v is small, any bσ has a small 
effect (Inequality 3.2), so altruistic bet-hedgers undermine the condition (high v) that favoured them 
(Figure 3.4a,b). This frequency-dependence can generate polymorphisms of altruists and defectors 
(Figure 3.4c), provided that allele frequency does not fluctuate intensively, which can otherwise 
destablise the equilibrium (Figure 3.5) and lead to fixation (Lande, 2007). 
 
Figure 3.2 | Increased stochasticity can increase the potential for selection of altruistic behaviour. Without 
stochastic effects, altruism evolves when rbµ > cµ (shown in region ‘1’ in a and b for cµ = 1, and r = 0.5). As 
stochasticity v increases, the power of b:c benefits increases, reducing the ratio of bµ:cµ needed for the 
evolution of altruism. (a) In this scenario, altruists secure a high b = 0.75, considerably increasing the scope 
for altruism (extending region ‘1’ to region ‘2’). Actors may also reduce the volatility of their personal fecundity 
(here, c = –0.4), reducing the magnitude of the total cost C below cµ and increasing the potential for altruism 
further (extending to region ‘3’). Altruism is always deleterious in region ‘4’. (b) In this scenario, altruists secure 
a low b = 0.1 and personal volatility reduction of c = −0.1 (regions as in a). Comparing a (b = 0.75) and b 
(b = 0.1), larger reductions of recipient volatility (higher b) result in larger increases in the inclusive fitness of 
the actor. (c) The minimum relatedness required for the evolution of altruism under different cµ values (curved 
lines, from cµ = 0.05 to 0.4, when b = 0.75, c = 0 and bµ = 0.2); as stochasticity (v) increases, the minimum 






Figure 3.3 | The interaction between the frequency of altruists and the effectiveness of altruism. (a) The 
stochastic Hamilton’s rule predicts that selection on volatility-suppressing altruism with fixed costs and benefits 
can generate negative frequency dependence and is sensitive to mild mean-fecundity costs (cµ). We evaluate 
a population undergoing synchronous fluctuations to identify the frequency p* at which there is no expected 
change in allele frequency. We illustrate the result with individual fecundities of 4 and 1 in good and bad years 
respectively. Relatedness is r = 0.5. (b) Simulated population outcomes (frequency after 100,000 generations) 
match predictions of the stochastic Hamilton’s rule in a. Warmer colours (pink) denote higher polymorphic 
frequencies of altruists. In this haploid model (Appendix B), 1% of breeding spots are available each year for 
replacement by offspring that year: with such constraints on the magnitude of the response to selection, 
radical stochastic shifts in allele frequency over single generations do not occur, allowing the population to 
settle at equilibria where all alleles have equal expected relative fitness without being continually displaced 
(Figure 3.5). (c) Competing an altruistic allele against a defector allele reveals the action of frequency-
dependent selection. Here, populations experiencing costs of c = 0.2 and η = 0.466 converge to p* = 0.359 
from any initial frequency (coloured lines show five starting frequencies from 0.001 to 0.999), as predicted by 






Figure 3.4 | Stochasticity as a function of bet-hedger frequency. Stochasticity 𝑣 =
(𝑝𝜂+(1−𝑝))𝜎00
𝜇00−𝑝𝑐
 for the model 
of altruistic bet-hedging in Appendix B plotted against frequency (p) and cost (c) for three different values of 
𝜂 (where lower values of η denote greater buffering of recipients from the environment). (a-b) When η is small, 
representing high levels of volatility reduction, v declines steeply with p across the range of costs. (c) When 𝜂 










Figure 3.5 | Weak selection negates the capacity of temporal autocorrelation to drive the frequency of altruistic 
bet-hedgers away from the convergence frequency. Individual-based simulations from five different initial 
frequencies of an altruistic bet hedging allele (p) competing against a non-cooperator. (a) The population has 
zero temporal autocorrelation (environmental state in each generation is random). (b) The population has 
strong temporal autocorrelation (environmental state in the next generation has a 90% probability of 
remaining the same as in the current generation). Despite higher amplitude fluctuations, this population 
converges to the same point (from the five different starting frequencies) as the uncorrelated population (a). 
(c) The same population is simulated with greater gene frequency changes (10% of the resident genotype 
frequencies are available to change each generation). The population is repeatedly carried to frequencies far 
from the convergence point. In this case, the utility of the stochastic Hamilton’s rule is both identifying whether 
a given trait is immune from invasion by competitors, and identifying the expected generational change at each 










Apparent reduction of recipient reproductive volatility (implying bσ>0) has been shown in starlings 
(Rubenstein, 2011), sociable weavers (Covas et al., 2008), woodpeckers (Koenig and Walters, 2015), 
wasps (Wenzel and Pickering, 1991), and allodapine bees (Stevens et al., 2007). We illustrate a volatility-
reduction route to sociality with two examples. First, we consider sister–sister cooperation in 
facultatively-social insects (as in certain carpenter bees, where a means-based Hamilton’s rule is 
violated; Rehan et al., 2014). In strongly stochastic environments, altruism could evolve between 
haplodiploid sisters when values of mean fecundity alone would predict it to be deleterious, as 
predicted by Inequality 3.2 (Figure 3.6a) and simulations of haplodiploid populations (Figure 3.6b; 
Appendix C1). Second, using published estimates of mean fecundity and high stochasticity in Galapagos 
mockingbirds (Mimus parvulus), we indicate how volatility effects could favour cooperative breeding 
even if helping increases the recipient’s average fecundity only as much as it reduces the actor’s (cµ=bµ; 
Figure 3.6c; Appendix C2). 
 
 
Figure 3.6 | Empirical studies of Hamilton’s rule may benefit from incorporating stochasticity. (a) Model of sister–
sister cooperation between facultatively social insects: volatility effects can drive the invasion of altruists in 
regions of parameter space (below the dashed line) in which the means-based Hamilton’s rule (rbµ > cµ) is 
violated. (b) These predictions are matched in an individual-based haplodiploid simulation. In both a and b, 
good and bad years occur equally (d  = 0.5) at random. In Appendix B, we discuss temporal correlation. 
Coordinates plot average frequency across five replicate simulations after 1,000 generations, from an initial 
frequency P = 0.05. (c) In high-stochasticity conditions, helpers may buffer breeders from profound 
environmental fluctuations (Cockburn and Russell, 2011; Rubenstein, 2011). We estimate rbµ values in the 
Galapagos mockingbird, and show that volatility effects can, in principle, drive cooperation (above the dashed 
line) even when mean fecundity costs cµ cancel out bµ (here, bµ = cµ = 0.3). See Appendix C. Image of bee, K. 
Walker (CC-BY 3.0 AU); image of mockingbird, Biodiversity Heritage Library (CC-BY 2.0). 
 
 
Inequality 3.2 reveals three core conditions for altruistic bet-hedging. First, members of the non-
altruistic genotype suffer synchronous fluctuations in lifetime reproductive success driven by 






. Third, actors either cannot predict environmental fluctuations or cannot 
generate phenotypes for different conditions (Figure 3.7; Appendix B5). If actors can obtain and utilise 
information at sufficiently low costs (rendering the environment predictable), plastic cooperation 
outcompetes constitutive cooperation (increasing bµ and reducing cµ). 
 
 
Figure 3.7 | The trade-off between constitutive and inducible altruism in a stochastic world depends on plasticity 
costs and information reliability. We show a population fluctuating randomly between a good and a bad 
environmental state, comprising three alleles: ‘selfish’ (S), for which the carriers never cooperate; ‘constitutive 
cooperator’ (C), for which the carriers always cooperate; and ‘inducible cooperator’ (I) for which the carriers 
cooperate only when they believe they are in the bad (low-fecundity) state. Information reliability is set by A 
(actors diagnose true state with probability A). Apexes represent monomorphic populations. Without social 
behaviour, individuals obtain four and one offspring in good and bad states respectively. Cooperation confers 
on recipients 1.5 additional offspring in bad states but reduces recipient fecundity by 0.2 offspring in good 
states, and costs actors 0.5 offspring in all states. (a) When considering only mean fecundity, the means-based 
Hamilton’s rule rbµ > cµ, commonly used empirically, mistakenly predicts that selfishness (S) will dominate. 
Under stochastic conditions, cooperation evolves. (b) Constitutive cooperators invade (until reaching a mixture 
of altruists and defectors) when information is imperfect (A = 0.75) and there is a plasticity cost (0.1 offspring). 
(c) When the reliability of information is increased (A = 1), plastic cooperators outcompete constitutive 
cooperators. (d) Increasing plasticity costs, however (here, from 0.1 to 0.3 offspring), eliminates plasticity 
benefits, enabling constitutive cooperators to invade. Vectors show directions of expected changes in 
frequencies: these represent continuous expected trajectories when frequencies are constrained to change by 
small amounts per generation. Relatedness r = 0.5 in all plots. Details are provided in Appendix B. 
 
 
Synchronous fluctuations (high v) are generated when different patches within the population 
experience correlated environmental changes (Figure 3.1b). If offspring disperse across 
environmentally uncorrelated patches (Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012) but compete at a whole-population 
level, v falls. Likewise, iteroparity and long generations across different environmental conditions 
reduce v, whilst correlated exposure to environmental fluctuations within lifetimes increases v. For 
these reasons, Inequality 3.2 suggests that the most promising avenues to detect bσ-driven sociality 
may occur among social microbes, which can experience: (i) population-wide fluctuations (high v); (ii) 
short generations (high v); (iii) competing clones (high r); and (iv) opportunities to confer homeostasis 
64 
 
on others (bσ>0), including through the construction of biofilms (Lowery et al., 2017) and incipiently-
multicellular clusters withstanding profound abiotic and biotic stress. 
We have shown that altruistic effects on recipient volatility are visible to selection. Significantly, 
Hamilton’s rule identifies ultimate payoffs by incorporating any effects of population structure (Gardner 
et al., 2011). To make case-specific predictions, researchers should, accordingly, utilise explicit 
information on population structure and ecology. The empirical challenge to detect volatility-
suppressing sociality will best be met using tailored models guided by field data for specific scenarios, 
led by the general framework of inclusive fitness theory (Gardner et al., 2011; Bourke, 2014a; Birch, 
2017). In summary, Hamilton’s rule reveals the action of selection under stochasticity: shielding 





Table 3.1 | Parameters of the model 
Notation Definition Expression 
𝑁 Population size – 
  
𝑤𝑥  Number of surviving offspring (reproductive 
success) of the 𝑥th individual 
– 
?̅? Mean reproductive success in the population – 
  




𝐺𝑥  Genetic value of individual 𝑥 – 
𝑟 Relatedness  
  
𝛽𝐺𝑦,𝐺𝑥  
𝑧𝑥  Trait value of individual 𝑥 – 
  





𝑘 ?̅? ≫ 𝑘th mixed moment of reproductive success 
of individual 𝑥 and ?̅? across  𝛱 
  
𝔼𝜋[(𝑤𝑥 − 𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥])(?̅? − 𝔼𝜋[?̅?])
𝑘] 
𝜈 Stochasticity of the environment 𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
 
𝜌𝑥 Correlation between 𝑤𝑥  and ?̅? across 𝛱 𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥?̅?] − 𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ⋅ 𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥]𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
 








Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on a social partner’s expected 
relative fitness 
  








Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on its own expected relative 
fitness 
  
𝑏𝜇 Mean fecundity benefit in stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule 
𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑦],𝐺𝑥 
Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on a social partner’s expected 
number of offspring. We make use of the 
identity 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑦],𝐺𝑥 = 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦 in non-class-
structured populations. 
  
𝑐𝜇 Mean fecundity cost in stochastic Hamilton’s 
rule 
−𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥  
Partial regression of a focal individual’s 





𝑏𝜎  Volatility-suppressing benefit in stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule 
−𝛽𝜌𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑦],𝐺𝑥  
Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on a partner’s standard 
deviation in reproductive success, where the 
standard deviation is weighted by its 
correlation with ?̅?. We make use of the 
identity 𝛽𝜌𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑦],𝐺𝑥 = 𝛽𝜌𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦  in non-
class-structured populations 
  
𝑐𝜎  Volatility-suppressing cost in stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule 
𝛽𝜌𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 
Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on a partner’s standard 
deviation in reproductive success, where the 
standard deviation is weighted by its 
correlation with ?̅? 
  
𝑏𝑘  𝑘th moment benefit in stochastic Hamilton’s 
rule 
𝛽≪𝑤𝑦,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥  
Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on the 𝑘th mixed moments of 
a partner’s joint distribution for reproductive 
success 𝑤𝑦 and population average 
reproductive success ?̅?. We make use of the 
identity 𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑦 = 𝛽≪𝑤𝑦 ,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥  in non-
class-structured populations 
  
𝑐𝑘  𝑘th moment cost in stochastic Hamilton’s 
rule 
−𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥 
Partial regression of a focal individual’s 
genetic value on the 𝑘th mixed moments of 
its own joint distribution for reproductive 
success 𝑤𝑦 and population average 
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 Demographic influences on altruistic bet-hedging 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
When faced by traits that appear deleterious to their bearer’s expected reproductive 
success, biologists often turn to ‘bet-hedging’ explanations. Bet-hedging theory argues that 
traits that reduce an individual’s expected reproductive success can still be favoured by 
selection if they sufficiently reduce the uncertainty of reproductive success. In Chapter 3, I 
showed how bet-hedging theory can be extended to social behaviour. Actors can increase 
their inclusive fitness by buffering relatives from unpredictable fluctuations in reproductive 
success, without providing any increase to the expected number of offspring produced by 
relatives. However, despite widespread speculation that these altruistic bet-hedging effects 
may be fundamental drivers of sociality amongst insects, birds, and mammals, the ecological 
conditions that favour sociality in volatile environments remain unclear. In this chapter, I 
argue that whether altruistic bet-hedging is favoured by selection depends crucially on 
demography (the structure of the population). Specifically, I use the ‘stochastic Hamilton’s 
rule’ of the previous chapter to illustrate how two fundamental factors – the spatial scale of 
environmental fluctuation and the spatial scale of competition – can exert a profound 
influence over selection for social behaviour in a volatile world. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 









Volatile environments can drive the evolution of ‘bet-hedging’ traits (Gillespie, 1974a, 1977), which 
stabilise their carrier’s fluctuating reproductive success at the cost of reducing their expected 
reproductive success. Recent speculation has focussed on a possible link between bet-hedging and 
altruism (Rubenstein, 2011; Cockburn and Russell, 2011): altruists may be able to stabilise the 
fluctuating reproductive success of relatives, driving the evolution of sociality without necessarily 
increasing the relatives’ expected reproductive successes. However, selection for bet-hedging traits is 
crucially determined by demography (Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). A rich knowledge of demographic 
influences on non-social bet-hedging has developed in the theoretical literature (Rice and 
Papadopoulos, 2009; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012; Schreiber and Moore, 2017; Xue and Leibler, 2017). In 
this chapter, I focus on extending these principles to social evolution. Specifically, I use the ‘stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule’ of Chapter 3 to illustrate how two demographic factors – (1) the spatial scale of 
environmental fluctuation and (2) the spatial scale of competition – can exert considerable influences 
over the success of social forms of bet-hedging. 
A stronger appreciation of demographic influences on bet-hedging may carry wide empirical 
implications in biology. Bet-hedging is now frequently invoked as an explanation for a remarkable range 
of social and non-social traits (Table 4.1), ranging from avian cooperative breeding (Shen et al., 2017; 
Guindre-Parker and Rubenstein, 2018) to cancer vascularisation (Gravenmier et al., 2018). In each case, 
subtle effects of demography may exert considerable influence over the viability of the bet-hedging 
hypothesis. In particular, two core demographic principles have been established for selection in 
volatile environments: 
1. Metapopulations are better than panmictic populations at sustaining polymorphisms: 
metapopulations of demes connected by some degree of dispersal reduce the probability of one 
allele going extinct (or fixating) due to a stochastic event (Gillespie, 1974b, 1978; Frank and Slatkin, 
1990; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). 
2. Bet-hedging can evolve due to demographic stochasticity in large populations, but only if the 
population is structured into small demes with strong local competition (Lehmann and Balloux, 
2007). When between-deme dispersal occurs after density-dependent regulation within demes 
(local competition), dispersal has no effect on the outcome of selection: density-dependent 




Table 4.1 | A sample of recently proposed bet-hedging traits in fields across evolutionary biology (2017–
2018) 
Trait Taxa References 
Cooperative breeding Birds Shen et al. (2017); Guindre-Parker and Rubenstein (2018) 
Reproductive mode Jellyfish Schnedler-Meyer et al. (2018) 
Clutch size Frogs Chen et al. (2018) 
Seed germination Plants Cuello et al. (2018) 
Hormone signalling Plants Johnston and Bassel (2018) 
Extra-pair paternity Birds Yasui and Yoshimura (2018) 
Irrationality Humans Brennan et al. (2018) 
Sex differences General Wilkins and Bhattacharya (2018) 
Embryology Polychaetes Thonig et al. (2017) 
Migration routes Birds Blackburn et al. (2017) 
Social slug formation Slime moulds Martínez-García and Tarnita (2017) 
Blood supply to cancer Humans Gravenmier et al. (2017) 
Hatching time Shrimp Pinceel et al. (2017) 
Egg size Fish Shama (2017) 
Antibiotic production Bacteria Bayramoglu et al. (2017) 
 
Some authors have considered potential links between demography, stochasticity, and social 
evolution. Levin and Kilmer (1974) and Lehmann et al. (2006), for instance, modelled social behaviour 
in the context of environmental stochasticity in a deme-structured population, although in these 
models environmental stochasticity entails the complete stochastic destruction of the home deme: 
actors can invest to reduce the probability that their home deme goes extinct (influencing the fitness 
of all deme-mates). This is not the sense in which I use environmental stochasticity here, where 
environmental state is free to fluctuate on a continuous scale within demes: altruists can intervene to 
reduce the exposure of individual social partners to the fluctuating environment. However, altruism to 
prevent deme extinction can be seen as an extreme form of volatility-suppressing cooperation: (1) the 
actor influences the fitness of all deme-mates rather than a specific social partner and (2) 
environmental stochasticity is extreme and binary (i.e., complete deme extinction versus complete 
deme survival). 
Subsequently, Lehmann and Balloux (2007) modelled demographic stochasticity in a deme-structured 
population, and investigated a potential link between kin selection and stochasticity by exploring how 
local stochasticity can influence relatedness. Deme-level stochasticity can cause the stochastic 
extinction of lineages within the deme, inflating relatedness and potentially providing a more 
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favourable context for kin-selected altruism (Lehmann and Balloux, 2007). Various effects of 
stochasticity on relatedness have been proposed: for instance, Uyenoyama (1979) highlighted that 
stochasticity in migration could generate between-deme differences in relatedness. Here, however, I 
focus on the benefit term in Hamilton’s rule, and leave stochastic effects on within-deme relatedness 
implicit. 
In this chapter, I begin to extend to altruistic bet-hedging the key principles developed for non-social 
bet-hedging against both environmental and demographic stochasticity in a deme-structured 
population (Frank and Slatkin, 1990; Shpak and Proulx, 2007).  
4.3 Grain size of environmental fluctuation 
In Chapter 3, I showed that whether altruistic bet-hedging is favoured by selection is determined by 
a ‘stochastic Hamilton’s rule’: 
𝑟(𝑏𝜇 + 𝑣𝑏𝜎) > 𝑐𝜇 + 𝑣𝑐𝜎 (4.7) 
where 𝑟 is relatedness, 𝑏𝜇 is any increased expected absolute fitness of a recipient, 𝑏𝜎 is any 
decreased recipient uncertainty in absolute fitness, 𝑐𝜇 is any reduced expected absolute fitness of the 
actor, and 𝑐𝜎 is any increased uncertainty in the actor’s absolute fitness. 𝑣 is the coefficient of variation 
in population average reproductive success ?̅?. 𝑣 is larger when different areas inhabited by the 
population fluctuate in sync between environmental states. In this section, I show that selection on 𝑏𝜎 
and 𝑐𝜎 is greatest when there is a strong correlation in environmental conditions between different 
spatial areas (high 𝑣). 
The magnitude of the stochasticity coefficient 𝑣 depends on the correlation amongst individuals in 
their exposure to all conditions of the environment. Accordingly, when individuals are distributed across 
different microenvironments, the degree of correlation in environmental state across 
microenvironments influences the magnitude of 𝑣. Here, I illustrate this principle in a population 
divided into multiple microenvironments. 
Let the population undergoing global competition be distributed across a total of 𝑀 
microenvironment patches, each of which samples its local environmental ‘microstate’ from an 
identical distribution. Population-wide environmental state 𝜋 is, in effect, a specific combination of 
microstates across a network of spatial patches inhabited by a population. Assuming there are equal 
numbers of individuals in each patch, the whole-population average reproductive success ?̅? is equal to 










Since the scale of competition is the whole population, the stochasticity coefficient 𝑣 is obtained as 


















We assume that every patch samples its microstate from an identical distribution with a mean of 
𝔼𝜋[?̅?𝑚] = 𝔼𝜋[?̅?] and a variance of 𝕍𝜋[?̅?𝑚], but patches can be correlated or uncorrelated in their 
samples from this distribution. The variance of ?̅? (i.e., 𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
2) can then be obtained using the general 
formula for the variance of a mean (since ?̅? is the mean of a total of 𝑀 patches, each with its own ?̅?𝑚 
in a particular state 𝜋 of the population): 













?̅? denotes the average between-patch correlation in average reproductive success ?̅?𝑚. As patch 
number 𝑀 approaches infinity, this whole-population variance 𝕍𝜋[?̅?] converges to a simple function 
of ?̅? and the within-patch variance 𝕍𝜋[?̅?𝑚] in average reproductive success: 
lim
𝑀→∞
𝕍𝜋[?̅?] = ?̅? ⋅ 𝕍𝜋[?̅?𝑚] (4.11) 
𝕍𝜋[?̅?] is the square of the numerator of 𝑣. Therefore, in a population distributed over many patches, 
𝑣 can be defined as follows, where 𝑣𝑚 is the coefficient of variation in average reproductive success 












⋅ √?̅? = 𝑣𝑚√?̅? (4.12) 
Equation 4.12 shows that whole-population stochasticity 𝑣 approaches within-patch stochasticity 𝑣𝑚 
as between-patch correlation approaches 1 (full correlation). This illustrates the fundamental point, 
emphasised by Starrfelt and Kokko (2012) for non-social bet-hedging, that selection on variation effects 
(𝑏𝜎 and 𝑐𝜎 in Inequality 4.7) is driven by whole-population environmental fluctuation when the scale of 
competition is at the level of the whole population (global competition), and that the ‘grain size’ 
(Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012) of environmental fluctuation (the size of completely correlated areas of the 
population) is key in determining the strength of selection. 
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4.4 The spatial scales of competition and fluctuation 
In Chapter 3 and the previous section, I followed the familiar assumption (both in the literature on 
Hamilton’s rule and the literature on bet-hedging) that the boundaries of the population are the same 
as the boundaries of the scale of competition (Gardner et al., 2011; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012; 
Schreiber, 2015). In this scenario, the actor’s offspring compete for places in the next generation with 
the whole population. It is then irrelevant whether the actor happens to live in an area in which others 
produce disproportionately more offspring than elsewhere. Neighbours are not more directly in 
competition with the actor than individuals living in foreign areas. 
Here, I relax this assumption. The previous work implicitly assumed no extra competition within spatial 
areas. Let a ‘deme’ be defined broadly as a subpopulation living in a specific area. In this section, I allow 
density regulation to occur at the scale of individual demes before dispersal. I show that local 
fluctuations can select for altruistic bet-hedging (both individual and altruistic) if and only if density-
regulation occurs at least partially at the deme scale. This extends the insights of Shpak and Proulx 
(2007) from non-social bet-hedging to altruistic bet-hedging sensu Chapter 3. For clarity, I will begin by 
presenting the main results concerning the interaction of the spatial scales of competition and 
fluctuation, and then explain how each result is derived.  
4.4.1 Environmental stochasticity 
The first main result is the form taken by the stochastic Hamilton’s rule when the spatial scales of 
competition and fluctuation are made explicit (by giving them their own coefficients). For a population 
consisting of demes that are free to fluctuate independently in local environmental state, I find that a 











+ (1 − 𝑎)𝑣⦿𝑏𝜎
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⏞                    
Total Hamiltonian benefit (𝐵)






+ (1 − 𝑎)𝑣⦿𝑐𝜎
⦿




⏞                  
Total Hamiltonian cost (𝐶)
(4.13)
 
This further unpacking of Hamilton’s rule makes explicit the two demographic parameters we are 
interested in (Figure 4.1): the spatial scale of competition (determined by 𝑎) and the spatial scale of 
environmental fluctuation (determined by 𝑣⦁ and 𝑣⦿). First, the parameter 𝑎 denotes the spatial scale 
of competition, here split across two levels: competition for limited spaces in the next generation 
occurring (1) against local deme-members and (2) against any individual from the global population. 
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Higher 𝑎 means that competition is more local; lower 𝑎 means that competition is more global. Second, 
Inequality 4.13 captures the spatial scale of environmental fluctuation, using the coefficients 𝑣⦁ and 
𝑣⦿. Whereas in the previous chapter I used a single measure of stochasticity (𝑣) for the whole 
population, in Inequality 4.13 I split the influences on stochasticity (as experienced by a focal individual) 
into local (𝑣⦁) and global (𝑣⦿). Informally (formal definitions are provided in ‘Derivation’ below), local 
influences on stochasticity are fluctuations in average reproductive success on the local deme: as local 
fluctuations become more profound, 𝑣⦁ rises in value. Likewise, global influences on stochasticity are 
fluctuations in average reproductive success across the whole population: as global fluctuations 
become stronger, 𝑣⦿ rises in value. 
𝑟 denotes relatedness (relative to the actor’s competitors). As in Chapter 3, 𝑏𝜇 denotes the actor’s 
effect on the expected reproductive success of a recipient and 𝑐𝜇 the actor’s effect on its own expected 




⦁ , and 𝑐𝜎
⦿) are now slightly subtler than previously. Throughout this chapter, ‘⦁’ is used to denote 
‘local’ and ‘⦿’ is used to denote ‘global’. As in Chapter 3, the volatility terms denote the actor’s effects 
on its own reproductive volatility and the reproductive volatility of the recipient, where volatility is the 
standard deviation in the focal individual’s reproductive success multiplied by how much its 
reproductive success correlates with any fluctuations in the average reproductive success amongst its 
competitors. 
The biological implication of Inequality 4.13 is that an organism inhabiting a population structured 
into independently-fluctuating demes can profitably buffer its relatives from environmentally-driven 
fluctuations in average reproductive success on the local deme (𝑣⦁ > 0) even at a personal cost to its 
expected reproductive success (𝑐𝜇 > 0). If an ecologist surveys a population through the generations 
and shows no fluctuations in average reproductive success (where the average is taken across all 
individuals in the population), they would be correct in concluding that there are no global influences 
on stochasticity. In Inequality 4.13, this means that 𝑣⦿ (the term capturing global stochasticity) is equal 
to zero. At a local level, however, independent demes may be fluctuating considerably in their average 
reproductive success, each driven by local environmental effects. Some demes might be experiencing 
a local explosion in disease, others an unexpected fall in predator abundance, others an unexpected 
rise in predator abundance, still others a rare increase in a favourable food item, and so on through 
myriad combinations of environmental conditions. To simplify the interpretation, Inequality 4.13 
assumes that all demes sample their environmental state from a common distribution. In other words, 
when each deme is considered independently, the probability that it is currently in each of the 
environmental states is the same for all demes. Very few demes may be experiencing a food bonanza, 
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but all demes had the same probability that it would occur. This assumption is not strictly necessary, 
and I provide a more general expression that allows for demes to differ in their probabilities of being in 
each state in the ‘Derivation’ section (page 77). However, committing to this assumption helps to 
simplify the expression, and therefore to illustrate the central point: when there is selection on altruistic 
bet-hedging, the spatial scales of competition and fluctuation exert strong influences on the outcome.  
The biological intuition underlying this point is that bet-hedging alleles only gain their advantage 
during periods when their competitors are suffering poor average reproductive success; at these 
moments, the increase to the bet-hedger’s relative fitness is enough to offset any decreases to relative 
fitness caused by a lower expected reproductive success. It is crucial, then, that bet-hedgers experience 
a fluctuating background (average reproductive success amongst their competitors) in order to secure 
these benefits during episodes of harsh environmental states. If demes are fluctuating independently 
(𝑣⦁ > 0) in a globally non-fluctuating population (𝑣⦿ = 0), and competition is global (𝑎 = 0), there is 
no scope for bet-hedging. On the other hand, as competition becomes increasingly local (i.e., as 𝑎 gets 
closer to 1), the bet-hedgers find themselves against a fluctuating background of competitors, and 
begin to gain the critical advantage. 
 
Figure 4.1 | Two key aspects of demography determine the power of selection on bet-hedging, both non-social 





4.4.2 Demographic stochasticity 
The second main result in this section is the form taken by Hamilton’s rule when individual demes 
experience no environmental fluctuations but individuals within the demes independently experience 
unpredictability in their reproductive successes around some central value. By chance, some individuals 
do well; also, by chance, others do poorly. This situation is one of pure demographic (as opposed to 
environmental) stochasticity. Because individuals are exposed to stochastic variation, the average 
reproductive success within demes can fluctuate stochastically – provided that the number of 
individuals in the deme (𝑁𝑑) is small enough that individual-level fluctuations can exert a meaningful 
influence over the deme’s average reproductive success (Melbinger and Vergassola, 2015). For this 
reason, 𝑁𝑑 now appears in the condition for selection when we derive the stochastic Hamilton’s rule 






























𝔼𝜋[𝑆?̅?] is the expected average reproductive success across the whole population. I provide formal 
definitions of 𝑐𝜎2
⦁  and 𝑏𝜎2
⦁  in detail in the derivation below, but, informally, they describe the actor’s 
effects on its own and its recipient’s variances in reproductive success respectively. In these 
coefficients, there is no correlation term, by definition: demographic stochasticity is defined by 
individuals experiencing stochastic variation in reproductive success independently of one another. 
𝑐𝜎2
⦁  and 𝑏𝜎2
⦁  are the direct and simple effects on the variance in reproductive success. In a situation of 
pure demographic stochasticity, one individual may unexpectedly produce more offspring than normal; 
by chance, another individual might also produce unexpectedly more offspring than normal, but these 
two individuals are enjoying entirely unconnected episodes of good luck. Here, there is no underlying 
environmental cause that leads to correlated fluctuation across individuals. Inequality 4.14 is very 
similar to the result we derived in Chapter 3 (Inequality 3.5) for demographic stochasticity in a single 
population with global competition (i.e., where 𝑁𝑑 = 𝑁). 
The biological implication of Inequality 4.14 is that a social organism can profitably buffer its close 
relatives (high 𝑟) from stochastic variation in reproductive success (𝑏𝜎2
⦁ > 0) even when individuals 
sample their reproductive success independently of other individuals. However, unlike the 
environmental stochasticity described by Inequality 4.13, this situation occurs only under restrictive 
biological conditions, which we might expect to be rare. Specifically, competition must occur locally 
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(𝑎 > 0) within demes of very small size (small 𝑁𝑑). Accordingly, Inequality 4.14 highlights in a social 
setting the key point established for non-social bet-hedging traits by Shpak and Proulx (2007) and 
Lehmann and Balloux (2007): demographic stochasticity can drive bet-hedging when deme size (𝑁𝑑) is 
small. As the number of individuals on the deme rises (high 𝑁𝑑), the fraction 
𝑎
𝑁𝑑
 (which determines the 
viability of volatility-suppressing altruism under conditions of pure demographic stochasticity) goes 
towards zero, eliminating the importance of volatility effects and restoring Hamilton’s rule to the 
means-only form commonly used empirically (𝑟𝑏𝜇 > 𝑐𝜇). 
Inequalities 4.13 and 4.14 emphasise one of the key points I argued in Chapter 3, this time in the 
context of a deme-structured population: environmental stochasticity is likely to be a much more 
powerful driver of altruistic bet-hedging than demographic stochasticity. In the next section, I provide 
derivations of these two inequalities. 
4.4.3 Derivation 
In this section, I provide derivations of Inequality 4.13 and of Inequality 4.14 in turn. Here, I apply the 
multilevel Price equation6 (Price, 1972) to the context of individuals 𝑖 within demes 𝑑 (subpopulations). 
In this context, the multilevel Price equation states that the change in the average breeding value for a 
trait of interest is the sum of between-deme selection (given by the covariance between deme-level 
fitness and average breeding value for the deme) and within-deme selection (given by the expected 
covariance between individual fitness and individual breeding value, across demes):  
Δ?̅? = ℂ𝑑 (
?̅?𝑑
?̅?
, ?̅?𝑑)⏟        
Between−deme
selection
+ 𝔼𝑑 [ℂ𝑖 (
𝑤𝑖𝑑
?̅?





𝐺 denotes breeding value for the trait of interest. As in Chapter 3, this might, for instance, be 𝐺 = 1 
for carriers of an allele and 𝐺 = 0 for non-carriers. 𝑑 denotes the identity of the deme (𝑑 ∈ 𝐷). Every 
individual in the population has its own breeding value. 𝐺𝑖𝑑 denotes the breeding value of the 𝑖th 
individual within deme 𝑑. The average of breeding values for the deme 𝑑 is denoted ?̅?𝑑. 𝑤𝑖𝑑 is the 
absolute fitness of the 𝑖th individual in the deme 𝑑. The average of all 𝑤𝑖𝑑 within the deme 𝑑 is ?̅?𝑑. ?̅? 





𝑑=1 ), which is also the average absolute 
                                                          
6 The well-known derivation of the multilevel Price equation (Okasha, 2004; Frank, 2012; Gardner, 2015c) 
is provided in Appendix D (page 253). 
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𝑑=1 ) in the special case in which demes are equal in 
size (i.e., when 𝑁𝑑 is the same for all demes 𝑑). 
Accordingly, we can account for stochasticity by taking the expectation of Equation 4.15 to obtain the 
condition for an expected increase in average breeding value (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] > 0), meaning that selection 
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To capture the tension between local and global competition, we introduce an element of density-
dependence: it is harder to raise an offspring successfully to maturity when doing so requires struggling 
against a large number of other competitors locally. There are various ways of incorporating density-
dependence into models of social evolution (van Dyken, 2010). Here, I consider the scenario in which 
density-dependence arises in the transition from juveniles to adulthood (henceforth, density-
dependent juvenile survival) because the local environment has a limited carrying capacity. 
I follow Frank (1998), Gardner and West (2004), and van Dyken (2010) in making a simplifying 
assumption: across the whole population, all individuals experience the same magnitude of local 
density-dependence. This allows us to treat the spatial scale of competition parameter 𝑎 (introduced 
in section 4.4.1) as a constant. Following Frank (1998), express the fitness of the focal individual 𝑖 in 
deme 𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑑 as: 
𝑤𝑖𝑑 =
𝑆𝑖𝑑
𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?
(4.17) 
 Every individual in each deme 𝑖𝑑 produces a number of juveniles 𝑆𝑖𝑑 before density-dependent 
regulation of juvenile survival. An individual 𝑖 on deme 𝑑 produces 𝑆𝑖𝑑 juveniles (Figure 4.2a); density-
dependence during juvenile survival converts this absolute number to a fitness value 𝑤𝑖𝑑 (Figure 4.2b); 
traits associated with higher fitness values spread in the population, and others are selected against 
(Figure 4.2c). Note that 𝑤𝑖𝑑 can be smaller or larger than 𝑆𝑖𝑑: it is a measure of relative success, relative 
specifically to the focal organism’s competitors: juveniles produced (𝑆𝑖𝑑) survive to adulthood with a 





Figure 4.2 | Density-dependent juvenile survival. (a) Individual 𝑖𝑑 produces 𝑆𝑖𝑑  juveniles. (b) This juvenile 
production is converted into a fitness value 𝑤𝑖𝑑, the value of which depends on the extent of local versus global 
competition (the parameter 𝑎) during density-dependent regulation of juvenile survival to adulthood. (c) The 
trait of interest will become more common in the population if carriers of the trait tend to have a higher fitness 
value 𝑤𝑖𝑑  than the average member of the population (?̅?). Nest image: BHL (CC). 
 
To clarify the meaning of the scale of competition parameter 𝑎, it is helpful to consider the two 
extreme cases (𝑎 = 0 and 𝑎 = 1). If there is no local competition (𝑎 = 0), the individual’s fitness 
(Equation 4.17) is simplified to the number of juveniles it can produce relative to the average number 





The average fitness ?̅? in the population (Equation 4.16) is then equal to 1. In other words, the average 























) = 1 (4.19) 






This case of complete local competition (𝑎 = 1) means that the change in the relative frequency of 
the focal allele in the population is just the total of all the within-deme struggles for juvenile survival to 
adulthood occurring independently across separate demes. For instance, we can imagine a deme in 
which the average individual has produced two juveniles (𝑆?̅? = 2). Assume that all other demes have 
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been much more successful: in each of these demes, the average individual has produced one hundred 
juveniles (𝑆?̅? = 100). If there is complete local competition (𝑎 = 1), juveniles on the focal deme will 
never face density-dependent competition for survival against the high numbers of juveniles produced 
in the rest of the population. Accordingly, an individual 𝑖 who produces four juveniles on the focal deme 






= 2). A less fortunate individual 𝑖 who produces 







0.04). To ask whether, across the whole population, there is an increase or a decrease in the frequency 
of the focal allele, we then ask whether carrying the allele leads to a higher relative fitness on average 
across all demes.  
When there is pure local competition (𝑎 = 1), we do not need to consider the fact that individuals on 
different demes may be producing different absolute numbers of juveniles before density-dependence 
occurs: with 𝑎 = 1, the outcome of selection depends entirely on within-deme selection rather than 




). As is the case when 𝑎 = 0 (above), the average 𝑤𝑖𝑑 in the whole population (?̅?) must also 
be equal to 1 if 𝑎 = 1. Substituting ?̅?𝑑 = ?̅? = 1 into Inequality 4.16, the condition for selection to 
favour the trait of interest (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] > 0) can then be simplified, because between-deme selection 
vanishes (a covariance with a constant is equal to zero): 










However, in the more general case where an individual’s competitors come from more than one 
spatial level in the population (i.e., partly from the local deme and partly from the global population of 
all demes, 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1), ?̅? is not equal to 1. The between-deme selection covariance of Inequality 4.16 
remains in the condition for selection to favour the trait of interest. In this case, substituting the 
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Within−deme fitness 



















For future uses of this inequality (Inequality 4.22), it will be convenient to express the expected 
between-deme selection in the form of the product of a regression slope and the variance. In the terms 
of Price (1972), these are the ‘intensity of selection’ between demes and the ‘variation on which 
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The aim now is to rearrange Inequality 4.22 so that we separate the effects of local stochasticity and 
global stochasticity: obtaining separate terms for local and global stochasticity will make clear how they 
each influence the outcome of selection. The crucial term to rearrange appears in the within-deme 
selection covariance above. We focus on the 𝑖th individual’s within-deme fitness (the average, across 
environmental states, of the number of juveniles produced by 𝑖 relativized by the number of juveniles 
produced by 𝑖’s competitors): 
Within deme fitness = 𝔼𝜋 [
𝑆𝑖𝑑
?̅?(𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?)
] (4.24) 
Equation 4.24 is the expectation of a ratio of two random variables (the numerator and the 
denominator are both random variables). To expand expectations of ratios into the underlying 
statistical moments characterising each random variable, we can use the Delta method (an application 
of a Taylor series approximation), as in Chapter 3 (Rice, 2008; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). Specifically, 











In the same way, we can substitute the numerator and denominator of Equation 4.24 into 𝑋 and 𝑌 
respectively, in Equation 4.25, and then carry the constants 𝑎 and (1 − 𝑎) out of the covariance terms 





𝔼𝜋[?̅?(𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?)]
(𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] − 𝑎
ℂ𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑 , ?̅?𝑆?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?(𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?)]
− (1 − 𝑎)
ℂ𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑 , ?̅?𝑆?̅?]





In Equation 4.26, the term 𝔼𝜋[?̅?(𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?)] appears in several places. Biologically, this term 
represents the expected fitness (over environmental states 𝜋) of the average competitor of a member 
of deme 𝑑. If competition for juvenile survival to adulthood is entirely local (𝑎 = 1), the expected fitness 
of an average competitor is 𝔼𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?]. If competition for juvenile survival to adulthood is entirely global 
(𝑎 = 0), the expected fitness of an average competitor is 𝔼𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?]. Note that ?̅? appears in each 
expectation as a scaling factor, relativising fitness. To simplify the notation, henceforth denote the 
fitness of the average competitor of a member of deme 𝑑 by 𝑧𝑑 (i.e., 𝑧𝑑 = ?̅?(𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?)). 𝑧𝑑 is 
free to differ for members of different demes, because 𝑆?̅? can take on different values in different 
demes. Below (in the section titled ‘Special cases’), I will return to the special case in which all demes 
sample their environmental state independently from a shared probability distribution, which leads to 
a useful simplification of the argument. 
It is clearer to express correlations rather than covariances. Since ℂ𝜋[𝑋, 𝑌] = 𝜌𝑋,𝑌𝜎[𝑋]𝜎[𝑌], we can 














Local and global sources of stochasticity 
In Equation 4.27, there are two sources of stochasticity that influence the within-deme fitness of 
individual 𝑖𝑑: local and global. First, there are fluctuations in the fitness of average competitors on the 
local deme 𝑑 (represented in Equation 4.27 by the standard deviation over environmental states 
𝜎𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?]). Second, there are fluctuations in the fitness of the average competitor in the global 
population (represented in Equation 4.27 by the standard deviation over environmental states 
𝜎𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?]). In Chapter 3, I defined a stochasticity coefficient 𝑣 as the coefficient of variation in population 
average reproductive success (standard deviation divided by the expectation of average reproductive 
success in the population). Here, I take a similar approach. However, rather than a single term 𝑣 for all 
stochasticity, I split stochasticity into the two sources of fluctuation (local and global). First, define local 
stochasticity as the fluctuation in the local deme’s average fitness (relative to the expected fitness of 






The subscript 𝑑 denotes the deme on which this stochasticity coefficient applies. In the general case, 
different demes are free to show different levels of stochasticity. I will return below to the special case 
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in which demes draw their environmental state from a common distribution. The superscript ‘⦁’ 
denotes ‘local’; I separate it from the subscript 𝑑 to highlight that different demes 𝑑 can experience 
different stochasticities 𝑣⦁, in principle. 
Second, define global stochasticity as the fluctuation in the whole population’s average fitness 






The superscript ‘⦿’ denotes ‘global’. Again, I separate it from the subscript 𝑑 to highlight that 
members of different demes can experience different ‘global’ stochasticities 𝑣⦿. Biologically, this 
means that, although the raw fluctuation in population-wide average reproductive success (𝜎𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?]) 
is by definition the same for every member of every deme, its importance depends on the fitness of an 
average competitor, which can differ between demes. Informally, this can be understood in terms of 
the severity of fluctuations relative to the focal individual’s expectation of average fitness: for the same 
magnitude of fluctuation, an individual on a deme where individuals have, on average, 50 offspring will 
experience population-wide fluctuations as less profound than an individual on a deme where 
individuals have, on average, only 20 offspring. The relative size of fluctuation is magnified as 𝔼𝜋[𝑧𝑑] 
becomes smaller, which is why the stochasticity terms capture the relative importance of stochasticity 
to the organism when optimising its fitness. 
To clarify these two sources of stochasticity (local and global), it is worth noting how they depend on 
the spatial scale of competition (𝑎). When 𝑎 = 0, competition is completely global. In this case, all 
individuals on all demes face the same average competitor. The denominator of the stochasticity 
coefficients (the expected fitness of an average competitor, 𝔼𝜋[𝑧𝑑]) is now the same from the 
perspective of any deme 𝑑. In summary, the denominator (𝔼𝜋[𝑧𝑑]) scales the magnitude of each 
stochasticity coefficient according to the average fitness that the focal individual is competing against. 
The numerators (𝜎𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?] and 𝜎𝜋[?̅?𝑆?̅?]) measure the degree to which local and global average fitness 
fluctuate. 
To include explicit terms for the spatial scales of competition and fluctuation in the condition for 
selection to favour the trait of interest, we substitute the within-deme fitness for individual 𝑖𝑑 (Equation 









⏞          
Expected between−deme selection




⦁𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] − (1 − 𝑎)𝑣𝑑
⦿𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑])
⏞                                            
Within−deme fitness for the 𝑖th individual
, 𝐺𝑖𝑑)]




It is worth recapping the biological meaning of Inequality 4.30. Each individual in the population 
samples its number of juveniles (𝑆𝑖𝑑) from its own private probability distribution. Each individual’s 
distribution is characterised by its own expected value (𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]) and its own standard deviation 
(𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]). The key message of bet-hedging theory is that variation in fitness at the level of the individual 
can only exert an influence over the outcome of selection if it is correlated with fluctuations in other 
individuals (Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012); this is because bet-hedgers gain their advantage during periods 
when the general population is underperforming (amplifying the reproductive value of any successful 
reproduction). If there are no correlated fluctuations, there can be no fluctuating reproductive value.  
Because we are interested in effects occurring at different spatial levels in the population (local 
competition and global competition), there are two forms of correlation to consider: the correlation of 
the focal individual’s juvenile production (𝑆𝑖𝑑)  with local fluctuations (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑 in Inequality 4.30) and 
the correlation with global fluctuations (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔 in Inequality 4.30). In many biologically relevant cases, 
these correlation terms can be completely ignored. For instance, if all individuals in a focal deme will 
do better than they normally do when the deme is in a favourable environmental state (and do worse 
than they normally do when the deme is in an unfavourable environmental state), the underlying 
correlation here is simply 1. Correlation therefore vanishes from Inequality 4.30. Biologically, this 
describes a reasonable scenario – or at least a close approximation of reality: in a drought, all individuals 
do worse than they would normally do; in a bonanza, all individuals do better than they would normally 
do. Inequality 4.30 is not committed to this simplifying condition, however biologically reasonable it 
may be. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these underlying correlations exert little effect on the 
outcome under a broad range of biologically reasonable scenarios, which helps to simplify the 
interpretation. Last, note that each volatility term in Inequality 4.30 (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] and 
𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]) is preceded by a negative sign. The biological meaning here is that stochasticity in the 
focal individual’s ability to produce juveniles (𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]) penalises their total fitness only if these 
stochastic effects are correlated with fluctuations amongst the focal individual’s average competitors.  
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Now that we have a general condition for selection in which the spatial scale of competition (𝑎) and 
the spatial scale of fluctuation (𝑣𝑑
⦁  and 𝑣𝑑
⦁ ) are explicit, we can turn to social behaviour. Specifically, we 
aim to capture social effects on the reproductive uncertainty of social partners, and ask how these 
social effects are selected under different spatial scales of competition and fluctuation. 
 
Regression slopes for different aspects of fitness 
I follow the form of Hamilton’s rule developed by Queller (1992a), in which the fitness of a focal 
individual is described by a multiple linear regression on its own and its social partner’s genotypes (see 
Chapters 1 and 3). The genotype of the focal individual 𝑖𝑑 appears in Inequality 4.30 as 𝐺𝑖𝑑. Denote the 
genotype of the social partner 𝑗𝑑 as 𝐺𝑗𝑑. Whereas Queller (1992a) used a single response variable (the 
organism’s fitness), here we are interested in different components of fitness, specifically the mean 
and volatility in reproductive success. We therefore use more than one response variable. In Inequality 
4.30, there are three key components of the focal individual’s fitness. These are: 
1. its expected number of juveniles produced (𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]); 
2. its standard deviation in juvenile production correlated with local competitors (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]); 
and 
3. its standard deviation in juvenile production correlated with global competitors (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]). 
Accordingly, describe each one using multiple regressions on 𝐺𝑖𝑑 and 𝐺𝑗𝑑: 










𝐺𝑗𝑑 + 𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] 
(4.33) 
In each expression, the intercept terms (𝛼) capture the ‘baseline’ values for each component of 
fitness, before the effects of the focal individual’s genotype (𝐺𝑖𝑑) and the genotype of its social partner 
(𝐺𝑗𝑑) are considered. The error terms (𝜖) capture variation across the fitted regression lines. Both the 
intercepts (𝛼) and error terms (𝜖) will vanish subsequently from the analysis (discussed below), so we 
need only focus on the partial regression terms (𝛽).  
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To make the biological meanings of each partial regression slope 𝛽 more explicit, we now denote 
them as follows. First, let 𝑐𝜇 denote the effect of the focal individual on its own expected fecundity: 
𝑐𝜇 = −𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑],𝐺𝑖𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑑 (4.34) 
𝑐𝜇 is the ‘cost’ term to the expected number of juveniles produced. Note that I follow the convention 
of defining the cost term with a negative sign (Gardner et al., 2011), which ultimately leads to the 
condition 𝑟𝐵 − 𝐶 > 0. When substituted into the regression equation, we add a negative in front of 
the cost term. 
Second, the effect of a social partner on the focal individual’s expected number of juveniles (before 
density-dependent regulation of juvenile survival): 
𝑏𝜇 = 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑],𝐺𝑗𝑑 (4.35) 
𝑏𝜇 denotes the benefit provided by a social partner 𝑗𝑑 (whose genotype is 𝐺𝑗𝑑) to the expected 
number of juveniles that the focal individual can produce (𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]). A social partner may, for instance, 
be able to provision the focal individual with additional resources, guard the nest, or provide a ‘life 
insurance’ benefit (Field et al., 2000). Note that we are focusing on social effects experienced by a focal 
individual (the so-called ‘neighbour-modulated’ approach; Gardner et al., 2011). Assuming an absence 
of class structure, benefit terms of this type are exactly equal to the benefit term provided by the focal 
individual on the deme 𝑑 (i.e., 𝑏𝜇 = 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑],𝐺𝑗𝑑 = 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑗𝑑],𝐺𝑖𝑑), because they are in fact parts of 
regressions taken across the whole deme: the components of Hamilton’s rule are taken across the 
whole competitive population (Queller, 1992a, 1992b). We can therefore switch our perspective easily 
and describe 𝑏𝜇 as the effect of a focal individual on a social partner. This takes us from a ‘neighbour-
modulated’ Hamilton’s rule to an ‘inclusive fitness’ Hamilton’s rule. 
Next, let 𝑐𝜎,𝑑






⦁  measures the extent to which focal individual 𝑖𝑑 (whose genotype is 𝐺𝑖𝑑) fails or succeeds in 
buffering itself from local fluctuations in reproductive success. As previously, the superscript ‘⦁’ 
highlights that this is the component of fitness dealing with the individual’s ability to buffer local 
fluctuations on deme 𝑑. If possessing a higher genetic value 𝐺𝑖𝑑 is associated with a higher level of 
locally-correlated stochasticity in the focal individual’s reproduction (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]), the regression 
slope 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁  is positive. When we come to substitute this term back into the condition for selection, we 
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will find that it is preceded by a negative sign. This makes biological sense: higher levels of reproductive 
stochasticity reduce the focal individual’s total fitness. 
Next, let 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁  denote the effect of a social partner on the focal individual’s (locally-correlated) 




If social partners successfully buffer the focal individual from local stochasticity, the regression slope 
here is negative, which increases fitness. In order that the benefit term 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁  captures a positive 
increment to fitness, we therefore add the negative sign: a negative slope 𝛽𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑],𝐺𝑗𝑑










⦿  is identical to 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁  with the exception that here we are dealing with the correlations with global 
fluctuations (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔) rather than correlations with local deme fluctuations (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑). It is important 
to note that 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿  is specific to the deme 𝑑: it is the extent to which actors in deme 𝑑 buffer themselves 
from global fluctuations. To maintain maximum generality, we allow actors in other demes to achieve 
this to greater or lesser degrees, meaning that 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿  is a deme-specific fitness effect. In the special case 
where actors have the same buffering effect on their own reproduction regardless of which deme they 
are present in, 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿  is the same for all demes across the whole population. 
Finally, let 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿  denote the effect of a social partner on the focal individual’s (globally-correlated) 





⦿  above, 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿  is identical to 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁  with the exception that here we are dealing with the 
correlations with global fluctuations (𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔) rather than correlations with local deme fluctuations 
(𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑). Similarly, 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿  is specific to the deme 𝑑: it is the extent to which social partners in deme 𝑑 
buffer their recipients from global fluctuations. This social effect is free to differ between demes. As 
with 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿ , the simplest special case is where social partners have the same buffering effect in all demes, 
such that 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿  is the same in all demes across the whole population. 
88 
 
For a behaviour or trait of interest, we now have three forms of ‘cost’ paid by the actor (𝑐𝜇, 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ , and 
𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿ ). We also have three forms of ‘benefit’ enjoyed by the recipient (𝑏𝜇, 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁ , and 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿ ). These six terms 
appear in the regression equations for three components of the focal individual’s fitness (𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑], 
𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑], and 𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]). To recap: 
𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] = 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] − 𝑐𝜇𝐺𝑖𝑑 + 𝑏𝜇𝐺𝑗𝑑 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] (4.40) 
𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] = 𝛼𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
+ 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ 𝐺𝑖𝑑 − 𝑏𝜎,𝑑




⦿ 𝐺𝑖𝑑 − 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿ 𝐺𝑗𝑑 + 𝜖𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
(4.42) 
To obtain the condition for selection in a form that is recognisable as Hamilton’s rule, we now 












ℂ𝑖 (𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] − 𝑐𝜇𝐺𝑖𝑑 + 𝑏𝜇𝐺𝑗𝑑 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] − 𝑎𝑣𝑑
⦁ (𝛼𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
+ 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ 𝐺𝑖𝑑 − 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁ 𝐺𝑗𝑑 + 𝜖𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
)
− (1 − 𝑎)𝑣𝑑
⦿ (𝛼𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
+ 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿ 𝐺𝑖𝑑 − 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿ 𝐺𝑗𝑑 + 𝜖𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
) , 𝐺𝑖𝑑)] > 0 
(4.43) 
















, 𝐺𝑖𝑑) + 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ ℂ𝑖(𝐺𝑖𝑑 , 𝐺𝑖𝑑) − 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁ ℂ𝑖(𝐺𝑗𝑑 , 𝐺𝑖𝑑)
+ ℂ𝑖 (𝜖𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
, 𝐺𝑖𝑑))
− (1 − 𝑎)𝑣𝑑
⦿ (ℂ𝑖 (𝛼𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
, 𝐺𝑖𝑑) + 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿ ℂ𝑖(𝐺𝑖𝑑 , 𝐺𝑖𝑑) − 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿ ℂ𝑖(𝐺𝑗𝑑 , 𝐺𝑖𝑑)
+ ℂ𝑖 (𝜖𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅??̅?𝑔𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]




As in Chapter 3, we can now remove from this inequality any covariances with a constant (which are, 
by definition, equal to zero). We assume that any covariances with the error terms (𝜖) in Equations 
4.40–4.42 are equal to zero (Birch and Marshall, 2014). The covariances involving intercepts (𝛼) and 
error terms (𝜖) can therefore be dropped from Inequality 4.44. 
We now make within-deme relatedness (henceforth, 𝑟𝑑) explicit for the deme 𝑑. Let 𝑟𝑑 be the 
regression of partner genetic value (𝐺𝑗𝑑) on the focal individual’s genetic value (𝐺𝑖𝑑) across all 

















(𝑟𝑑𝑏𝜇 − 𝑐𝜇 − 𝑎𝑣𝑑
⦁ (𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ − 𝑟𝑑𝑏𝜎,𝑑








Thus, we have partitioned variance in allele frequency into two components: within-deme variance 
(𝕍𝑖[𝐺𝑖𝑑] for each deme 𝑑) and between-deme variance (𝕍𝑑[?̅?𝑑]). 
  
Special case 
Inequality 4.46 captures the general condition for selection of the trait of interest. Here, relatedness, 
social fitness effects, non-social fitness effects, deme size, and the magnitude and type of 
environmental fluctuation are free to differ between demes, and demes are free to accumulate 
different allele frequencies through time such that, at the start of the time interval considered by 
Inequality 4.46, there may already exist considerable differences between demes in the frequency of 
different traits. In this section, I show how a simpler expression (Inequality 4.13) can be derived, in 
which it is easier to see the effects of the scale of competition (𝑎) and the spatial scale of fluctuation 
(𝑣𝑑
⦁  and 𝑣𝑑
⦿). This requires simplifying assumptions that eliminate the sources of between-deme 
heterogeneity listed at the start of this paragraph. 
Consider the following special case: 
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1. Let each patch exist as an independent arena of environmental fluctuation within a well-mixed 
global population undergoing density-dependent regulation of juvenile survival to adulthood.  
2. On reaching adulthood, let juveniles disperse at random across the population (i.e., assume global 
dispersal). 
3. Previous adults die when the new generation disperses (i.e., assume discrete adult generations 
without overlap). 
4. Let demes be identical but independent fluctuating arenas of environmental change. In other 
words, all demes are equally likely to suffer drought, or food abundance, or local increases in 
parasite pressure. Some demes will fall into one environmental state, others into another, but the 
probability of each state is now identical across demes. 
Because this special case assumes fully random dispersal of adults at the end of each discrete 
generation, the alleles of interest will be in essentially equal frequencies in any two areas of the 
population. We can define a well-mixed population of adults as possessing a constant variance in 
breeding value 𝕍𝑖𝑑[𝐺𝑖𝑑] within all demes on patches: for all demes 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 on separate patches, 
𝕍𝑖𝑑[𝐺𝑖𝑑] is equal to the global variance in allele frequency 𝕍𝑖[𝐺𝑖] across the whole population. Likewise, 
because all demes have the same allele frequency, they have the same average breeding value ?̅?𝑑. 
Accordingly, there is no variance in ?̅?𝑑 between demes (𝕍𝑑[?̅?𝑑] = 0), so between-deme selection is 
zero in Inequality 4.46. It is important to note that this is a significant simplifying assumption: it has long 
been appreciated that 𝕍𝑑[?̅?𝑑] can be nonzero simply due to ‘sampling errors in colonization’ 
(Uyenoyama, 1979) during between-deme dispersal. 
Because we have now introduced the assumption that demes are identical but independent 
fluctuating arenas, 𝔼𝜋[𝑧𝑑] (the expectation over stochasticity of the average fitness of a competitor of 
an individual in deme 𝑑) is the same for all demes. It can therefore be carried outside of the expected 
within-deme selection term in Inequality 4.46 and divided out of the inequality. Local and global sources 
of stochasticity (𝑣𝑑
⦁  and 𝑣𝑑
⦿ respectively) are now no longer deme-specific, so we can drop the 
subscripts ‘𝑑’. Inequality 4.46 can now be simplified to: 
𝔼𝑑[𝑟𝑑𝑏𝜇 − 𝑐𝜇 − 𝑎𝑣
⦁(𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ − 𝑟𝑑𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁ ) − (1 − 𝑎)𝑣⦿(𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿ − 𝑟𝑑𝑏𝜎,𝑑




In the additional special case where demes do not differ in any way except environmental state (and 
therefore their baseline fecundity 𝑆?̅?), Inequality 4.47 can be further simplified. Relatedness (𝑟𝑑), direct 
fitness effects (𝑐𝜇, 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦁ , and 𝑐𝜎,𝑑
⦿ ), and indirect fitness effects (𝑏𝜇, 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦁ , and 𝑏𝜎,𝑑
⦿ ) are no longer deme-
specific. Rather, relatedness and the fitness effects of behaviour are the same wherever the focal 













+ (1 − 𝑎)𝑣⦿𝑏𝜎
⦿






⏞                    
Total Hamiltonian benefit (𝐵)






+ (1 − 𝑎)𝑣⦿𝑐𝜎
⦿




⏞                  
Total Hamiltonian cost (𝐶)
 
Selection can favour altruistically buffering relatives (𝑟 > 0) from local environmental fluctuations 
(𝑏𝜎
⦁ > 0) if competition is local (𝑎 > 0) and the local deme experiences stochastic fluctuations in 
average reproductive success (𝑣⦁ > 0), even if there are no fluctuations globally (𝑣⦿ ≈ 0).  
 
Demographic stochasticity 
We have now derived Inequality 4.13 (the condition for altruistic bet-hedging to evolve by 
environmental stochasticity in a deme-structured population). We now turn to Inequality 4.14 (the 
condition for altruistic bet-hedging to evolve by demographic stochasticity in a deme-structured 
population). 
Consider a population of a very large number of demes in a well-mixed population subject to local 
demographic stochasticity and local density-dependent regulation. At a whole population scale, despite 
the potential for fluctuation in individual 𝑆?̅? values between different demes, there is no fluctuation in 
𝑆?̅?. By the law of large numbers across many demes, there is negligible fluctuation in whole-population 
average juvenile production 𝑆?̅? and negligible fluctuation in whole-population average fitness (after 
density-dependent juvenile survival) ?̅?. At the limit of an infinite number of independent demes with 
intra-demic demographic stochasticity, ?̅? can therefore be treated as a constant across environmental 
states (i.e., it converges in probability) – which I do in the following steps. Thus, under demographic 
stochasticity at the limit of infinite deme number, we can write: 
ℂ𝜋(𝑆𝑖𝑑 , ?̅?𝑆?̅?) = ?̅?ℂ𝜋(𝑆𝑖𝑑 , 𝑆?̅?) (4.48) 
ℂ𝜋(𝑆𝑖𝑑 , ?̅?𝑆?̅?) = 0 (4.49) 







?̅?𝔼𝜋[𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?]
(𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑] − 𝑎
?̅?ℂ𝜋(𝑆𝑖𝑑, 𝑆?̅?)
?̅?𝔼𝜋[𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?]
) (4.50) 
?̅? cancels out of the fraction. Under the definition of demographic stochasticity, ℂ𝜋(𝑆𝑖𝑑 , 𝑆𝑗𝑑) = 0 for 
all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. Note that: 
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𝔼𝜋[𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?]
) (4.52) 
We will commit to the assumptions in the ‘special case’ above: we assume a single well-mixed 
population where allele frequencies are the same throughout the population, rather than showing a 
patchy distribution between demes. Under this simplifying assumption: 
𝔼𝜋[𝑆?̅?] = 𝔼𝜋[𝑆?̅?] (4.53) 
Therefore: 
𝔼𝜋[𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?] = 𝔼𝜋[𝑆?̅?] (4.54) 
As in the ‘special case’ above, the uniform nature of the population also removes the scope for 
between-deme selection, since 𝕍𝑑[?̅?𝑑] = 0. The condition for selection is then: 





, 𝐺𝑖𝑑)] > 0 (4.55) 
Using Queller’s regression method (following the same series of steps as we have just done for 






























where volatility-increasing cost 𝑐𝜎2 = 𝛽𝕍(𝑆𝑖𝑑),𝐺𝑖𝑑 and volatility-reducing benefit 𝑏𝜎2 = −𝛽𝕍(𝑆𝑖𝑑),𝐺𝑗𝑑. 
In other words, when Inequality 4.14 is satisfied, altruistic bet-hedging can evolve in a large population 
that appears to show no aggregate fluctuation, because fluctuations are occurring at a local level 
alongside local competition. Local demographic stochasticity (𝜎𝜋[𝑆?̅?] > 0) within the population 
generates a fluctuating background reproductive success over local demes, despite the essential 
absence of wholesale fluctuation at a global scale (𝜎𝜋[𝑆?̅?] ≈ 0). When individuals face local competition 
for reproductive success (higher values of the local density-dependent competition parameter 𝑎), local 
chance fluctuations in baseline reproductive success (𝑆?̅?) provide the volatile background necessary for 
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bet-hedgers to invade. Bet-hedgers then dampen exposure to individual-level reproductive uncertainty 
– either for their own reproductive success (𝑐𝜎
⦁ < 0) and/or for the success of relatives (𝑏𝜎
⦁ > 0, 𝑟 > 0). 
When alleles do not differ in expected reproductive success (𝑟𝑏𝜇 − 𝑐𝜇 = 0), any slight reduction in 
the uncertainty of a relative’s reproduction (𝑏𝜎2
⦁ > 0, 𝑟 > 0) is expected to be favoured by selection 
for any combination of deme size 𝑁𝑑 and value of nonzero local competition 𝑎, although the marginal 
change in expected outcome will be extremely slight at high 𝑁𝑑. The ratio 
𝑎
𝑁𝑑
 exerts a strong control 
over the scope for bet-hedging to invade by demographic stochasticity. When 𝑎 = 1 (i.e., the whole 
population is a single deme), Inequality 4.14 recovers the expansion of the stochastic Hamilton’s rule 
for demographic stochasticity of Chapter 3. 
4.5 Evolutionarily stable strategy in a simple game 
To explore the effects of demography on altruistic bet-hedging, I illustrate altruistic bet-hedging with 
local competition in a simple game in which cooperators and defectors inhabit a population composed 
of identical demes on patches showing independent environmental fluctuations. To find the 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we consider whether a monomorphic population is resistant to 
invasion by a mutant at different scales of competition 𝑎. 
In the case where phenotype is entirely determined by genotype (𝐺𝑖𝑑 = 𝑧𝑖𝑑), we can translate 
between HRG and a partial derivative version of Hamilton’s rule expressed in terms of phenotypes 
(Gardner et al., 2010). This requires committing to an assumption of weak selection (Birch, 2016b). Let 
𝑧 denote focal phenotype and 𝑧′ denote partner phenotype.  
Because the environmental state on each deme’s patch is fluctuating independently, there is no inter-
deme correlation in reproductive success: by the law of large numbers (given a large or infinite number 
of demes 𝐷), there is no fluctuation in average fecundity at a whole population scale (𝑣𝑑
⦿ is zero). 
Accordingly, global sources of stochasticity can be set to zero in Hamilton’s rule. For Inequality 4.13, 





























< 0 (4.58) 
To illustrate the role of patchy stochasticity, consider a haploid asexual population of two alleles 
(selfish and cooperative). Environmental state of each deme fluctuates equally and unpredictably 
between two environmental states 𝜋, a high fecundity state 1 and a low fecundity state 2. The selfish 
allele never cooperates. The cooperative allele eliminates local environmental effects on fecundity, 
such that recipients obtain their expected (pre-density-regulation) fecundity 𝔼𝜋[𝑆] in all states. 
Individuals without cooperative partners have fecundity 𝑆𝜋⦁, which depends on the local environmental 
state 𝜋⦁. Cooperators pay a cost 𝐶. Payoffs are therefore defined according to the simple matrix in 
Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2 | State-dependent payoffs to row player 
given their own behaviour and behaviour of a 
partner (columns) 
 Cooperative Selfish 
Cooperative 𝔼𝜋[𝑆] − 𝐶 𝑆𝜋⦁ − 𝐶 
Selfish 𝔼𝜋[𝑆] 𝑆𝜋⦁  
 
The phenotype 𝑧 in this case is the probability of acting cooperatively. Consider the interaction 
between two players with phenotypes 𝑧 (focal individual) and 𝑧′ (partner individual). Given there are 




− 𝑧𝐶 (4.59) 
In other words, the expected fecundity payoff (where the expectation is taken across environmental 
states) does not depend on the social partner’s phenotype 𝑧′: it only depends on the focal individual’s 
phenotype 𝑧. We therefore only need one partial derivative for expected fecundity: 
𝜕𝔼𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
𝜕𝑧
= −𝐶 (4.60) 
We also need the partial derivatives for 𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,?̅?𝑑𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]. Because there are two states, and one of these 
states carries a higher fecundity for everyone (𝑆1 > 𝑆2), the correlation term 𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑑,𝑆̅𝑑 = 1 for all 
individuals on the deme. Fecundity volatility is then: 





In other words, fecundity volatility (standard deviation across environmental states) does not depend 
on the focal individual’s phenotype 𝑧: it only depends on the partner individual’s phenotype 𝑧′. If the 
partner increases the rate of defection (i.e., reduces 𝑧′), the focal is exposed to increased fecundity 
volatility. We therefore need one partial derivative on fecundity volatility, because the first term in the 
brackets in Equation 4.56 is zero: 
𝜕𝜎𝜋[𝑆𝑖𝑑]
𝜕𝑧′
= −0.5√(𝑆1 − 𝑆2)
2 (4.62) 
The final variable we need is intra-demic stochasticity. In the limit of an infinite number of demes 𝐷, 
whole-population-state-specific population average reproductive success (?̅?𝜋) converges in probability 
to a constant (𝑥). Taking the limit of an infinite number of demes therefore simplifies the local 
stochasticity coefficient 𝑣𝑑
⦁ . The constant 𝑥 can be carried outside of both the numerator and the 







𝑥𝔼𝜋[𝑎𝑆?̅? + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆?̅?]
=
𝜎𝜋[𝑆?̅?]
𝑎𝔼𝜋[𝑆?̅?] + (1 − 𝑎)𝔼𝜋[𝑆?̅?]
(4.63) 
Let demes represent discrete arenas in a well-mixed population on patches be equal in size 𝑁𝑑, equal 
in genetic variance, and sampling their environmental state as identical and independent random 








𝑆1 + 𝑆2 − 2𝑐𝑧̅
(4.64) 
Intra-demic volatility in baseline fecundity (𝜎𝜋[𝑆?̅?]) depends on the intra-demic frequency of 
defection (1 − 𝑧̅): in this scenario (Table 4.2), higher rates of local defection generate higher levels of 
local stochasticity. Because we are solving for the ESS strategy, we consider a mutant allele invading a 
population that is otherwise monomorphic (evaluate at 𝑧′ = 𝑧 = 𝑧̅; Gardner, Griffin and West, 2010). 
The frequency of each type of interaction follows the 𝛼 coefficient of Gardner et al. (2011), as in 
Chapter 3, applied here within demes rather than at a whole population scale (Table 4.3). Intra-demic 











= −𝐶 − 𝑎 (
√(𝑆1 − 𝑆2)
2(𝑧̅ − 1)2
𝑆1 + 𝑆2 − 2𝑐𝑧̅
) (−0.5√(𝑆1 − 𝑆2)
2𝑟) = 0 (4.65) 





2 − 2𝑐(𝑆1 + 𝑆2)
−4𝑐2 + 𝑎𝑟(𝑆1 − 𝑆2)
2
(4.66) 
𝑧∗ increases with 𝑎. Intuitively, in a globally stable metapopulation with stochastic demes, the ESS 
level of volatility-suppressing cooperation increases as the scale of competition (Figure 4.3a). becomes 
increasingly intra-demic (Figure 4.3b). 
 




phenotype (𝑧′)  
Frequency within the local deme 𝑑 
0 0 𝛼(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑝)2 
0 1 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
1 0 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
1 1 𝛼𝑝 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝2 
 
 
Figure 4.3 | Intuitively, buffering relatives from local sources of stochasticity can evolve when the scale of 
competition is local. (a) Focal individuals experience two sources of competition (global and local), and 
therefore two sources of stochasticity. (b) Here, I plot five different cost values for the payoffs in the simple 
bet-hedging game in Table 4.2 and show the strategy 𝑧∗. 𝑟 = 0.5; 𝑆1 = 4; 𝑆2 = 1. 
4.6 Individual-based simulation 
In the previous section, we solved directly for equilibrium strategies under the simplifying assumption 
that demes are identical in all parameters except local patch environmental state. This reveals the 
contribution of the fluctuating environment without the confounding effect of alternative sources of 
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inter-patch variation (e.g. variation in social effects between demes driven by local frequency-
dependence). Practically, this means that individuals are effectively allocated randomly to demes each 
generation after selection (surviving adult offspring disperse across the landscape). As a result, demes 
do not develop locally-distinct allele frequencies, so starting allele frequencies on each patch for each 
bout of selection do not vary in space as we move over the landscape. This means that both (1) local 
frequency-dependence through the generations and (2) group selection between demes can be 
eliminated when solving for the ESS. 
In this section, I show (using individual-based simulations) that relaxing this assumption – and instead 
permitting local build-up of independent intra-demic allele frequencies – has a relatively slight effect 
on the outcome in this simple cooperative game. Despite permitting local allele clustering, the 
simulation outcomes echo the analytical predictions in Figure 4.3b. Environmental fluctuation alone 
accounts for the major part of variation in outcomes.  
I use simulations in MATLAB in discrete generations (code is provided in Appendix 2). For each deme, 
I allow asexual individuals to interact according to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, and vary the scale of 
competition by sampling a proportion 𝑎 of future deme members from the home deme (in proportion 
to payoffs) and a proportion 1 − 𝑎 from the offspring pool of the whole metapopulation (also in 
proportion to payoffs). Intermediate levels of cooperation predicted by a mixed ESS (Equation 4.27) can 
be achieved by either a (1) monomorphic population playing a mixed strategy or (2) a polymorphic 
population playing distinct pure strategies (Maynard Smith, 1973): in either case, the same predicted 
average level of cooperation (𝑧̅ = 𝑧∗) will be achieved. Here, I compete two fixed strategies: 
constitutive cooperators (𝑧 = 1) versus constitutive defectors (𝑧 = 0). 
Outcomes at two different cost values are shown in Figure 4.4, and follow the predictions of the 
unpacked Hamilton’s rule (Figure 4.3). Constitutive cooperators (𝑧 = 1) invade a population of 
constitutive defectors (𝑧 = 0) to a metapopulation-level polymorphic equilibrium. This can occur when 
the scale of competition is sufficiently high to expose individuals to strong local fluctuations in baseline 
fecundity (Figure 4.5) 
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Figure 4.4 | Altruistic bet-hedgers invade fine-grained metapopulations with stochastic demes and local (intra-
demic) competition. Simulation outcomes follow the analytical predictions in Figure 4.3. (a) Costs of cooperation 
𝑐 = 0.3; (b) Costs of cooperation 𝑐 = 0.1. In each figure, each scale of competition value 𝑎 is simulated five times 
(up to either fixation or 10,000 generations): mean end frequency across replicates is shown in black; individual 
replicates are shown in blue. Note that when competition is entirely local (𝑎 = 1) in the higher cost simulation 
(panel a), high levels of stochastic extinctions on demes occur, and cannot be reversed by migration (the ‘rescue 
effect’). This leads to a drop to a low frequency: there is a high risk of permanent stochastic extinction on each 
deme. 𝑁𝑑 = 1,000, 𝐷 = 1,000, 𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑆1 = 4, 𝑆2 = 1, 𝑃(𝜋1
⦁ ↔ 𝜋2
⦁) = 0.5. Simulations start at 𝑝 = 0.01. 
 
Figure 4.5 | Simulation results confirm that higher levels of local competition (𝒂) lead to more successful 
penetration of the metapopulation by altruistic bet-hedgers. Each circle depicts a deme; the matrix is the entire 
metapopulation. Warmer colours denote higher intra-demic frequencies of the cooperator (altruistic bet-
hedging). After 1,000 generations, the cooperator allele is extinct when competition is half-local and half-global 
(𝑎 = 0.5). The cooperator is polymorphically stable with non-cooperators at a whole-metapopulation level 
when competition is increasingly intra-demic (𝑎 = 0.75). When competition is highly intra-demic (𝑎 = 0.9), 
the effect of local environmental fluctuations is significantly amplified, leading to increased penetration of 
altruistic bet-hedging across the metapopulation. Cooperators start at 𝑝 = 0.05 in all simulations. 𝑁𝑑 = 1,000, 
𝐷 = 400, 𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑆1 = 4, 𝑆2 = 1, 𝑐 = 0.3, 𝑃(𝜋1
⦁ ↔ 𝜋2




4.7 Stable coexistence of altruistic bet-hedgers and defectors in 
metapopulations 
In Chapter 3, I showed that altruistic bet-hedging can generate intermediate allele frequencies at 
which there is zero expected change due to selection (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 0). However, I also emphasised that 
these expected polymorphisms can be vulnerable to collapse: a chance run of the same environmental 
state across a sequence of generations can drive one allele to fixation. This point has been made 
repeatedly in the non-social bet-hedging literature: a recent synthesis (Dean et al., 2017) expresses it 
concisely as ‘rare extended periods of environmental stasis purge variation, especially when selection is 
strong.’ 
Intuitively, polymorphisms should be less vulnerable in metapopulations (Frank and Slatkin, 1990; 
Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). At a metapopulation scale, the amplitude of allele frequency change is 
reduced. The duration required of any ‘extended periods of environmental stasis’ (Dean et al., 2017) to 
drive fixation is increased. By making specific assumptions about the population, Frank and Slatkin 
(1990) note that the variance of the change in allele frequency across 𝐷 demes is intra-demic variance 
divided by 𝐷. In this section, I show how this result can be arrived at from the Price equation formalism 
adopted in this chapter. The variance of allele frequency change is the variance of the multilevel Price 
equation (Equation 4.15): 
𝕍𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 𝕍𝜋 [
ℂ𝑑(?̅?𝑑 , ?̅?𝑑) + 𝔼𝑑[ℂ𝑖(𝑤𝑖𝑑 , 𝐺𝑖𝑑)]
?̅?
] (4.67) 
As above, we assume that group selection between demes is either absent or negligible 
(ℂ𝑑(?̅?𝑑 , ?̅?𝑑) = 0). Expressed in terms of the within-deme selection gradient, where 𝑊𝑖𝑑 is the relative 




𝕍𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 𝕍𝜋 [𝔼𝑑 [𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝐺𝑖𝑑𝕍𝜋[𝐺𝑖𝑑]]] (4.68) 
In the special case in which each deme has the same within-deme allele frequencies, 𝕍𝜋[𝐺𝑖𝑑] is 
identical across all demes (denote this value 𝛾), and can be removed from the expectation over demes: 
𝕍𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 𝕍𝜋 [𝔼𝑑[𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝐺𝑖𝑑]] 𝛾 (4.69) 
 Under this unique condition, differences in the response to selection between demes are due solely 
to different values of the regression slope 𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝐺𝑖𝑑 in different demes. If the set of state-dependent 
fitness effects is the same for all demes, then each deme samples 𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝐺𝑖𝑑 from a common distribution. 










where ?̅?𝛽 is the average correlation in 𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝐺𝑖𝑑 across demes. 
When the average correlation in the action of selection 𝛽𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝐺𝑖𝑑 between demes is zero (?̅?𝛽 = 0), the 





Accordingly, increasing deme structure (increasing 𝐷) and reducing inter-demic state correlations 
(reducing ?̅?𝛽) reduces the variance of the probability distribution of possible changes in whole-
metapopulation allele frequency. Without high-amplitude fluctuations, populations are infrequently 
displaced from the polymorphism frequency at which there is no expected change due to selection. I 
confirm this effect by adjusting the individual-based simulation: when deme number is small, additional 
demes prevent stochastic extinction (Figure 4.6), and high deme number 𝐷 stabilises global fluctuation 




Figure 4.6 | When populations are subdivided into few demes, additional demes increase the viability of altruistic 
bet-hedging. We consider a population of 1,000 individuals, and connect it to 1–9 additional demes of 1,000 
individuals. At all deme numbers, local (intra-demic) competition across the resulting metapopulation increases 
its capacity to sustain cooperation. Colours represent average relative frequencies sampled at 10,000 generations 
across five replicate simulations at each parameter combination. 𝑁𝑑 = 1,000, 𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑆1 = 4, 𝑆2 = 1, 𝐶 = 0.3, 
𝑃(𝜋1
⦁ ↔ 𝜋2





Figure 4.7 | Metapopulations invaded by altruistic bet-hedgers maintain low-amplitude fluctuations in bet-
hedger frequency, despite high-amplitude fluctuations at the level of individual demes. Whole-metapopulation 
allele frequency is shown by the solid black line; red dots mark all intra-demic allele frequencies. The aggregate 
effect of uncorrelated environmental fluctuations across demes stabilises the global frequency despite high 
intra-demic stochasticity. Here, intra-demic competition predominates (𝑎 = 0.75). 𝑁𝑑 = 1,000, 𝐷 = 400, 𝑟 =
0.5, 𝑆1 = 4, 𝑆2 = 1, 𝐶 = 0.3, 𝑃(𝜋1
⦁ ↔ 𝜋2
⦁) = 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 | With rising global competition, local stochasticity is unable to sustain altruistic bet-hedging: bet-
hedgers are not exposed to sufficiently high levels of stochasticity in their cooperative neighbourhood. Whole-
metapopulation allele frequency is shown by the solid black line; red dots mark all intra-demic allele 
frequencies. 𝑁𝑑 = 1,000, 𝐷 = 400, 𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑆1 = 4, 𝑆2 = 1, 𝐶 = 0.3, 𝑃(𝜋1
⦁ ↔ 𝜋2
⦁) = 0.5. 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have used the stochastic Hamilton’s rule to capture the principle that populations 
that are globally stable (i.e., showing no temporal fluctuation in population average reproductive 
success) can sustain bet-hedging, as long as local stochasticity is strong and competition is local. By 
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including social effects, this chapter extends this principle to altruistic as well as non-social bet-hedging. 
In particular, I have emphasised that empirical bet-hedging explanations based on demographic – as 
opposed to environmental – stochasticity face a high burden of proof. In line with Shpak and Proulx 
(2007) and Lehmann and Balloux (2007), biologists arguing from demographic stochasticity should 
demonstrate that size of the competitive neighbourhood is sufficiently small to allow average 
reproductive success to undergo meaningful local temporal fluctuations. 
In summary, the viability of altruistic bet-hedging is influenced by several key parameters, which have 
been discussed in various non-social bet-hedging contexts (Frank and Slatkin, 1990; Shpak and Proulx, 
2007; Lehmann and Balloux, 2007; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012; Schreiber, 2015). Here, I (1) extend these 
results to social evolution by showing how they influence different components of a stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule and (2) analyse bet-hedging with the scale of competition made explicit in a single 
coefficient. The key parameters are: (a) the scale of competition, (b) local and global sources of 
stochasticity, (c) deme population size (in the case of intra-demic demographic stochasticity), and (d) 
deme number (in the case of local competition). The crucial importance of demography highlights an 
important empirical direction for resolving the emerging links between sociality and stochasticity. To 
uncover the tantalising potential role of bet-hedging in social evolution, especially in the evolution of 
cooperative breeding and eusociality (Stevens et al., 2007; Cockburn and Russell, 2011; Rubenstein, 
2011), we must first identify the spatial scale at which the recipients of altruism face competition for 





































 Drifting in Polistes canadensis: do drifters pursue a 
specific behavioural strategy? 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
Workers in the Neotropical paper wasp Polistes canadensis show high levels of between-colony 
movement (a behaviour known as ‘drifting’). As a result, ‘drifter’ workers appear to squander helping 
effort on foreign colonies, paying a high cost to indirect fitness with no apparent justification. 
Although observed by W. D. Hamilton and flagged as a paradoxical ‘anomaly’ to inclusive fitness 
theory in 1964, drifters in P. canadensis continue to pose an unsolved problem for the logic of kin 
selection. Here, using radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagging and behavioural observation, I 
ask whether drifters differ from non-drifters in cooperative behaviour, aggression, size, and 
dominance rank. Experimental removal of queens in an RFID-tagged population of 1,450 wasps 
showed that, contrary to expectation, drifters are not universally low-ranking subordinates, and are 
found at all levels of dominance hierarchies. Drifters do not differ from non-drifters in ovary 
activation or participation in the struggle for nest-inheritance. I find no evidence that drifting is part 
of a specific set of correlated behaviours: drifter wasps are indistinguishable from non-drifters in 
behavioural and morphological phenotype. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
5.2 Introduction 
Eusocial societies play host to a diversity of actors with different – and sometimes incompatible – 
agendas (Starks, 1996; Tibbetts, 2007; Jandt et al., 2013). In the simple eusocial wasps, a ‘queen’ 
monopolises reproduction whilst her subordinate ‘workers’ raise the brood. This sharp division of 
labour arises socially rather than physiologically (Boomsma and Gawne, 2018; Sumner et al., 2018); 
workers are capable of mating and egg-laying, but refrain from doing so whilst the queen maintains her 
social dominance (Tibbetts et al., 2011). To understand how organisms maximise fitness within these 
dynamic and heterogeneous societies (Theraulaz et al., 1990), biologists have long sought to identify 
sets of correlated behavioural traits. However, the ultimate drivers of behavioural diversity are not fully 
understood (Zanette and Field, 2009; Torres et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2018), and pinpointing drivers 
of behavioural variation within the colony is a central focus for the field (Wright et al., 2018). 
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It is now clear that wasps in the simple eusocial genus Polistes traffic between colonies at high rates 
(a behaviour known as ‘drifting’). A number of authors have reported between 10% and 56% of wasps 
visiting neighbouring colonies (P. canadensis: Pickering 1980; Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne 2013; P. 
chinensis: Kasuya 1981; P. jadwigae: Tsuchida and Itô 1987). The discovery of high rates of drifting in 
Polistes suggests a potentially neglected driver of behavioural variation in simple eusocial societies: in 
principle, drifters and non-drifters may pursue different inclusive fitness agendas (Sumner et al., 2007). 
However, we lack detailed behavioural profiles for drifting wasps. Here, I ask whether drifters differ 
from non-drifters in the key traits that characterise Polistes wasps. 
Why drifting exists at all has long been a paradox (Hamilton, 1964b; Pickering, 1980; Sumner et al., 
2007; Lengronne, 2013; Nonacs, 2017). By drifting to a neighbour colony, a Polistes canadensis worker 
experiences more than a two-fold reduction in relatedness to the brood (changing her indirect fitness 
interests; Sumner et al., 2007), is exposed to an alternative dominance hierarchy (changing her direct 
fitness interests), and may risk aggressive rejection (potentially leading to injury or death). Drifting in 
social insects has often been linked to direct fitness maximisation (Blacher et al., 2013; Härtel et al., 
2006). In bumblebees (Bombus terrestris), Blacher et al. (2013) conclude that fertile drifters are 
pursuing a pre-determined strategy of parasitic egg-laying in unrelated colonies. In the common 
yellowjacket (Vespula vulgaris), Oliviera et al. (2016) find that incoming drifters possess active ovaries 
at a frequency five times greater than residents. In the Cape honeybee (Apis mellifera capensis), a 
mutant lineage of females reproduces clonally, parasitically lays eggs, and drifts through the colony 
population as a superorganismal version of transmissible cancer (Beekman and Oldroyd, 2008). In each 
case, drifting is part of a parasitic behavioural strategy: drifting correlates with egg-laying and 
behavioural traits that permit successful infiltration of hostile colonies. 
In contrast to these results from other taxa, P. canadensis drifters have previously been shown to lack 
active ovaries. A general lack of ovary activation suggests a reason for drifting other than parasitic egg-
dumping (Sumner et al., 2007). The prevailing hypothesis is that P. canadensis drifters are non-
reproductive workers attempting to maximise indirect fitness by strategically directing help to related 
neighbour queens (Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne et al., 2012): this hypothesis 
would predict that drifting correlates with ‘cooperative’ behaviours (e.g., high rates of foraging and low 
rates of aggression, and a lack of participation in the struggle for nest inheritance). An alternative direct 
fitness possibility is that, given the potential for frequent queen supersedure in P. canadensis (Toth et 
al., 2016), drifters may visit multiple colonies to maximise their chance of participating in a competitive 
inheritance struggle following the death or loss of foreign queens (Sumner et al., 2007), at which point 
ovaries can be activated. If drifting is associated with a specialist strategy (e.g., minimising foraging and 
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maximising dominance), it is possible that individuals with different body sizes show different 
tendencies to drift, which I test here. 
In this chapter, I use a combination of radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagging and field censuses 
to identify drifters in P. canadensis. I then use experimental queen removal to trigger the aggressive 
fight for nest inheritance on focal colonies, which reveals the otherwise-cryptic dominance status of 
wasps on the colony. I then test the following hypotheses: (1) drifters and non-drifters differ in total 
behavioural profiles; (2) drifters and non-drifters differ in dominance during the nest inheritance 
struggle; (3) drifters target nest inheritance opportunities; and (4) drifters and non-drifters differ 
physically (body size and ovary activation). 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Study site and species 
P. canadensis L. is an independent-founding simple eusocial wasp, distributed widely across South 
and Central America (Figure 5.1a; West-Eberhard, 1986; Carpenter, 1996). The 
genus Polistes comprises around two-hundred species distributed in both temperate and tropical 
habitats, and has developed into a model genus for social evolution, largely because nests lack covering 
envelopes and so allow non-invasive observation. As a tropical polistine, P. canadensis nests are 
founded year-round by both single foundresses and closely-related co-foundresses (West-Eberhard, 
1986; Sumner, Kelstrup and Fanelli, 2010; Lengronne, 2013; Southon et al., unpublished); this differs 
from the seasonal nest-founding that characterises the well-studied temperate Polistes species P. 
dominula, where nests are founded synchronously after foundresses emerge from a winter hibernation 
(Leadbeater et al., 2011). Typically one individual (the ‘queen’) becomes the egg-layer (monogyny) 
whilst co-foundresses and her daughters act as non-reproductive workers (Sumner et al., 2010). Unlike 
an ‘advanced’ eusocial species, reproductive division of labour is not driven by strict and irreversible 
morphologically-imposed differentiation into distinct ‘queen’ and ‘worker’ roles in Polistes (West-
Eberhard, 1986; Sumner et al., 2010; though see De Souza et al., 2016, for evidence of incipient physical 
differentiation between workers and queens in P. ferreri and P. versicolor). Instead, reproductive 
division of labour arises behaviourally: helpers ‘choose’ to help, but remain capable of activating 
ovaries, mating, and egg-laying. Nonetheless, experimental data reveals a decline in fertility and loss in 
behavioural plasticity with age (Sumner et al., 2010; Bell, 2016): younger individuals are likely to be 
more competitive and successful queen replacements. 
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Colonies proceed through a stereotyped nesting cycle, divided into three broad phases: (1) pre-
emergence (before the emergence by pupation of the first offspring), (2) post-emergence (beginning 
with the first emergence), and (3) declining phase (the end of a colony’s life, characterised by brood 
death, workers absconding, a decline in queen fecundity, and the eventual collapse of the colony). If 
the resident queen dies before the nest has entered terminal decline, queen succession can occur; the 
new queen is established through extended aggressive dominance confrontations (this chapter), rather 
than following a peaceful age-based convention. Colonies typically occur in aggregations (Sumner et 
al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013), frequently on derelict or undisturbed buildings (Jeanne, 1979; Pickering, 
1980; Giray et al., 2005; Sumner et al., 2007, 2010, Torres et al., 2009, 2013). 
P. canadensis shows some behavioural differences across the range, but the extent to which these 
reflect local adaptation versus plasticity remains unstudied. Although evidence remains incomplete, the 
nesting cycle of P. canadensis is likely to differ latitudinally as a consequence of latitudinal differences 
in nest architecture. In the Guianas and Amazon, colonies are split into closely packed but discrete 
combs oriented horizontally, potentially to limit brood loss to parasites (Jeanne, 1979; Downing and 
Jeanne, 1986), whereas Central American and Colombian colonies possess only a single comb 
suspended vertically (West-Eberhard, 1986). The modular nature of P. canadensis nests in French 
Guiana (unlike Panama) may enable nesting sites to be used in perpetuity through a sequence of queens 
(‘serial polygyny’) as new combs are annexed and old combs are removed. In Panama, by contrast, nests 
are typically composed of a single comb, and the destruction of one comb consequently results in the 
complete destruction of the entire brood (see Chapter 5). Colonies face whole-comb predation by army 
ants and birds, and brood loss to predatory dipteran larvae (see Chapter 5) alongside lepidopteran and 
hymenopteran parasitoids (Jeanne, 1979). Individual workers also face high death rates: Sumner et al. 
(2007) estimate a 7% chance of death per day. 
I studied a free-living aggregation of 33 P. canadensis colonies (32 post-emergence and one pre-
emergence) in Sinnamary, French Guiana (Rue Damerette: 5°22'27.12", -52°57'26.64"). The site was 
within 350 m of the Flueve Sinnamary river in a small town surrounded by lowland tropical forest (Figure 





Figure 5.1 | Study site. (a) French Guiana (black arrow) is in the mid-Neotropical range of P. canadensis. White 
circles denote distribution records of P. canadensis from the Global Mapper project (Polistes Foundation, 
2018). (b) The study population was in the small town of Sinnamary. (c) The focal aggregation inhabited a 
derelict house (part of the interior shown). Photograph: PK. 
5.3.2 RFID tagging and paint marking 
For each colony, I identified egg-layers (single queens) by observing egg replacement after 
experimentally removing an egg, which typically occurs within 30 min. Egg-layers were marked with a 
unique paint code on the thorax, and (as queens remain on the nest at all times) did not receive RFID 
tags. I radio tagged and colour marked 1,450 adult wasps across the 33 colonies (Figure 5.2), 
representing effectively the entire adult population. I removed wasps gently from colonies using 
forceps, and tagged and marked each individual swiftly to minimise disturbance. I attached low-
frequency passive RFID tags (GiS TS-Q5 BeeTags, 18 mg, less than 1% of female mass; Sumner et al., 
2007) with unique hexadecimal number codes to the thorax with a small quantity of cyanoacrylate 
Loctite glue, and held the wasp for 30 s to ensure fixture. 
I added wasp-specific colour codes to the upper half of the wings using Posca pens (standardly used 
for paint-marking on the thorax; Yagound et al., 2017). I measured the wing length of each wasp (to the 
nearest hundredth of a millimetre) using digital callipers; wing length is a commonly used proxy for total 
body size in Polistes (Nonacs and Reeve, 1995). I also recorded eye colour (older wasps possess red 
eyes, whilst wasps <3 days old possess black and brown eyes; Pickering 1980). Since Strepsiptera 
parasites are known to influence Polistes nest-leaving and aggregation behaviour by brain manipulation 
(Geffre et al., 2017), I inspected all wasps for Strepsiptera, and recorded if the puparia or the 
cephalothorax of strepsipterans were extruding from the abdominal stergites. I released wasps 
immediately after inspection to ensure stable fixture of the tag and that glue was restricted to a small 
area of the upper thorax (and so not affecting wing movement). Young adults (black or brown eyes) 
were placed back on the colony with forceps to ensure safe return, as they may not yet have oriented 
from the nest. Older adults were released near the colony and monitored to ensure capable flying with 
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the tag (Sumner et al., 2007). Wasps were retagged following the same method if the tag was lost 
during the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 | RFID-tagging and colour coding. Each wasp (n = 1,450) received a unique RFID tag and a six-colour 
individual paint code on the wings. GiS TS-Q5 BeeTags are the smallest commercially available passive 
transponder RFID tags, weighing 18 mg, which minimises weight carried by wasps. Tags do not have a 
detectable influence on wasp drifting (Sumner et al., 2007). Photograph: PK. 
 
I fitted each colony with 2–6 GiS TS-A27 RFID antennae (representing equal coverage by nest size) 
with 3 cm detection radii (Sumner et al., 2007), comprising a total of 64 RFID antennae across the 
aggregation. Each antenna was paired with a separate data-reader (GiS TS-R64) to record the detection 
times of the individually identified tags. Data were collected from readers at the end of each detection 
day (after 7 pm). Readers and antennae were powered using an array of nine car batteries wired with 
electrical cords. Colonies were screened with acetate sheets, which restricted wasp flight paths to 
within approximately 10 cm of the antennae, following methods in Sumner et al. (2007) and Lengronne 
(2013), where colony screening did not deter continued entry and exit. When the same wasp was 
detected more than once within a two-minute time window, all observations after the first were 
discounted (i.e., repeat detections within 120 s were treated as a single detection); 120 s allows 
sufficient time for the wasp to pass the antennae (a single detection bout). Wasps were not detected 
on the nest, but rather on entry and exit flightpaths. Note that the data are silent on whether wasps 
were entering or exiting during any one detection bout, and not all passages past the antennae are 
detectable; we therefore do not calculate time on nest for individuals. 
I surrounded each colony with RFID antennae in 360 degrees (Figure 5.3). Because colonies in P. 
canadensis are comprised of multiple combs in the southern part of the range (see Study site and 
species, above), the antennal array differs here to that used by Sumner et al. (2007), who studied a 
Panamanian population and so placed RFID antennae over the front of single vertically hanging comb. 
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I matched RFID data with behavioural observations, associated daily censuses, and ad libitum records 
(when an observer noted a wasp in a foreign colony opportunistically, outside of an observation 
window) in both the pre- and post- manipulation phases. In all analyses, a ‘drifter’ was defined as any 
wasp detected via any method (tagging, RFID, and visual observations) on two or more colonies across 
the monitoring period (pre-manipulation and post-manipulation phases). To identify drifters, I used a 
combination of automated and visual methods to maximise detection probability and minimise false 
negatives (drifters not detected drifting). Note that by classifying individuals according to whether or 
not they actually drifted during the monitoring period, we make no prior assumptions about whether 
individuals are in two distinct adaptive classes, follow a continuum of drifting probabilities, or all 
become drifters with the same  random events. This question is distinct from whether or not drifting is 
associated with specific behavioural strategies. For instance, in bumble bees (Bombus terrestris) drifting 
may occur accidentally (a random distribution per individual), but – once individuals find themselves in 
foreign colonies – they may up-regulate a specific set of opportunistic behaviours (Birmingham et al., 
2004; but see Blacher et al., 2013). 
 
 
Figure 5.3 | P. canadensis colonies in the Guianas and Amazon are comprised of multiple horizontally-positioned 
combs (Jeanne, 1979). (a) View of a colony in Sinnamary. Photograph courtesy of Dr B. Corbara. (b) RFID 
antennae positioned around the combs. Antennae reading ranges are shown by dotted lines. 
5.3.3 Monitoring responses of drifters to experimental removal of the queen 
To ask whether drifting wasps participate in the competition for nest inheritance, I experimentally 
removed queens within the colony aggregation. A similar experiment has been performed for the 
advanced eusocial common wasp Vespula vulgaris (Oliveira et al., 2016), in which queen removal was 
triggered on two focal colonies within an artificial aggregation of four colonies. Removing the resident 
queen alters the expression of dominance behaviour considerably (Tibbetts and Huang, 2010). In 
tropical Polistes, the resulting nest-inheritance struggle – in which high-ranking subordinates compete 
to become the single egg-layer – is characterised by stereotyped aggressive interactions and ritualised 
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submission postures between interacting pairs of wasps, allowing a robust dominance network to be 
constructed. To minimise disturbance to the wider population (and so maximise ecological validity), I 
restricted the queen-removal manipulation to a subset of seven of the 33 colonies within the 
aggregation; henceforth, these experimentally manipulated colonies are referred to as the ‘focal 
colonies’. Previous research on P. canadensis drifting has shown that drifting networks are typically 
structured into local clusters: close nests form partially discrete drifting subnetworks, such that 
disturbance in one part of the subnetwork is likely to affect other colonies in the subnetwork (Sumner 
et al., 2007; Lengronne 2013). Accordingly, to minimise confounding interactions between queen 
removals at different colonies, I used stratified random sampling by dividing the aggregation into seven 
visually identifiable colony clusters and randomising selection of the focal colony within each cluster.  
To test whether drifters change their behaviour by targeting nest inheritance opportunities when they 
arise, I monitored the nest visitation networks of all 1,450 RFID-tagged wasps either side of the queen 
removals. I sampled the pre-manipulation aggregation using RFID for seven days before and seven days 
following manipulation (9 pm–7 pm each day). Following Lengronne (2013), I used worker-to-brood 
ratio as a measure of the needs of the colony. I counted brood and recorded adult group sizes at the 
beginning of each manipulation phase and 12 days after queen removal. Brood counts were made 
during the daytime by shining a torch into each cell, recording the number of eggs, larvae (small, 
medium, and large, following Bell, 2016), and pupae present. To record adult group size accurately, 
colony size was censused at night (after 9 pm) using a red-light torch. 
5.3.3.a Behavioural observations 
To quantify aggressive and cooperative behaviours (Itô, 1985; Bell, 2016), I recorded all on-nest 
behaviours and social interactions (Table 5.1). Behaviours were recorded in a series of 2 h daily 
observation windows (using manual recording of behaviours in field observation supplemented with 
video recording, to allow for more observation windows than are possible from manual observations 
alone). I observed colonies for seven days pre-manipulation and a minimum of seven days post-
manipulation. If the struggle for nest inheritance continued beyond seven days, observations were 
continued until (1) a new queen was confirmed by observation of egg-laying (both observed 
behaviourally and following experimental removal of an egg to precipitate egg replacement), and (2) 
subsidence of on-nest aggression. Focal colonies were therefore tracked for 7, 11, 12, 12, 23, and 26 
days post-manipulation. 
Here, I have followed the established method, as used in previous analyses of drifting in Polistes 
(Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne 2013), of assigning wasps to a starting colony based on where they are 
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initially tagged. For most individuals, this will be the natal colony (Sumner et al., 2007); however, in 
some cases, wasps may be drifting when tagged. For a minority of drifters, the starting colony will not 
be the natal colony. In this thesis, I explicitly use the term ‘tagging colony’ as the colony where wasps 
began the experiment. With this caveat, I define a drifting wasp as an ‘in-drifter’ on the focal colony if 
it was tagged on a different colony, and an ‘out-drifter’ if the focal colony is also the tagging colony and 
the wasp was recorded on a separate nest. 
 
 
Table 5.1 | Ethogram of key monitored behaviours. Behaviours identified as ‘aggressive’ were used in the 
percolation-conductance algorithm to predict dominance percentile. 
 
Social behaviour  






Antennation   Antennal inspection of wasp 𝐵 by wasp 𝐴 
Receive trophallaxis (Rec T)   Transfer of liquid food by regurgitation from wasp 𝐵 
to wasp 𝐴 
Receive food (Rec F)   Transfer of solid food from large food ball from wasp 
𝐵 to wasp 𝐴 
Bite   Bite to wings, legs, head, or thorax of wasp 𝐵 by 
wasp 𝐴 
Lunge   Sudden fast approach of wasp 𝐴 towards wasp 𝐵 
without walking or moving tarsi placement 
Chase   Fast pursuit of wasp 𝐵 by wasp 𝐴 across the comb 
surface 
Sting   Attempted sting by wasp 𝐴, accompanied by 
abdomen twisted underneath thorax towards wasp 
𝐵 
Dominate   Submission posture (flattened body, pressed to nest 
surface) adopted by wasp 𝐵 post-antennation or 
close approach by wasp 𝐴 
Deny    Wasp 𝐴 refuses to transfer food to wasp 𝐵 following 
solicitation by 𝐵 
Falling fight   𝐴 and 𝐵 both fall from the nest during a struggle, 
with one or both individuals grasping the other  
Non-social behaviour Description 
Check cells Inspection of multiple cells (brood-containing or empty) 
Feed brood Transfer of water or foodstuff to larva. Head fully within a brood-
containing cell for a minimum of 5 s. 
Build cells Layering of pulp to build a new cell or add to an existing cell 
Process food Manipulation of a solid food ball by mandibles 
Abdominal wagging (Ab wag) Rapid horizontal vibration of abdomen 
Arrive/leave Arrival or departure from the nest (foraging) 
Larval cannibalism Consumption of live brood 




5.3.3.b Reproductive status 
At the completion of all nest inheritance competitions (26 days following queen removal), I collected 
identified drifters still present (n = 35) together with a random sample of non-drifters (n = 41). Note 
that the small number of surviving tagged drifters available for collection is due to the rapid turnover 
of the population (in Sumner et al., 2007, daily mortality probability for individual wasps was 7%) and 
the difficulty of recovering specific individuals (a similar proportion of surviving target wasps was 
recovered by Sumner et al., 2007). I scored ovaries for developmental status following the five 
categories of Gobbi et al. (2006), listed in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 | Grades of ovary development. (a) 
Ovarioles lack oocytes. (b) Ovarioles carry small, 
early-stage oocytes. (c) Large, maturing oocytes 
at fork in ovary. (d) Large number of highly-
mature oocytes. (e) Resorption of oocytes in a 
previously mature ovary. Figure redrawn and 
adapted from Gobbi et al. (2006). 
5.3.3.c Statistical methods 
Analyses: I used Bayesian mixed models in WinBUGS (Lunn et al., 2000) with diffuse (wide variance) 
normal priors (Kéry, 2010) for fixed effects and 𝒩(0, 𝜏𝑢 ) for random effects, with diffuse gamma 
hyperpriors for 𝜏𝑢. I ran all analyses for 100,000 iterations of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) using 
Gibbs sampling and zero thinning (Link and Eaton, 2012), and assessed cross-chain convergence via the 
Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). In all models, convergence occurred quickly. For 
each model, I present the means, medians, and 95% credible intervals for the relevant parameters. 
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Throughout this and subsequent chapters, I treat non-overlap with zero of the 95% credible intervals 
as grounds for concluding the effect to be plausibly different from zero (Kéry, 2010), i.e. ‘credible’. All 
credible effects are highlighted in bold in the results tables below. For model selection, I used Bayesian 
model averaging via indicator variable selection by assigning each predictor 𝑖 an indicator variable 𝑔𝑖 
with a Bernoulli (0.5) prior (Kuo and Mallick, 1998; Ntzoufras, 2002). Higher values of 𝑔𝑖 (i.e., closer to 
1) indicate a higher rate of contributing to the optimum model during MCMC. For each averaged model, 
I present the posterior estimates for each parameter, together with the posterior mean for each 
associated selection indicator 𝑔𝑖 in brackets. 
For model checking, I calculated Bayesian residuals within WinBUGS, and assessed graphically for 
autocorrelation. I used posterior predictive checks of the fitted model by (1) confirming graphically that 
the observed scatter falls within the credible region predicted by the fitted model, (2) checking that 
standardised residuals fall between -2.0 and 2.0 for most data points (Conn et al., 2018), and (3) 
calculating goodness-of-fit ‘posterior predictive p-values’ (PPPs) for Normal linear models. The optimal 
model should have a PPP of 0.5 (Gelman, 2013). There are multiple candidate test statistics for the PPP 
(Conn et al., 2018); each one is a measure of the discrepancy between model and data. Here, I followed 
Kéry (2010) in using the residual sum-of-squares as the discrepancy measure.  
I tested the following four hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Drifters and non-drifters differ in total behavioural profiles. All behavioural analyses were 
restricted to wasps that featured in behavioural observations on the focal colonies (n = 230 non-drifters, 
n = 55 in-drifters, n = 41 out-drifters). First, to confirm that queen removal led to an up-regulation of 
aggression on the focal colonies, I used a simple mixed model of wasp aggression with focal colony as 
a random effect. I used principal components analysis (PCA) to detect correlations between all 
behaviours in the ethogram (Table 5.1) including all data from pre- and post- manipulation phases in 
order to ask directly whether manipulation drives a shift in PCA score. I used the R package FactoMineR 
(Lê et al., 2008), and visualised results using the package factoextra (Kassambara and Mundt, 2017). All 
variables were mean-centred and standardised by variance before PCA (Abdi and Williams, 2010). I ran 
mixed models separately for the first and second principal component, with focal colony, tagging 
colony, and wasp as random effects, experimental phase (i.e., pre- and post- manipulation) as a dummy 
variable, and wasp type (non-drifter, in-drifter, or out-drifter) as a categorical fixed effect. 
Hypothesis 2: Drifters and non-drifters differ in dominance during the nest inheritance struggle. I tested 
the hypothesis that drifters are low ranking subordinates: participation and success in the nest 
inheritance struggle reveal whether wasps are low or high in the dominance hierarchy. I inferred 
dominance hierarchy percentiles using the six post-manipulation aggressive networks revealed by 
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queen removal. To obtain estimated dominance ranks for the colonies undergoing the nest inheritance 
struggle (n = 242 wasps), I used the percolation-conductance algorithm provided by the package Perc 
in R (Fujii et al., 2016) on all behaviours classified as ‘aggressive’ in Table 5.1. This algorithm allows for 
inferences to be made on dominance networks by taking indirect social links into account. Because 
dominance status is largely cryptic until aggressive confrontations are triggered by the death of the 
resident queen, dominance percentile ranks refer to ranks on the focal colonies undergoing the nest 
inheritance struggle, not the natal or tagging colony of drifters. I used a linear model of within-colony 
inferred dominance percentile, with wasp type (non-drifter, in-drifter, and out-drifter) as a fixed effect. 
In practice, there may be little difference in dominance status between wasps outside the upper 
percentiles; I therefore also used a more focused logistic model, with a dummy response variable for 
whether the focal wasp was within the upper tenth percentile for predicted dominance status on the 
colony. 
Hypothesis 3: Drifters target nest inheritance opportunities. If drifters show a shared response to queen 
loss, I expect the drifter class as a whole (out-drifters and in-drifters) to change its investment in the 
focal colonies following manipulation. I tested this hypothesis using a binary logistic regression, in which 
individual drifters have two options: (1) visit non-focal colonies (queenright) or (2) visit focal colonies 
(queenless after manipulation). To focus on a standardised measure of drifter investment, I restricted 
the analysis to the 98 RFID-detected drifters (individuals who drift in either the pre- or post- 
manipulation phase), which constituted 2,141 radio-detections. If drifting occurs randomly across all 
nests, non-manipulated nests (n = 26) should receive 3.71 times as many drifting events as manipulated 
nests (n = 7). To take account of additional pre-existing differences in drifting rate that many occur for 
extrinsic reasons, I compared the log-odds of drifter preference between the two nest categories either 
side of the manipulation, with experimental phase and main colony (most visited colony) worker-to-
brood ratio as fixed effects. I included drifter and main colony (most visited colony) as random effects. 
The preceding analysis did not allow for a diversity of strategies amongst drifters: drifting for nest 
inheritance might plausibly be a strategy pursued only by a high-ranking subset of drifters. If nest 
inheritance drifters represent a high-ranking subset of the total drifter class that react strategically to 
the opportunity for nest inheritance, this subset would be expected to increase time investment in the 
focal colonies. I therefore ran a more focussed model with the inferred dominance status of individual 
wasps (generated above by percolation-conductance) as an additional predictor, using the dataset of 
44 RFID-detected drifters who featured in the on-colony behavioural data for the simulated annealing 
of dominance rank, and allowed for an interaction between dominance rank and experimental phase. 
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Hypothesis 4: Drifters and non-drifters differ physically. First, using wasps for which wing 
measurements were available (n = 152 drifters, n = 1,055 non-drifters), I tested for a difference in body 
size (using wing length as a proxy). Second, to ask whether dissected drifters and non-drifters differ in 
ovary activation, I used a logistic mixed model with colony as a random effect, in which ovary grade 
categories C, D, and E were considered ‘active’ and categories A and B were considered ‘inactive’ (Figure 
5.4). To test for differences in egg size and egg number between drifters and non-drifters, I used linear 
mixed models (with colony as a random effect). 
5.4 Results 
RFID tagging: RFID-tagged colonies ranged in size from 2 to 61 workers. A total of 856 wasps were 
detected by RFID across the experiment, representing 59.0% of the 1,450 originally RFID-tagged wasps. 
Of these, 680 wasps (48.9% of the tagged population) were detected more than once by the RFID-
antennae. This is similar to the 37.2% of the tagged population in Sumner et al. (2007), suggesting that 
RFID tagging was comparably effective despite the difference in colony architecture between French 
Guiana and Panama. In the pre-manipulation phase, RFID-detected wasps had 12.9 ± 44.0 (mean ± SD, 
range = 1–567) radio-detections. In the post-manipulation phase, RFID-detected wasps had 19.3 ± 56.8 
(mean ± SD, range = 1–505) radio-detections. 
In total, two hundred and sixteen drifters (14.9% of the population) were identified. Ninety-eight 
drifters were detected by RFID alone; an additional 118 were detected by ad libitum visual observation 
and behavioural monitoring. Of the RFID-detected population, 7.2% (49/683) were detected by RFID 
visiting multiple colonies in the pre-manipulation phase (Figure 5.5a), and 10.4% of the RFID-detected 
population (65/625) were detected by RFID in the post-manipulation phase (Figure 5.5b). 31 wasps 
were detected by RFID on only a single colony but one that differed from their tagging colony (which 
plausibly represent a permanent switch since tagging); including these as drifters, the pre-manipulation 
RFID-detected drifting rate was 13.1% (80 drifters of 610 wasps detected by RFID in the pre-
manipulation). Only 16 wasps were detected by RFID visiting multiple colonies within both phases. Of 
the total recorded drifters, 66.2% (143/216) appeared on the seven intensively-observed focal colonies 
at least once during the experiment or tagging. There was no evidence that Strepsiptera infection rates 
differed between drifters and non-drifters: only four of the 1,450 wasps showed extruding Strepsiptera, 
each on different colonies. 
Queen removal: Queen removal led to aggressive competition for nest inheritance on six of the seven 
focal colonies; one of the seven colonies was immediately abandoned by adult wasps following queen 
removal and was removed from analysis. Bites represented the largest percentage of aggressive 
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interactions (86% of post-manipulation aggression, n = 2,658 aggressive interactions), and experimental 
phase credibly increased the hourly bite rate on the focal colonies (Table 5.2).  
The six eventual new queens were all resident wasps of the colonies they inherited: no in-drifters 
inherited the nest. RFID data showed that three of these six new queens showed out-drifting behaviour 
to foreign colonies before becoming queen: (1) one future queen drifted to the closest neighbour nest 
during the post-manipulation period; (2) another future queen drifted to the closest neighbour nest 
during both the pre-manipulation and the post-manipulation periods; and (3) a third future queen 
drifted to two close neighbours, once each, during the pre-manipulation, and once to one of these 
neighbours during the post-manipulation. (These accounts of future queens previously drifting are 
necessarily anecdotal: a formal analysis is impossible with such a small sample.) 
 
Table 5.2 | Posterior estimates for change in hourly bite rate on focal colonies following experimental queen 
removal. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Intercept 0.028 2.997 0.013 -6.047 0.105 5.988 
Experimental phase 
(queen removal) (g = 
0.988) 
0.368 0.358 0.002 0.199 0.377 0.495 
Model precision 1.290 0.084 0.000 1.130 1.288 1.460 
Focal colony (random 
effect) precision 
4.3E-13 1.0E-10 6.2E-13 0.000 0.000 1.8E-25 
Bayesian R2 0.015 0.065 3.0E-4 -0.121 0.018 0.133 
Posterior predictive p-
value 





Figure 5.5 | RFID drifting networks (a) before queen removal and (b) after queen removal in an aggregation of 
33 colonies. Nodes are separate colonies; weighted edges are wasps drifting from their tagging colony. The 
seven queen-removal (‘focal’) colonies are shown in orange. Colonies are annotated and scaled in size by total 
worker number (value given alongside node) during each phase. Dashed lines denote exterior walls of the 
building. Networks visualised in Cytoscape. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Do drifters and non-drifters differ in total behavioural profiles? There was no evidence 
that drifters and non-drifters differed in behaviour. In total, 10,137 behavioural acts and social 
interactions were recorded, 6,887 of which were in the post-manipulation phase (Figure 5.6; Figure 
5.7). The first and second principal components of total P. canadensis behaviour (Figure 5.8a,b) 
approximately represent: (1) general activity levels (first principal component) and (2) the spectrum 
from aggression to cooperation (second principal component). The first and second principal 
components explained only 32.4% of the total variation, reflecting the high degree of behavioural 
plasticity displayed by simple eusocial insects (Sumner et al., 2006): individuals perform many colony 
functions, rather than specialising in narrow behavioural roles. The distribution of low proportions of 
variance explained by the first three principal components (21.7%, 10.7%, and 7.9%) is close to that 
reported for P. canadensis in Panama with an essentially similar ethogram (Bell 2016; 23.3%, 10.8%, 
and 8.0% respectively). The null expectation for 21 behaviours (Table 5.1) is that each should explain 
4.76% variation per behaviour (100/21; horizontal red line in Figure 5.8c). Components above this line 
are more informative than an analysis of individual behaviours. 
Non-drifters, in-drifters, and out-drifters did not differ on either principal component in each mixed 
model (Table 5.3; Table 5.4), and there was the full overlap of the 95% confidence ellipses for drifters 
and non-drifters in the PCA (Figure 5.8b). Observation colony and tagging colony had no credible effects 
(Figure 5.9). However, experimental phase had a credible effect on the second principal component 
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(Table 5.4, with a high indicator variable 𝑔𝑖 = 0.961). In the interpretation suggested by Figure 5.8, this 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.8 | Principal components analysis (PCA) of P. canadensis behaviour. (a) First and second principal components of total behavioural dataset 
(see Table 5.1 for description of each behaviour). (b) Drifters and non-drifters are not distinguishable by the first and second components. 
Observations are scaled by cos2 (a measure of the extent to which the components describe the observation). (c) The first and second components 




Table 5.3 | Posterior estimates for mixed model of first principal component of P. canadensis behaviour (means parameterisation).  
100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Non-drifter main effect (g = 0.002) -0.145 3.154 0.070 -6.292 -0.176 5.922 
In-drifter main effect (g = 0.002) 0.093 3.168 0.082 -5.958 0.0964 6.190 
Out-drifter main effect (g = 0.002) -0.260 3.179 0.078 -6.364 -0.239 5.892 
Phase effect (g = 0.123) -0.011 2.990 0.082 -6.067 0.068 6.018 
Non-drifter/phase interaction (g = 0.116) -0.050 2.939 0.057 -5.988 -0.004 6.088 
In-drifter/phase interaction (g = 0.116) -0.063 2.983 0.069 -5.865 -0.017 5.864 
Out-drifter/phase interaction (g = 0.116) -0.009 2.939 0.078 -5.905 0.157 5.949 
Model precision 0.267 0.029 0.003 0.2162 0.265 0.326 
Focal colony (random effect) (g = 0.833) precision 7.413 24.63 1.621 1.0E-5 1.833 64.390 
Tagging colony (random effect) (g = 0.187) precision 14.100 32.23 2.292 0.0257 4.099 100.800 
Bayesian R2 0.160 0.096 0.012 -0.023 0.162 0.331 






Figure 5.9 | No strong effect of colony on P. canadensis within-colony behaviour. (a) The effects for all six focal 
colonies’ 95% credible intervals overlapped zero for the first principal component of wasp behaviour. (b) 
Similarly, no effect of tagging colony on the first principal component of behaviour. (c) One focal colony 
(numbered 6) showed a 95% credible interval not overlapping zero for the second principal component. (d) No 







Table 5.4 | Posterior estimates for mixed model of second principal component of P. canadensis behaviour (means parameterisation). 100,000 iterations 
MCMC. 




Non-drifter main effect (g = 0.000) 0.0476 3.159 0.043 -6.219 0.054 6.243 
In-drifter main effect (g = 0.000) 0.0084 3.175 0.044 -6.290 0.029 6.139 
Out-drifter main effect (g = 0.000) 0.0159 3.166 0.044 -6.244 0.058 6.110 
Phase effect (g = 0.961) -0.457 0.628 0.010 -0.788 -0.463 -0.135 
Non-drifter/phase interaction (g = 0.006) 0.0097 3.148 0.044 -6.193 0.011 6.162 
In-drifter/phase interaction (g = 0.006) 0.058 3.188 0.045 -6.170 0.040 6.449 
Out-drifter/phase interaction (g = 0.006) 0.027 3.125 0.047 -6.206 0.028 6.292 
Model precision 0.501 0.033 5.4E-4 0.439 0.500 0.568 
Focal colony (random effect) (g = 1.000) precision 3.065 2.215 0.057 0.554 2.600 8.326 
Tagging colony (random effect) (g = 0.061) precision 8.474 33.44 2.430 4.3E-8 0.005 93.73 
Bayesian R2 0.128 0.058 9.6E-4 0.009 0.130 0.233 




Hypothesis 2: Do drifters and non-drifters differ in dominance during the nest inheritance struggle? In 
the post-manipulation dataset used for inferring dominance status, non-drifters, in-drifters (foreign 
wasps), and out-drifters (resident wasps) were all found throughout the inferred dominance hierarchy 
(Figure 5.10). Bayesian model averaging removed the drifter effect from the model (g = 0.037), and the 
95% credible intervals were unchanged from the prior probabilities (Table 5.5). Similarly, there was no 
effect of drifting on the probability of being in the upper tenth dominance percentiles (Table 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.10 | In-drifters were found at all levels of the focal colony hierarchy during the nest inheritance 
competition. Contrary to prediction if drifters are all low-ranking indirect fitness maximisers, in-drifters and 
out-drifters are indistinguishable from non-drifting resident wasps in dominance percentile rank: high ranks 
are accessible to foreign wasps. Mean percentile ranks for each wasp type are shown by crosses. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Do drifters target nest inheritance opportunities? There was no evidence that drifters 
targeted nest inheritance opportunities by switching to newly queenless colonies. RFID-detected 
drifters (n = 98) showed no change in proportional investment towards the focal (queenless) colonies 
after queen removal (Table 5.7). The identity of the colony that the drifter’s invested most in had a 
credible effect on proportional investment and was fully retained by variable selection (g = 1.000). 
Likewise, restricting the analysis to the 44 drifters for whom simulated annealing estimates of 
dominance rank were available (see Hypothesis 2), showed no effect of queen removal on proportional 
investment as detected by RFID (Table 5.8). All predictors were removed as non-contributory by 
Bayesian model averaging (g close to zero) except for drifter’s main colony, which was credible (95% 
credibility interval not overlapping zero) and fully retained (g = 1.000). 
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Table 5.5 | Posterior estimates for linear model of estimated within-colony dominance percentile. 100,000 
iterations MCMC. 




Intercept 48.20 4.237 0.043 42.65 48.60 52.48 
Non-drifter effect (g = 0.037) 0.477 31.33 0.096 -61.54 0.789 61.61 
In-drifter effect (g = 0.037) 0.400 31.34 0.101 -61.70 0.707 61.39 
Out-drifter effect (g = 0.037) 0.656 31.31 0.116 -61.22 1.074 61.25 
Linear model precision 0.001 1.0E-4 3.6E-7 9.8E-4 0.001 0.001 
  
Table 5.6 | Posterior estimates for logistic model for probability of being in the upper tenth dominance 
percentile. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Intercept -2.380 0.234 0.002 -2.853 -2.373 -1.942 
Non-drifter effect (g = 0.001) -0.153 31.60 0.168 -61.94 -0.077 62.13 
In-drifter effect (g = 0.001) -0.252 31.64 0.171 -61.81 -0.098 61.96 





Table 5.7 | Posterior estimates for logistic model for drifter change in investment in focal colonies (RFID visits). 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Intercept -2.445 1.335 0.048 -4.659 -2.506 0.499 
Phase effect (g = 0.058) 5.3E-4 3.064 0.010 -6.143 0.029 6.089 
Worker-to-brood ratio (g = 0.498) 0.146 3.174 0.078 -6.234 0.239 6.109 
Wasp random effect (g = 0.123) precision 34.17 679.4 18.04 0.011 0.044 40.76 
Main colony random effect (g = 1.000) 
precision 
0.079 0.033 4.2E-4 0.029 0.074 0.158 
 
Table 5.8 | Posterior estimates for logistic model for drifter change in investment in focal colonies (RFID visits) for drifters with estimated 
dominance percentile ranks. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Intercept 0.682 0.969 0.047 -1.336 0.695 2.565 
Phase effect (g = 0.038) 0.020 9.694 0.062 -19.22 0.047 19.27 
Main colony random effect (g = 1.000) 
precision 
0.186 0.127 0.002 0.033 0.157 0.509 
Rank effect (g = 0.017) 0.028 9.970 0.064 -19.52 -0.004 19.82 




Hypothesis 4: Do drifters and non-drifters differ physically? 
Ovary activation: Only four of the 76 dissected wasps showed C/D (active) or E (regressing) grade 
ovaries: 91.4% (32/35) of drifters and 97.6% (40/41) of non-drifters had inactive ovaries (Figure 5.11a). 
These ovary grades were all characterised by eggs under 1 mm in length (Figure 5.11b). Binary logistic 
regression found no credible difference between drifters and non-drifters in ovary activation (active or 
inactive; Table 5.10; Figure 5.11a), and no effect of colony. However, within the ovary-inactive wasps 
(A and B grade), drifters were credibly more likely to have B stage ovaries than non-drifters (Table 5.10; 
Figure 5.11a), meaning that ovaries contained at least some immature oocytes (B grade) as opposed to 
no oocytes (A grade). 
Restricting the analysis to the 34 wasps with oocytes (i.e., excluding A grade ovaries), there was no 
credible difference between drifters and non-drifters in egg size (Table 5.11; Figure 5.11b) or egg 
number (Table 5.12; Figure 5.11c). Note, however, that the small sample of oocyte-bearing wasps may 
obscure any true effect. Although there was superficially an effect of colony on egg size (i.e., 95% 
credibility intervals for different colonies non-overlapping zero), colony random effect was removed 
from the optimum model by Bayesian model averaging (g = 0.020). 
Wing length: Drifters and non-drifters did not differ in wing length (a proxy for body size) (Table 5.13). 
There was a credible effect of colony on wing length (for seven colonies, wing length effects showed 
95% credible intervals nonoverlapping zero; Figure 5.12). 
 
Figure 5.11 | Ovary dissections showed no difference in total ovary activation between drifters and non-drifters. 
(a) Grades of ovary development (see Figure 5.4). Drifters (n = 35) and non-drifters (n = 41) did not differ in 
ovary activation (A/B: inactive; C/D/E: active). However, ovary-inactive drifters (A or B grade) were more likely 
than ovary-inactive non-drifters to have B grade ovaries. (b) Drifters and non-drifters did not credibly differ in 
egg size. Only four wasps had eggs larger than 1 mm in length (dashed line). (c) Drifters and non-drifters did 




Table 5.9 | Posterior estimates for binary logistic mixed model of ovary activation. 
100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Intercept -6.247 4.766 0.145 -19.23 -3.892 -2.196 
Drifter regression slope (g = 0.396) 1.156 8.869 0.120 -18.10 1.935 17.89 
Colony random effect precision (g = 0.349) 6.178 18.06 1.827 0.006 0.355 58.63 
 
Table 5.10 | Posterior estimates for binary logistic mixed model of ‘A’ versus ‘B’ grade ovaries. 
100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Intercept -0.955 8.294 0.131 -17.74 -1.761 17.88 
Drifter regression slope (g = 0.340) 0.938 8.261 0.118 -17.90 1.862 18.44 
Colony random effect precision (g = 0.401) 13.28 31.73 2.960 0.004 0.719 107.3 
 
 
Table 5.11 | Posterior estimates for linear mixed model of egg size. 100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Intercept 0.621 0.086 3.0E-4 0.453 0.621 0.791 
Drifter regression slope (g = 0.000) 2.119 1001 2.993 -1965 0.260 1966 
Colony random effect (g = 0.020) precision 1.9E-8 2.4E-7 1.1E-8 0.000 3.0E-24 6.5E-10 
Linear model precision 4.391 1.084 0.003 2.532 4.302 6.738 






Table 5.12 | Posterior estimates for linear mixed model of egg number. 100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Intercept 12.72 248.8 0.795 -215.2 13.68 210.2 
Drifter regression slope (g = 0.015) 2.466 992.7 3.055 -1957 5.551 1963 
Colony random effect (g = 0.158) precision 22.80 148.6 3.282 0.000 7.2E-14 232.0 
Linear model precision 0.004 0.001 2.9E-5 0.003 0.004 0.007 
Posterior predictive p-value 0.500 0.500 0.002 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
Table 5.13 | Posterior estimates for mixed model of wing length. 100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Intercept 1937.0 6.999 0.0761 1923 1937 1951 
Drifter regression slope (g = 0.028) 1.799 984.9 3.132 -1947 11.15 1951 
Colony random effect precision (g = 0.998) 1.226 34.79 1.200 4.3E-4 8.6E-4 0.002 
Linear model precision 9.7E-5 4.0E-6 1.2E-8 8.9E-5 9.6E-5 1.0E-4 





Figure 5.12 | Wing length differed between 
colonies. 95% credible intervals for the 
random effect ‘colony’ in a mixed model of 
wing length (n = 33 colonies, n = 1,207 




By examining key phenotypic traits characterising Polistes wasps, I have found no evidence that 
drifters represent a distinct class of individual: there is no evidence that drifting is part of a specialist 
set of correlated behaviours. Instead, drifting may be a feature of P. canadensis life history that occurs 
with a given probability in the lives of all wasps. 
What are drifting rates in P. canadensis? Drifters comprised 14.9% of the studied population. Different 
studies on P. canadensis populations have found varied rates of drifting using the same methods 
(Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013), reaching a maximum of 56% in one Panamanian population 
(Sumner et al., 2007). From the small sample of RFID-tagged populations to date, it is too early to test 
potential reasons for inter-population variance in drifting rates. However, it is possible that there is a 
latitudinal gradient in drifting rates in P. canadensis from the Amazon latitudes to Central America; 
there is a latitudinal gradient in colony architecture over the same range (Jeanne, 1979) that may reflect 
an as-yet unidentified environmental gradient. Parasite pressure, resource scarcity, and optimum 
nesting seasons may all vary across the gradient, and each may influence drifting rates. Replicating RFID 
tagging across multiple aggregations along this gradient may be valuable. 
Of the 216 total identified drifters, 66.2% (143/216) were detected on the seven focal colonies (either 
at tagging or during the experiment). This means that the intensively-observed 21.2% (7/33) of the 
colonies in the aggregation were visited by 66.2% of the identified drifters at some point in the study. 
Three potential explanations can be imagined for this apparent bias. First, sampling bias: drifters 
appearing on non-focal colonies, which did not receive the same intensity of observation as the focal 
colonies, are likely to have a lower rate of detection. Second, social crisis may have amplified either 
drifter detection probability or drifting rates on the focal colonies (although the second of these is 
unlikely, given the lack of a detectable change in drifter investment in the focal colonies). Third, drifters 
typically visit multiple colonies, so observing just a subset of colonies intensively may have led to 
detecting a large fraction of the population’s drifters (i.e., no sampling bias).   
Why are drifters found at all levels of the dominance hierarchy? I found no evidence that drifters are 
drawn from a particular dominance stratum: (1) drifters occur at all levels of participation rate in the 
nest inheritance competition and are behaviourally indistinguishable from non-drifters (Table 5.4); (2) 
drifters do not differ from non-drifters in ovary activation following exposure to queen loss (Table 5.9); 
and (3) drifters do not adjust their visit rates to invest strategically in experimentally queenless colonies 
(Table 5.7). The lack of changes in investment preference either side of the manipulation suggests that 
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drifters do not show a shared response to the opportunity for nest inheritance. Instead, wasps with a 
history of drifting who invest heavily in competition for nest inheritance had already invested heavily in 
the focal colony during the pre-manipulation phase before the removal of the queen. Being a drifter 
does not predict the tendency to compete for the egg-laying position. Although high-ranking drifters 
can compete for nest inheritance on queenless nests (at a level indistinguishable from wasps who do 
not show drifting behaviour), there is no support for the hypothesis that they move between nests to 
maximise nest inheritance opportunities. Nonetheless, the presence of at least some highly-aggressive 
and competing foreign wasps in the colony during the nest inheritance struggle suggests that a subset 
of drifters may threaten both the indirect fitness interests of resident foragers and the direct fitness 
interests of resident high-ranking subordinates. Accepting drifters may be risky for the host colony. In 
Chapter 7, I ask whether host colonies possess the ability to discriminate and screen foreign arrivals. 
Various authors have proposed that drifting is an indirect fitness maximising strategy in which workers 
redistribute themselves optimally across related colonies (Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et al., 2007; 
Lengronne, 2013). This indirect fitness hypothesis predicts that drifters are low-ranking, non-
reproductive cooperators. The results here – drifters occur at all levels of social dominance – are 
consistent with two interpretations. First, drifting may not be a single strategy: in this hypothesis, 
cooperative drifting and aggressive drifting are separate inclusive fitness maximising strategies pursued 
by wasps at different levels of social dominance. Low-ranking wasps drift for indirect fitness; high-
ranking wasps drift for direct fitness. In Chapter 6, I examine the viability of the indirect fitness 
hypothesis. Second, drifting may instead be a stochastic event that occurs with approximately equal 
frequency in the lives of most wasps, leading to ‘accidental’ drifting across the social hierarchy. Note, 
however, that a null hypothesis in which drifting is purely accidental should lead to higher rates of 
drifting amongst low-ranking foragers, who frequently depart the home nest (Blacher et al., 2013). I 
have found no association between dominance rank and drifting within the dataset of 242 wasps for 
whom dominance status can be inferred on the focal colonies, but larger and replicated samples on 
numerous colonies are required before confident conclusions can be drawn.  
Why did drifters generally lack active ovaries? The generally low levels of ovary activation amongst 
drifters support the conclusion of Sumner et al. (2007) that P. canadensis drifters are not predominantly 
parasitic egg-dumpers. These results are consistent with the different views of drifters as either (1) 
strategic indirect fitness maximisers or (2) lost foragers. However, although the majority of drifters and 
non-drifters lacked active ovaries (i.e., C, D, or E grade ovaries), drifters were more likely to have B grade 
(oocyte-carrying) ovaries than non-drifters (Figure 5.11). A larger sample will be needed to confirm this 
effect. It is possible that egg-dumping opportunities arise only during the declining phase of the host 
colony, for which otherwise-benign drifters are primed for rapid ovary activation. Alternatively, the 
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association may be a sampling artefact, because we were forced to recover a pre-specified list of 
individuals for one sample (drifters) but not for the other sample (non-drifters): drifters with oocytes 
may be more easily sampled than drifters without oocytes, potentially because they are slightly less 
likely to be absent foraging or dead. The association should therefore be interpreted cautiously. 
Why did future queens drift? No foreign drifters inherited any nest. However, three of the six resident 
wasps who subsequently inherited their nests had temporarily drifted outwards to foreign colonies at 
points in the experiment. A larger sample of queenless nests is needed to confirm that this is a general 
effect. If it proves to be a common behaviour amongst successful nest inheritors, why does it occur? 
One possibility is that a high-ranking class of hopeful nest inheritors regularly scans the local 
aggregation for rare nest inheritance opportunities. However, if this is the sole explanation for 
movement by high-ranking wasps, the future queens should have only drifted in the pre-manipulation 
period. The three future queens who drifted all did so during the post-manipulation. An alternative 
explanation is that high-ranking wasps occasionally leave the nest because they are evicted, either by 
the other high-ranking wasps and the resident queen (when present) or by aggressive high-ranking 
rivals for nest inheritance (after the loss of the queen): before they successfully secured the queenship, 
the future queens were simply competitors. Brief eviction by rivals does occur: intense falling fights and 
stings, followed by immediate departures of one or both interactants, occurred throughout the post-
manipulation. In principle, queenright neighbour nests are safe resource-rich refuges during the queen 
struggle, at which competing wasps may, temporarily, (1) avoid dangerous over-exposure to nestmate 
aggression and (2) obtain valuable energy by soliciting trophallaxis from the undisturbed influx of 
foragers. A third possibility is that drifting by high-ranking wasps is a means of deceiving nestmates: 
drifting by high-ranking wasps may be a form of temporary defection from the home colony, avoiding 
the personal costs of helping raise the brood whilst maximising the chances of direct fitness success. 
When triggered or forced to depart on foraging trips by ritualised aggression from nestmates, high-
ranking wasps may superficially acquiesce but instead exploit the permeable borders of related 
neighbour colonies (at which they can avoid the high risks and energetic costs of foraging). In summary, 
the permeable nest network may accommodate sophisticated strategies by high-ranking wasps. 
However, high-ranking drifters were the minority: as is true amongst non-drifters, most drifters were 
low-ranking (Figure 5.10). 
How robust are conclusions based on single animal social networks? Experimental manipulations of 
wild animal social networks at population scales have typically been performed on single large networks 
(e.g., Firth and Sheldon 2015). Similarly, here I have experimentally manipulated a single large 
aggregation of 1,450 RFID-tagged wasps. Network observation is often a trade-off between maximising 
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within-network resolution and maximising between-colony replication (James et al., 2009). This is also 
the case with RFID in wild populations, which requires that a high degree of monitoring infrastructure 
(antennae, readers, car batteries, wiring, etc.) be partially reconstructed daily (Lengronne, 2013). This 
approach allows us to make more robust within-network conclusions, but means that generalising 
across networks should be done with caution until additional whole network replications can be 
performed. Similarly, to maintain ecological realism by avoiding over-manipulating the network, here I 
restricted queen removal to a subset of seven colonies; future replications of queen removal are 
required to generalise reliably to the behaviour of all P. canadensis drifters in queenless colonies.  
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used RFID-tagging, behavioural observation, and experimental queen removal to ask 
if drifting wasps show a distinct set of behaviours in comparison to non-drifting wasps. These results 
(1) find no evidence of drifter-specific behaviours within a large wild network, (2) suggest that drifting 
may not be a specific strategy pursued by a specific subset of wasps but rather an event that may occur 
in the lives of any wasp, and (3) provide the methods for future work in other Polistes aggregations to 



















































Polistes canadensis post-emergence colony,  
Fort Sherman, Panama.  
Photograph: PK  
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 Drifting and diminishing returns to altruism in paper 
wasps 
6.1 Chapter Summary 
Hamilton’s rule is a key principle of evolutionary biology: altruism evolves only if the benefits 
accruing to relatives are enough to justify the costs. However, in 1964 Hamilton highlighted 
an apparent anomaly to his own rule amongst the Polistes paper wasps of South America, 
which has recently received renewed interest. Recent results show large numbers of non-
reproductive workers helping foreign colonies, seemingly undermining the advantage of 
altruism by approximately halving the relatedness of recipients. Hamilton proposed that 
helping related queens may allow wasps to avoid futile cooperation on colonies where the 
payoffs of altruism are diminished. Here, using a dataset of a quarter of a million repeat 
observations of brood cells, I quantify the extent of diminishing returns to altruism in Polistes 
canadensis. Multistate Markov models show that wild colonies suffer strong diminishing 
returns to cooperation at levels capable of explaining drifters divesting to neighbour colonies. 
I argue that two rival hypotheses for extreme drifting – bet-hedging and indirect reciprocity – 
are only feasible under complex ecological scenarios, whilst diminishing returns are 
sufficiently strong to provide a simple justification for drifting. However, social network 
analyses of wasp drifting show no consistent movement from hypothetically ‘diminished’ 
colonies to hypothetically ‘undiminished’ colonies, and suggest that additional influences on 
the payoffs of altruism and extreme drifting in Polistes remain to be discovered. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
Inclusive fitness theory explains altruism (self-sacrifice in the service of others) as attempts to 
maximise the evolutionary success of shared alleles (Hamilton, 1964ab; Gardner et al., 2011). The 
theory is captured by a simple principle known as Hamilton’s rule: perform any altruistic act only if the 
recipient’s relatedness to yourself (𝑟) multiplied by the fitness increase (𝐵) is greater than your fitness 
decrease (𝐶), i.e., 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶. However, in his seminal paper introducing inclusive fitness theory, Hamilton 
(1964b) annexed a section on ‘anomalies’ that appeared to violate his own theory. Among this list of 
anomalies are Hamilton’s own observations of workers moving between colonies in the paper wasps of 
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South America. In Neotropical Polistes, non-reproductive workers continually move between colonies, 
raising the brood of distantly related recipients. Paradoxically, these workers appear to undermine their 
own inclusive fitness by diverting a finite amount of help from close relatives (high 𝑟) to neighbours 
(low 𝑟). Fifty years later, the paradox of between-colony worker traffic (known as ‘drifting’) in 
Neotropical Polistes wasps continues to pose a challenge to the logic of inclusive fitness theory. 
The scale of drifting in some Neotropical Polistes has since become clear. From visual censuses of over 
ten thousand Polistes canadensis workers in Panama, Pickering (1980) identified more than a thousand 
drifters, and argued that P. canadensis forms close clusters of colonies that he termed ‘extended 
colonies’ (Figure 6.1). High-resolution radio-tagging by Sumner et al. (2007) in Panama subsequently 
detected 56% of workers trafficking between colonies, dissolving the boundaries between colonies 
much like supercolonies in highly eusocial ants (Helanterä et al., 2009). Drifting is increasingly seen as 
an adaptive strategy across the social insects: in various taxa, drifters parasitise foreign colonies 
(Blacher, Yagound, et al., 2013), succeed foreign queens (Seppä et al., 2012), and enslave foreign 
workers (D’Ettorre and Heinze, 2001). However, between-colony cooperation by non-reproductive 
workers, who lack developed ovaries and perform standard worker tasks, has so far been observed only 
amongst primitively-eusocial Polistes wasps (P. canadensis: Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013; this 
thesis, Chapter 5) and highly-eusocial ants (Helanterä et al., 2009), and is little understood. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 | Polistes canadensis colonies often occur in clusters, allowing workers to move easily between colonies. 
(a) Tight cluster on Barro Colorado Island (Panama). Photograph: © Dr J. Pickering (1976), www.discoverlife.org. 
(b) Cluster at Fort Sherman (Panama). Photograph: PK. (c) Two colonies in a cluster at the same site. Photograph: 
PK. Colonies highlighted by asterisks. 
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We possess strong estimates of the relatedness of P. canadensis drifters to the brood they care for (𝑟 
in Hamilton’s rule; Table 6.1). Repeatedly across different drifter networks, drifters suffer a severe 
reduction in relatedness to recipients (from 𝑟 = 0.52 ± 0.12 towards home colonies to 𝑟 = 0.169 −
0.23 towards new colonies; Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne et al., unpublished). A simple solution to 
the drifting enigma is to suggest that drifters allocate investments in proportion to relatedness. A full 
sister queen (𝑟 = 0.75) on the natal nest should receive four times as much help as an aunt queen (𝑟 =
0.1875) on a neighbour nest. This common mistake – sometimes referred to as the ‘proportional 
altruism’ model – was identified by Altmann (1979) as a version of the ‘gambler’s fallacy’. Instead, 
rather than wasting effort on suboptimal recipients, it is always more profitable to invest entirely in the 
best recipient (Altmann, 1979; Dawkins, 1979; Weigel, 1981; Schulman and Rubenstein, 1983).  Drifters 
helping colonies in proportion to relatedness would be a simple failure to maximise inclusive fitness. 
Although we have estimates of relatedness (𝑟), we currently lack any quantification of the fitness costs 
and benefits of changing worker allegiance (𝐵 and 𝐶). In order to overcome the over two-to-three-fold 
reduction in relatedness (Table 6.1), any adaptive hypothesis invoking an indirect fitness benefit (𝐵) 
requires that drifting confers a two-to-three-fold greater benefit than non-drifting on recipients. Three 
indirect fitness hypotheses have been proposed to explain non-reproductive. drifting in Polistes: 
(1) Diminishing returns (Hamilton, 1964b): wasps seek new recipients when colony efficiency makes 
them increasingly redundant at home (Hamilton, 1964b; Page et al., 1989; Sumner et al., 2007; 
Lengronne, 2013). 
(2) Bet-hedging (Sumner et al., 2007): wasps help multiple related colonies in order to protect their 
inclusive fitness ‘investment portfolio’ against the destruction of any single colony by predators 
and parasites (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne et al., 2012; Lengronne, 2013).  
(3) Indirect reciprocity (Nonacs, 2017): wasps help nonrelatives so that their home queens receive 
reciprocal help.  
To explore these hypotheses, here I address the following questions: 
Question 1: How might diminishing returns explain drifting? Specifically, could the benefit 
provided by a worker to its host colony decline sufficiently as group size rises to justify 
workers switching to a lower-relatedness recipient? I collect longitudinal data on 
brood-rearing success on free-living colonies and ask how the number of workers 
affects the rate of brood development. 
Question 2: Do workers move to colonies where the returns are greatest? Specifically, do drifting 
wasps move from saturated colonies (where we expect little scope for providing 
benefits to the colony) to unsaturated colonies (where we expect a strong scope for 
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providing benefits to the colony), as predicted by the diminishing returns hypothesis? 
I use RFID data collected for this thesis and previous work in P. canadensis (Sumner 
et al., 2007; Lengronne et al., 2012; Lengronne, 2013). 
Question 3: How might indirect reciprocity explain drifting? Specifically, does the indirect 
reciprocity hypothesis provide a route to drifting that can outcompete ‘free-riding’ 
(colonies that benefit from drifters without supplying them)? 
Question 4: How might bet-hedging explain drifting? Specifically, under what conditions will wasps 
be selected to reduce the variance of their inclusive fitness ‘investment portfolios’? 
In overview, I will argue that diminishing returns are simple and testable, whilst bet-hedging and 
indirect reciprocity require complex ecological scenarios.  
Table 6.1 | Relatedness of drifters to recipients in P. canadensis (mean ± SE). 
Microsatellite data from Sumner et al. (2007) and T. Lengronne (2013). 
 Sumner et al. (2007) Lengronne et al. (unpublished) 
𝒓 to home colony 0.52 ± 0.12  
(𝑛 = 6 individual colonies) 
0.561 ± 0.029  
(𝑛 = 65 individual colonies) 
𝒓 to visited colonies 0.23 ± 0.056  
(𝑛 = 9 entire drifter networks, 
i.e., colony aggregations) 
0.169 ± 0.009  
(𝑛 = 63 individual colonies) 
6.3 Question 1:  How might diminishing returns (Hamilton, 1964b) explain drifting? 
The diminishing returns hypothesis predicts that wasps move to alternative, more distantly-related 
recipients when they are increasingly redundant on the natal nest. There are two forms of diminishing 
returns in social evolution: 
(1) Short-term: payoffs diminish due to the action of the focal altruist, so the altruist finds its recipient 
decreasingly valuable during its own investment. This should lead to altruists switching between 
recipients, as each recipient eventually becomes a suboptimal investment (Weigel, 1981; 
Schulman and Rubenstein, 1983). 
(2) Long-term: the focal altruist has a negligible effect on the payoff rate, but external factors mean 
that the payoff rate is already diminished for some recipients. This should lead to altruists 
investing solely in the best recipient, unless external factors cause payoff rates to diminish at that 
recipient. 
Short-term diminishing returns are only plausible drivers of Polistes drifting if a single worker can 
provide a sufficiently large investment that the remaining opportunities to raise additional brood to 
adulthood are diminished on the focal colony. This might occur if (a) colonies are sufficiently small that 
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all larvae can be quickly provisioned, leaving the focal worker redundant, or (b) individual workers 
perform specialist tasks that are less valuable once completed (e.g., foragers specialised on a particular 
prey item that is required by the colony only at intervals). The first may be unlikely in general, as post-
emergence colonies range in size between 8 and 200 workers tending between 100 and 600 larvae in 
various stages of development. With a ‘conveyor belt’ of numerous larvae developing, it is arguably 
unlikely that that a worker can increase the colony’s productivity sufficiently far to cause a large 
saturation in productivity rate. Likewise, the second situation does not match Polistes biology: high 
plasticity (Bell, 2014; this thesis, Chapter 5) implies little reason to expect drifters to provide specialist 
services. I do not consider short-term diminishing returns further here. 
Long-term diminishing returns provide a plausible driver of drifting. Here, a worker may find her effect 
on the colony’s productivity to be negligible. As worker-to-brood ratio rises, individual workers may 
become increasingly redundant, and – all else being equal – should move to colonies with a small 
worker-to-brood ratio. This leads to two testable predictions: (1) payoffs saturate with workforce size 
at a sufficient rate to justify switching to lower-relatedness recipients; and (2) wasps move from 
saturated to unsaturated colonies. I next test these two predictions in turn. 
Social insect colonies often suffer reduced per-capita productivity as they grow in size – an effect 
known as ‘Michener’s paradox’ (Michener, 1964; Karsai and Wenzel, 1998; Kramer et al., 2014; Grinsted 
and Field, 2018). The diminishing returns hypothesis suggests that workers drift to escape Michener’s 
paradox: move to a new colony where you will have a larger effect on productivity. However, not all 
social insects show Michener’s paradox. In contrast, Shreeves and Field (2002) show linearly increasing 
per-capita productivity in Liostenogaster flavolineata foundress groups. Likewise, Jeanne and Nordheim 
(1996) argue that per-capita productivity increases with group size in Polybia occidentalis (a conclusion 
disputed by Karsai and Wenzel, 1998). In this section I use natural variation in brood number and worker 
number to quantify productivity in P. canadensis colonies with different numbers of workers and 
worker-to-brood ratios. 
6.3.1 Methods 
6.3.1.a Brood development 
To obtain accurate measures of productivity, I tracked a cohort of developing brood on 91 free-living 
post-emergence colonies over a 56-day period (from 14th June to 8th August 2016). Colonies were 
clustered in six aggregations on the north coast of Panama (15.2 ± 7.7 colonies per aggregation, mean 
± S.D.) (Figure 6.2). Five aggregations were in clearings between lowland tropical forest and the Panama 
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Canal (former US Army Base Fort Sherman, San Lorenzo National Park, Colón Province) and one 
aggregation was in a clearing in a mangrove swamp (Galeta Point, Colón Province). 
 
Figure 6.2 | Study site and species. (a) Aggregations were in two areas of Colón Province, Panama. (b) Polistes 
canadensis is a Neotropical social wasp with behavioural – but not morphological – castes, typically a single 
queen, and high rates of drifting. Photograph: PK. 
 
 
Classification of brood development stages: In order to provide an accurate measure of how workers 
affect brood at different developmental stages, I split brood into 8 stereotypical developmental 
categories in a sequence through which all brood pass. Each category, and its notation, is listed in Figure 
6.3. These categories match those used by Bell (2016), with the exception that Bell’s ‘small’ was split 
into S (immediately eclosed), A (early stomach developed), and C, while Bell’s ‘large’ is split into T and 
L, to generate a fine-grained picture of development. In analysis, I have merged states S and A to 
improve identifiability; henceforth, S/A is simply termed 𝑆. I examined each brood cell every 5 days, 
using a ladder to access colonies and a flashlight to illuminate each cell. The cell classification (Figure 
6.3) was then dictated to a second observer, who recorded the specific cell’s current state on a 
hexagonal grid of the nest. Accordingly, brood classification was done by a single observer blind to the 
previous state of the cell. All extensions to the nest were annexed to the grid.  
Quantifying workforce size: I censused group size by recording total adult numbers at night (8 pm–11 
pm) using a red light to avoid disturbance (6–7 censuses per colony across the monitoring period). Nests 
that were difficult to observe were counted multiply to ensure the same total number in each count. 
Alongside the 91 colonies that provided brood development time data for the subsequent model, an 
additional 14 colonies were night-censused to provide additional data on colony survival. If group size 
changed between night-censuses, I assumed that any changes were smooth to avoid imposing artificial 
step changes in the model. I estimated group size as the mean (for each 5-day interval) of the fitted 
group sizes generated by a cubic spline through the night-censuses. Males were counted during daylight 
surveys during the brood surveys on 5-day intervals. Estimates of female number during each 5-day 





Figure 6.3 | 257,867 repeat observations were made of all cells on 91 post-emergence colonies over a 56-day period, recording 8 developmental states, empty cells, and death due 
to parasitism (sarcophagids and ichneumonids). To record the brood progress of the individual cells, larvae were split into stereotyped morphological categories. Over a period of 
weeks, eggs transition to pupae via larval stages. Brood pass through a clear developmental sequence of changing size, colour, and mouthpart complexity. Helping effort may 
affect these stages differently.  Photograph of P. canadensis nest: J. Pickering (1976) © www.discoverlife.org. 
144 
 
6.3.1.b Statistical methods 
The (relatedness-weighted) marginal effect of a worker on the development time of a larva is an 
incomplete measure of indirect fitness payoff. This is because Polistes nests experience a large amount 
of individual brood death (Sumner et al., 2007), which returns the cell to the start of the developmental 
process (once the queen has redeposited an egg). A worker’s major contribution might be to prevent 
inefficiency by minimising the rate of brood death. To accommodate both of these, I analysed brood 
development as a Markov chain, where the response variable is the expected time for a brood cell to 
produce a new adult (‘time to absorption’ of the Markov chain; Kemeny and Snell 1983). This is the 
measure relevant to inclusive fitness, and is distinct from the time taken for a single surviving brood to 
transition from an egg to an adult: the cell may cycle through repeat deaths before finally producing an 
adult. I treated the Markov transition matrix as a function of the predictor variables worker number, 
worker-to-brood ratio, and their interaction. To obtain the transition matrix, I used Bayesian mixed 
models with colony as a random effect: Bayesian Markov process models currently provide the most 
natural framework for incorporating random effects into longitudinal multistate models (Welton and 
Ades, 2005). Using the ‘time to absorption’ for P. canadensis colonies of different worker and brood 
sizes, I then obtained the predicted colony productivity rate, defined as the expected number of new 
adults produced per unit time. Because we are interested in the marginal effect of each additional 
worker on brood production, the most accurate measure of Hamiltonian benefit 𝐵 is the partial 
derivative of this rate with respect to worker number, evaluated at the point in demographic parameter 
space characterising any focal colony. 
I now describe the steps above in detail, in the following four sections (sections 6.3.1.c to 6.3.1.f). 
6.3.1.c Mixed model for brood development rates 
Because (1) brood states are categorical and (2) longitudinal data was observed in discrete time steps, 
I modelled the probability 𝜋𝑖𝑗 of a brood transition from developmental state 𝑖 to each state 𝑗 as 
multinomial logits. The self-transition 𝑖 → 𝑖 (the probability that the cell remains in the same state over 
the 5-day interval) provided the reference category (𝜙𝑖→𝑖 = 1) and all other transitions were described 
by log-linear functions of the covariates 𝑥ℎ in the vector 𝐱 (i.e., ln(𝜙𝑖→(𝑗≠𝑖)) = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛃ℎ𝑖𝑗𝐱ℎ): 
𝜋𝑖𝑗 =
𝜙𝑖→𝑗









I fitted the following log-linear regressions (note that the final two rows are adulthood (𝐴) and death 











1 𝜙𝐸→𝑆 𝜙𝐸→𝐶 𝜙𝐸→𝐷 𝜙𝐸→𝑇 − − − 𝜙𝐸→𝐹
− 1 𝜙𝑆→𝐶 𝜙𝑆→𝐷 𝜙𝑆→𝑇 𝜙𝑆→𝐿 − − 𝜙𝑆→𝐹
− − 1 𝜙𝐶→𝐷 𝜙𝐶→𝑇 𝜙𝐶→𝐿 − − 𝜙𝐶→𝐹
− − − 1 𝜙𝐷→𝑇 𝜙𝐷→𝐿 − − 𝜙𝐷→𝐹
− − − − 1 𝜙𝑇→𝐿 𝜙𝑇→𝑃 − 𝜙𝑇→𝐹
− − − − − 1 𝜙𝐿→𝑃 − 𝜙𝐿→𝐹
− − − − − − 1 𝜙𝑃→𝐴 𝜙𝑃→𝐹
− − − − − − − 1 −










The model is solved in discrete time, because brood were observed at fixed intervals. Accordingly, 
brood are free to transition from one state to a state further downstream than the next step in the 
sequence (effectively ‘skipping’ states in the Markov chain transition matrix); they have passed through 
the transitional states during the 5-day window, and are observed in a downstream state. Some 
transitions are not biologically possible during a 5-day window (such as E to L or C to P), so are not 
permitted in the Markov chain transition matrix (represented by a dash). 
Below, I present three models with increasing complexity. ‘Model 1’ focuses on the baseline transition 
rates (i.e., intercepts and random effects only) for the complete dataset of 168,811 observed transitions 
between live-brood-containing cells, which allows us to estimate the baseline productivity rate of P. 
canadensis colonies.  
Next, I present two models (‘Model 2’ and ‘Model 3’) to identify the marginal change in productivity 
associated with each additional worker at different points in the parameter space typifying P. 
canadensis colonies. It is important to avoid confounding effects caused by a confusion between cause 
and effect. When a colony enters the declining phase, females may abscond the nest or deprioritise 
brood rearing. In principle, therefore, declining phase nests could introduce spurious correlations 
between worker number and colony productivity To be strongly conservative in eliminating any 
confounding effects from declining-phase colonies, in ‘Model 2’ and ‘Model 3’ I therefore excluded all 
colony observations with more than 10% empty cells. Although this conservative step will remove a 
number of colonies at no risk of imminent decline, it is likely to exclude all declining-phase colonies. I 
also focused only on colony observations for which intra-colony variation through time in worker group 
sizes can be derived by cubic spline interpolation between night censuses These steps focused the 
payoff models onto a core dataset of 67,106 observed live brood transitions on 289 colony observations 
on 64 colonies (from the total dataset of 168,811 observed live brood transitions on 1,027 colony 




I confirmed MCMC convergence by ensuring that the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic was below 1.1 on 
Gelman plots for 3 chains. I used a minimum of 20,000 iterations per chain for all models until 
convergence. 
6.3.1.d Indicator variable selection procedure (Model 3) to find the optimal model of brood 
development rates 
The optimum approach to Bayesian model selection is controversial (Gelman and Rubin, 1995; 
Ntzoufras, 2011; Kruschke, 2013; Gelman et al., 2014; Hooten and Hobbs, 2015). Bayes factors are (1) 
often computationally intractable, (2) effectively impossible when comparing a large array of candidate 
models (Reich and Ghosh, 2006), and (3) have been criticised for paradoxical behaviour (Gelman et al., 
2014). Likewise, the standard ‘deviance information criterion’ (DIC) computed in WinBUGS 
(Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) may perform inappropriately for hierarchical models (Kéry, 2010; Tenan et 
al., 2014). A robust alternative approach – ‘indicator variable selection’ (Hooten and Hobbs, 2015) – is 
to allow the model to select itself. In an indicator variable selection procedure, we construct a saturated 
model, and introduce a series of binary indicator variables that ‘switch on’ or ‘switch off’ the predictor 
throughout MCMC (Hooten and Hobbs, 2015). The duration of MCMC time with each coefficient 
switched on is proportional to the coefficient’s marginal likelihood of contribution. For each predictor 
ℎ’s regression slope 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗 (within the vector 𝛃ℎ𝑖𝑗 in Equation 6.1), we can therefore annex a binary 
coefficient 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 that switches between 0 and 1, and then track the mean of the posterior distribution 
for 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗. If this mean is closer to 1, the corresponding regression slope 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗 is retained more frequently 
in the model. 
The priors for 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 and 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗 can be chosen to be independent (Kuo and Mallick, 1998) or joint (George 
and McCulloch 1997), and the decision is largely due to computational convenience: wide-variance 
vague priors may lead to problems in running MCMC when the priors are independent (Hooten and 
Hobbs, 2015). For the random effects, I used fully independent Bernoulli priors for 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 to allow the 
Gibbs sampler to turn the specific random effect on or off directly. For fixed effects, I used a product of 
the independent priors for 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 and 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗, which can be written in the form of a mixture model 
‘pseudoprior’ 𝑓(𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗) (Ntzoufras, 2002) known as a ‘slab and spike’ (Hooten and Hobbs, 2015): 
𝑓(𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗) = 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑓(𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 1) + (1 − 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗)𝑓(𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 0) (6.3) 
Following Ntzoufras (2002), I used normal priors for the conditional distribution of 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗 given 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 
within the slab and spike respectively: 
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𝑓(𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝑁(0, Σℎ𝑖𝑗) (6.4) 




 (with a default 𝑘 = 10; Ntzoufras 2002). 𝑘 can be tuned to assist MCMC in evaluating 
different models (Ntzoufras, 2002). The prior for 𝑓(𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 0) can be parameterised with a 
potentially nonzero mean (?̅?ℎ𝑖𝑗), and candidates for ?̅?ℎ𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑗 are the values generated in the 




with a sufficiently large 𝑘 to drive the ‘spike’ prior to zero – a strategy advocated by the ‘stochastic 
search variable selection’ (SSVS) approach to indicator variable selection (George and McCulloch 1993), 
leading to 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗 being indistinguishable from zero when 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 switches the predictor off. I modelled the 
indicators as Bernoulli random variables with a 50:50 prior (𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 ~ 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖(0.5)), representing our 
starting point of indifference between either including or dropping the slope 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑗. In interpreting the 
fitted model, I considered indicator variable selection to have ‘favoured’ retention of the associated 
predictor if 𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑗 > 0.6. 
6.3.1.e Expected time to adulthood 
To calculate the worker effect on the transition matrix for each model, controlling for oviposition rate, 
I submitted all estimated transition-to-death probabilities (𝜙𝑖→𝐹 ∀ 𝑖) to the prediction matrices as 
transitions to new eggs. This isolates the potential effect of workers (as opposed to the egg-layer) to 
obtain per-cell efficiency without the confounding effect of variation between queens in the rate at 
which replacement eggs are laid following the death of larvae. 
The expected ‘time to absorption’, in which a brood cell transitions from egg to adulthood 
(?̂?𝐸→𝐴𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑇) via intermediate states, can be obtained using the linear algebra for a discrete Markov 
process via the ‘fundamental matrix’ method of Kemeny and Snell (1983). Following Grinstead & Snell 
(1997), I obtained the fundamental matrix 𝐍 by inverting the matrix 𝐈t − 𝐐, where 𝐈t is the identity 
matrix for the transient states and 𝐐 is a square matrix of transition probabilities between each 
transient brood state with length equal to the number of transient states (i.e., all states apart from 
adulthood and death)7. Accordingly: 
𝐍 = (𝐈t − 𝐐)
−1 (6.6) 
                                                          
7 The sum of each row in 𝐈t − 𝐐 must equal zero, with the exception of the row specifying transitions from pupae 
(from which it is possible to reach the one absorbing state, adulthood). 
148 
 
The element 𝑛𝑖,𝑗 in 𝐍 is the frequency with which the chain is expected to visit state 𝑗 given a current 
state 𝑖. The vector 𝐭 of times to absorption is then: 
𝐭 = 𝐍𝟏 (6.7) 
where 𝟏 is a column vector of 1s. The 𝑖th element of 𝐭 is the duration (in step numbers) from state 𝑖 
to successful production of a new adult (?̂?𝐸→𝐴𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑇 = ∑ 𝑛𝐸→𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ). 
𝐈t − 𝐐 is not a symmetric positive-definite matrix (so cannot be inverted natively by WinBUGS). I 
therefore solved for 𝐍 in Mathematica. I derived the posterior predictive distribution for the passage 
from egg to adulthood (?̂?𝐸→𝐴𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑇) for single brood cells as a function of the fixed effects; I included 
random effects in the MCMC to improve the estimation of the fixed effects (i.e., fitting fixed effects 
whilst allowing for extraneous variation). I then derived the predicted whole-colony rate of brood 
production by converting the per-cell time to absorption to a productivity rate per unit time and scaling 
this rate to the number of active brood cells (containing brood from egg to large larva stages, inclusive) 
on the colony. 
6.3.1.f Indirect fitness payoff calculation  
To capture nonlinear returns to cooperation, Smith et al. (2010) propose a nonlinear form of 
Hamilton’s rule. Here, neighbour-modulated fitness 𝑤 is viewed as a polynomial linear regression on 
the frequency of cooperators amongst the focal individual’s social partners. I obtained the equivalent 
polynomial function to estimate absolute fitness by fitting the polynomial interpolation of productivity 
𝑞 against worker number 𝑧 and brood number 𝑦 using the 1,000 simulated points in the posterior 
predictive distribution for whole colony productivity rate (in Mathematica): i.e., to extract the shape of 
the posterior predictive distribution, I fit the smooth interpolation to 1,000 closely-packed samples 
monitored in MCMC. The diminishing returns hypothesis predicts that a worker can maximise inclusive 














where she has a larger effect on the production rate 𝑞 of offspring-equivalents by changing worker 
number 𝑥 on 𝑇 than she would have by changing 𝑞 on 𝐻. The end result of ‘Model 3’ is a model of these 
partial derivatives (estimates of benefit 𝐵 in Hamilton’s rule) for colonies of different worker numbers 




In total, 257,867 repeat observations were made of over 20,000 individually-tracked brood cells. 
Whole-colony failure was high: 105 post-emergence colonies were night-censused between 25th July 
2016 and 18th August 2016, of which 25.7% (27 colonies) died. 8.3% (14,070/168,811) of live-brood 
transitions were to death.  
Model 1 (intercepts-only): Baseline brood development rates of P. canadensis colonies: Using all 
observations on all 91 post-emergence colonies in all colony states (stable, declining, etc.), the 
intercepts-only model (Figure 6.4) showed that the probability of brood death falls with developmental 
stage, potentially reflecting reduced risk of mortality (due to disease, genetic defects, and cannibalism) 
rates for late-stage larvae. This may reflect workers prioritising re-cannibalising less valuable (i.e., less-
progressed) brood during temporary resource stress. Larvae spend the longest time in the ‘L’ stage. The 
high levels of brood failure generate an expected time for any specific egg-containing cell in the 
population to finally produce an adult (expected time to absorption) of 152 days, allowing for the 
possibility of multiple rounds of brood death. Note that this value is the average across developmental 
stages and is affected by falling brood productivity as colonies begin to decline. 
 
Figure 6.4 | Baseline transition rates (intercepts-only) for P. canadensis brood-rearing (Model 1). The Markov 
chain represents 168,811 observed live brood transitions across 91 colonies over 56 days. Shown are the 
transition rates (𝐐 matrix) for Model 1 from a starting state (time 𝑡) to the next observation (𝑡 + 1), occurring 
5 days later. High rates of brood death at all stages of development are represented by high reversions to the 
egg stage (state E): the first column shows that younger-stage brood are more likely to die than older-stage 
brood.  
 
Model 2 (worker-to-brood ratio only): Model 2 is a simple model with only a single predictor (worker-
to-brood ratio). The rates of progress changed substantially across the range of worker-to-brood ratios: 
brood failure declined with rising worker-to-brood ratio (Figure 6.5) and cells less frequently remained 
in the egg stage (Figure 6.5). Comparing transition matrices predicted by different worker-to-brood 





Figure 6.5 | Rates of state transitions change with worker-to-brood ratio (Model 2). (a) and (b) show are the 
probabilities of transitioning from each starting state at time 𝑡 to the next observation (𝑡 + 1), occurring 5 days 
later. (a) The 𝐐 matrix at the mean of posterior predictive distribution for a worker-to-brood ratio of 0.2. (b) 
The 𝐐 matrix at the mean of the posterior predictive distribution for a worker-to-brood ratio of 0.3. (c) By 
subtracting (a) from (b), we see how brood development rates change within the Markov chain: death 
(represented by transitions to state 1 in the posterior predictive model) is less likely. 
 
Model 3 (full model via indicator variable selection): Model 3 incorporated three predictors (worker 
number, worker-to-brood ratio, and their interaction) for each separate multinomial regression 
equation describing the Markov chain transition matrix for brood development. When selecting the 
optimum model of brood development, indicator variable selection favoured the retention of total 
worker number (Figure 6.6a), worker-to-brood ratio (Figure 6.6b), and their interactions (Figure 6.6c) 
as predictors for a number of brood transitions, which are shown as coloured arrows in Figure 6.6. In 
contrast, indicator variable selection only favoured retaining brood number as a predictor for a single 
brood transition (Figure 6.6c). For the subsection of colonies included in Model 3, brood numbers 
maintained by different worker numbers were close to linearly-predicted by worker group size (Table 
6.2) over the range of most group sizes (Figure 6.7). Goodness-of-fit was calculated using McFadden’s 
pseudo-𝑅2 for multinomial logistic regression. An ‘excellent’ fit is considered if 𝑅𝑀𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛
2  lies between 
0.2 and 0.4 (McFadden, 1977). The seven multinomial logistic regressions range in 𝑅𝑀𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛
2  from 
0.194 to 0.342, reflecting high likelihoods for the fitted models over an intercepts-only model. 
To obtain the predicted increment in brood production produced by the addition of a new worker to 
the colony, we can multiply brood number by per-brood Markov productivity rate at different points in 
parameter space, and take the partial derivative with respect to worker number. This represents an 
absolute fitness estimate of benefit 𝐵 in Hamilton’s rule, because it is the marginal effect of an 
additional worker on the payoff rate. Following these steps to obtain 𝐵 at different numbers of workers 
and brood reveals variation in the estimated benefits of altruism over the parameter space inhabited 




Figure 6.6 | Indicator variable selection results (Model 3). Shown are the positive and negative contributions of 
different predictors to separate brood transitions in Model 3. The predictors are: (a) number of workers (adult 
females). (b) Worker-to-brood ratio (brood defined as E to L). (c) Interactions between (a) and (b). If the 
transition arrow is blue, the predictor had a positive effect on the rate of the transition. If the transition arrow 
is red, the predictor had a negative effect on the rate of the transition. If the transition arrow is grey, the 
predictor had no effect on the rate of the transition. A positive or negative effect means, respectively, an 
increased or decreased transition rate relative to the rate at which the brood stays in the same state. For this 






Figure 6.7 | Brood size maintained by workforces of different sizes is linear for most of the natural range of 
colony demographies. Solid black line denotes the mean of the posterior predictive distribution at each 
workforce size; dashed lines show 2.5% and 97.5% credible intervals. Points show colony state at the start of 
separate 5-day observation episodes; colony is a random effect. 
 
Table 6.2 | Posteriors for parameters of brood size by workforce comparison.  
Quadratic model favoured by deviance information criterion (DIC). 
 μ σ MC error q2.5 Median q97.5 
Intercept 48.96 10.69 0.067 28.10 48.90 70.13 
Worker number 5.263 0.347 0.002 4.580 5.264 5.941 
Worker number squared -0.018 0.002 0.000 -0.023 -0.018 -0.014 
Whole model precision 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Colony (random effect) precision 1.970 43.93 0.761 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
Summary of Question 1: In this section, I have asked whether P. canadensis colonies show diminishing 
returns to cooperation. Two simple models (‘Model 1’ and ‘Model 2’) were used to build towards a full 
fitted model of the benefit term in Hamilton’s rule (‘Model 3’), which used Bayesian indicator variable 
selection to select the optimum model. The results of Model 3, plotted in Figure 6.8, show that colonies 
gain improved productivity rates as (1) total worker group size increases and (2) the ratio of workers to 
brood increases. However, Figure 6.8 also shows that each additional worker is – on average – 
associated with a smaller increase in productivity rate. More formally, the rate improvements in the 
Markov chain governing brood production decelerate as worker number and the ratio of workers to 
brood rises (Figure 6.8), implying strong diminishing returns to cooperation. For workers on low-payoff 
colonies (in areas of Figure 6.8 represented by colder colours), a more than twofold increase in payoff 
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is possible by drifting to high pay-off colonies (in areas of Figure 6.8 represented by warmer colours). 
In principle, this increase in the payoff rate of altruism would be sufficient to justify the approximately 
twofold reduction in relatedness to recipients (Sumner et al., 2007). In the next section, I ask whether 
drifting wasps do indeed move across the parameter space as predicted by this diminishing returns 
model of the benefit term 𝐵 in Hamilton’s rule. 
 
Figure 6.8 | Nonlinear returns to cooperation with additional workers: rate improvements in the Markov chain 
governing brood production decelerate as the ratio of workers to brood rises (descending from the dashed line) 
but accelerate once the colony has attained a high brood number (rising from the dashed line). For the zone 
occupied by most colonies (lower left of the space), colony productivity rate rises with worker group size (𝑧) 
and number of active brood (𝑦) but saturates as predicted by Michener’s paradox. Shown is the inferred 
marginal contribution of an additional worker (calculated as the partial derivative of colony productivity rate 
(𝑞), a function of total brood number and the time to absorption of the Markov process, with respect to worker 
group size (𝑧)). Colony productivity rate 𝑞, as a function of worker group size (𝑧), brood number (𝑦), and worker-
to-brood ratio (𝑧: 𝑦) was obtained by fitting a polynomial interpolation to 1,000 simulated samples 
(representing simulated colonies in the natural range of P. canadensis) from the posterior predictive 
distribution monitored during MCMC. Separate 5-day colony observations (white dots) show the parameter 




6.4 Question 2: Do workers move to colonies where the productivity returns are 
greatest? 
In this section, I test the second prediction of the diminishing returns hypothesis: wasps move from 
saturated to unsaturated colonies to maximise their marginal effect on colony productivity (Hamilton, 
1964b; Lengronne, 2013). To test this prediction, I collated available radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) data from unmanipulated P. canadensis populations, both from my own fieldwork and from 
previous fieldwork by the Sumner Lab Group. This comprised six populations in five separate field 
seasons, from French Guiana (2015 data: PK, Chapter 5, this thesis) and Panama (2016 data: PK, this 
chapter; 2005 data (first five days only): Sumner et al. 2007; 2009-2010 data: Lengronne 2013). Any 
data collected by others were used by permission of Dr S. Sumner and Dr T. Lengronne. I collected the 
2016 Panama RFID data in the field following identical methods to those described in Chapter 5, using 
691 RFID-tagged wasps on 26 colonies monitored over a six-day period, during which 331 wasps were 
detected by RFID.  
I removed from analysis any repeat detections occurring within 120 seconds of a first appearance, 
which typically represent movement of the wasp around the antennae before passing through the 
detection radius. Following this step, the total dataset of all available RFID studies on P. canadensis 
comprised 23,968 separate RFID-detections of 1,828 detected wasps.  
6.4.1 Social network analysis (SNA) 
To test whether drifters within this dataset tended to move in a particular direction across the 
demographic parameter space defining P. canadensis colonies, I used social network analyses (SNA). 
Analyses of network data are typically complicated by the difficulty of specifying appropriate random 
effects (i.e., inter-node dependencies are often complex functions of network structure). To avoid this 
problem, network analyses normally use MR-QAPs (multiple regression quadratic assignment 
procedures; Hirsch et al., 2012; Firth and Sheldon, 2015), also known as ‘QAP regressions’, which 
randomly permute the response variable (here, directional drifter links between colonies) across the 
matrix defining the network (colony aggregation). 
For the five RFID studies that consisted of single aggregations that can be analysed as singe networks, 
I used MR-QAP in the networks package UCINET (Borgatti et al., 1992, 2013), treating individual colonies 
as nodes and number of drifting events as directional edges. All analyses used 10,000 permutations. I 
included between-colony relatedness data (microsatellites) as independent variables for the Panama 
2005 aggregation (genotyped by Sumner et al. 2007) and the Panama 2009 aggregation (genotyped by 
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Lengronne 2013); details of genotyping in each case can be found in Sumner et al. (2007) and 
Lengronne (2013). If data were available, I used the difference between pairs of colonies in worker 
number, brood number, and worker-to-brood ratio as independent variables in MR-QAP. The 
diminishing returns hypothesis predicts that high-payoff colonies should receive drifters and low-payoff 
colonies should emit them (Figure 6.8). If this prediction holds, MR-QAP should show negative 
coefficients for worker number and worker-to-brood ratio: wasps will be moving from colonies with 
many workers and saturated productivity rates to colonies with few workers and unsaturated 
productivity rates.  
6.4.2 Results 
Across the dataset of 1,828 RFID-detected wasps (drifters and non-drifters), 22.6% (413/1,828) were 
identified as drifters, where drifters are defined as any wasp detected on more than one colony. This 
includes, for instance, wasps who were detected only on one colony by RFID but this colony was not 
where they had been during the tagging phase preceding RFID monitoring (denoted as ‘tagging-only 
drifters’ in Figure 6.9). 16.1% (295/1,828) of the RFID-detected wasps were detected on more than one 
colony by RFID during the RFID monitoring (‘RFID-phase drifters’ in Figure 6.9). Because it provides a 
standardised and identical method in each population, RFID allows us to compare drifting rates directly 
across P. canadensis populations, and reveals large variation between populations in drifting rates 
(Figure 6.9). Most drifters invested predominantly in a main colony and supplemented that colony with 
additional colonies visited less often (Figure 6.10). The initial tagging colony was the most visited colony 
for 53.3% of drifters. 
Figure 6.11 plots the trajectories of wasp drifting on the same axes as Figure 6.8, and shows no clear 
direction of movement from nests predicted to be ‘diminished’ to nests predicted to be ‘undiminished’. 
Similarly, social network analysis revealed no clear direction of wasp movement across the parameter 
space defining P. canadensis colonies (Table 6.3). I do not show Panama 2009 (Lengronne et al., 2012) 
in Table 6.3, because the model yielded a negative adjusted R2, which implies insufficient power in the 
sample size to test the predictors in that aggregation. . Relatedness and had no effect on drifting in the 
two genotyped populations (Panama 2005 is shown in Table 6.3b; Panama 2009 is not shown). Likewise, 
MR-QAP found no significant effect of the difference in worker-to-brood ratio between colonies in any 
aggregation (Table 6.3). In general, MR-QAP shows very low adjusted R2 values (0.00484–0.10479), 
which implies a biologically meaningless effect size of the various significant predictors; nonetheless, 
inter-colony distance was significant in 3 of the 4 populations and there was a significant effect of 




Figure 6.9 | RFID-detected drifting rates vary across P. canadensis populations. Shown are RFID data from six 
studies in different sites and years. ‘Tagging-only drifters’ are wasps who were detected by RFID on a single 
colony during RFID monitoring in which the colony that differed from their tagging colony. ‘RFID-phase’ drifters 
are wasps detected on more than one colony during RFID monitoring. ‘No drifting detected’ wasps are wasps 
never detected by RFID on foreign colonies. The percentage of RFID-detected drifters (‘tagging-only’ plus ‘RFID-














Figure 6.10 | Most drifters invest mainly in a single colony, and supplement that investment with other colonies. 
Shown are between-colony investment ratios by RFID-detected P. canadensis workers (n = 1,828 wasps) across 
six populations.  Each axis denotes the proportional time investment (number of separate RFID detection 
bouts) in the colony on which the wasp was first collected and tagged (‘initial tagging colony’) and the first and 
second most visited colonies other than the initial tagging colony (denoted ‘primary foreign colony’ and 
‘secondary foreign colony’, respectively). Points are individual wasps, scaled in proportion to the total number 
of RFID detections of a minimum 120-second duration. Populations were sampled in multiple sites and years: 
(a) data collected by Sumner et al. (2007) at Hospital Nacional (Panama, 2005); (b) data collected by T. 
Lengronne (unpublished) at Galeta Point Field Station (Panama, 2009); (c) data collected by T. Lengronne 
(unpublished) at Galeta Point Field Station aggregation 1 (Panama, 2010); (d) data collected by T. Lengronne 
(unpublished) at Galeta Point Field Station aggregation 2 (Panama, 2010); (e) data collected by P. Kennedy (this 
thesis) in Sinnamary (French Guiana, 2015); (f) data collected by P. Kennedy (this thesis) at Fort Sherman 
(Panama, 2016). 
 
Figure 6.11 | RFID-tracked wasps from multiple sites and years show no detectably consistent preferences for 
demographic features (group size and brood number) in their target colonies. Small points represent colonies; 
arrows represent drifter connections from a starting colony to a new colony; the mean values for worker group 
size and total brood number for start and destination colonies are shown in large black points, connected by an 
arrow. Brood counts were unavailable for the Panama 2010 ‘Machete Hut’ cohort (Lengronne, 2013). If wasps 
move from ‘diminished’ to ‘undiminished’ colonies, Figure 6.8 predicts that most trajectories should be from right 




Table 6.3 | Social network analyses of RFID-tagged wasp populations using MR-QAP. (a) French Guiana 
2015; (b) Panama 2005; (c) Panama (Machete Hut) 2010; (d) Panama (Seafront) 2010. For Panama 2005 
(Sumner et al., 2007), brood and worker counts were not available for 6 of the 33 colonies, and inter-
colony relatednesses were not available for 12 of the 33 colonies; for Panama 2010 ‘Seafront’ 
(Lengronne, 2013), brood counts were not available for 3 of the 12 colonies. Missing values were 
supplied to UCINET as ‘n’.  Brood data were not available for Panama ‘Machete Hut’. 
 








Intercept 0.28554 – – 
Distance between 
colonies 
-0.00033 -0.13349 0.00040* 
Difference in brood 
(E→L) number 
-0.00011 -0.01777 0.33507 
Difference in worker 
number 
0.00008 0.00534 0.45325 
Difference in worker-to-
brood ratio 
0.00981 0.00446 0.43766 
  
(b)    Panama (Hospital Nacional, 2005); 5 days, 33 colonies, fieldwork: Sumner 







Intercept 0.57794 – – 
Distance between 
colonies 
-0.00009 -0.16243 0.00340* 
Difference in brood (E→L) 
number 
-0.00092 -0.08269 0.0018* 
Difference in worker 
number 
0.00400 0.04339 0.02680* 
Difference in worker-to-
brood ratio 
-0.16634 -0.02418 0.05599 
 Relatedness -0.28105 -0.03514 0.34327 
  







Intercept 3.66122 – – 
Distance between 
colonies 
-0.00159 -0.00527 0.49125 
Difference in worker 
number 











Intercept 1.10340 – – 
Distance between 
colonies 
-0.00136 -0.32063 0.00020* 
Difference in worker 
number 
0.01414 0.14952 0.22278 
Difference in brood 
(E→L) number 
-0.01081 -0.42640 0.06759 
 Difference in worker-to-
brood ratio 
-0.54586 -0.23042 0.13829 
 
 
Summary of Question 3: In this section, social network analysis found no evidence that wasps move 
from low-payoff colonies towards high-payoff colonies: drifting trajectories shown in Figure 6.11 are 
not in the consistent direction predicted by Figure 6.8. Moreover, drifters did not invest in just a single 
high-payoff colony, but rather invested in several colonies (Figure 6.10). Taken together, the answers 
to Question 2 and Question 3 are equivocal on the diminishing returns hypothesis for drifting: P. 
canadensis does show strong diminishing returns to cooperation (Question 2), but there is no evidence 
– from social network analyses of RFID networks – that wasps move in the direction predicted by the 
diminishing returns hypothesis (Question 3). Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the analyses 
in this section (Question 3) are not a definitive test of the role of diminishing returns: they are restricted 
by representing only a small sample of wild aggregations (four networks), for which only two have 
relatedness data. An immediate priority will be to extend such analyses to additional variables that may 
influence payoff rates, including parasitism and queen fecundity (see Discussion). 
6.5 Question 3: How might indirect reciprocity (Nonacs, 2017) explain drifting?  
The indirect reciprocity hypothesis for drifting was proposed by Nonacs (2017) in reference to Polistes 
canadensis and other social insect species with high levels of cooperative drifting, including the 
supercolonial ants (Helanterä, 2009). It involves the following two hypothetical effects. First, 
cooperation between distant relatives or non-relatives generates disproportionately higher fecundity 
payoffs than cooperation between close relatives (‘social heterosis’; Nonacs and Kapheim 2007). 
Second, drifter-emitting colonies provide these ‘socially heterotic’ benefits to unrelated neighbours in 
order to increase the probability that they themselves receive similar help as a ‘reward’ from unrelated 
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third parties (‘indirect reciprocity’). These indirect-reciprocator third parties successfully identify the 
drifter-emitting colonies by the fact it has an honest and recognisable tag.  Thus, drifter-emitting 
colonies are rewarded by receiving social heterotic benefits from the arrival of drifters from third party 
colonies.  
There are two elements to this hypothesis: ‘social heterosis’ and ‘indirect reciprocity’. At present, 
there is limited evidence for social heterosis in wasps: Hoggard et al. (2013) show that antimicrobial 
compounds in Polistes humilis are more effective in genetically diverse colonies. There is clear evidence 
that intra-colony genetic diversity in ants provides disease resistance (Ugelvig et al., 2010) and even 
results in patriline-specific behavioural castes (‘genetic polyethism’; Evison and Hughes 2011; 
Waddington et al. 2010). In contrast, indirect reciprocity has never been found outside humans, where 
it is sustained by cognitively-complex image-scoring (Yoeli et al., 2013), and even amongst humans its 
existence is disputed (Bshary and Raihani, 2017). Accordingly, the claim that it could explain 
cooperation in a social insect is exciting. However, contrary to Nonacs (2017), here I argue that this 
complex combination of social heterosis and indirect reciprocity may be implausible as an explanation 
of drifting in Polistes.  
The conditions for drifting to evolve by indirect reciprocity can be captured in a simple scenario. Let 
a Polistes worker be related by 𝑟1 to her home queen and 𝑟2 to a neighbour queen. Let drifting confer 
a fecundity benefit 𝑥 on the neighbour queen, multiplied by a putative social heterosis effect 𝑘. Helping 
the home queen confers the fecundity benefit 𝑥 without any amplifying effect of social heterosis. To 
allow for indirect reciprocity, assume that providing help to neighbour queens increases the probability 
(from 𝑃0 to 𝑃1, where 𝑞 = 𝑃1 − 𝑃0) that the home queen receives the fecundity benefit 𝑘𝑥 from 
indirect-reciprocator third parties, who may be workers on other colonies (as envisioned by Nonacs, 
2017) or worker offspring of the recipient neighbour queen. Accordingly, drifting in this scenario 








When 𝑟2 = 0 (as proposed by Nonacs 2017; see black region in Figure 6.12), this resembles the well-
known rule 𝑞 > 𝑐/𝑏 for the evolution of indirect reciprocity in the absence of kin selection (Nowak 
2005), where 𝑐/𝑏 is the cost-to-benefit ratio. Because Nonac’s (2017) hypothesis invokes social 
heterosis, the recipient kin should in general be distantly related (0 < 𝑟2 ≪ 1); otherwise, there can be 
no social heterotic benefit due to cooperating with distant relatives. However, if some level of social 
heterosis benefit 𝑘 can be conferred on more closely-related kin (𝑟1 > 𝑟2 ≫ 0), the requirement for 






Figure 6.12 | The indirect reciprocity hypothesis is implausible as an explanation for drifting in P. canadensis. (a) 
The hypothesis argues that a worker from the focal colony (A) can confer a benefit 𝑥 on a neighbour colony 
(B), with the payoff amplified by a factor 𝑘 due to complementarity between unrelated or distantly-related 
workers (known as ‘social heterosis’). Drifting to colony B increases the probability that colony A receives 
similar social heterosis benefits due to the arrival of workers from a third-party colony (C). (b) Indirect 




; Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Adjusted for additional indirect fitness benefits from helping 






 (see main text), where 𝑟1 is the worker’s relatedness to the home colony and 
𝑟2 is inter-colony relatedness in social interactions. Here, I set 𝑘 =
1−𝑟2/𝑎
1−𝑟1/𝑎
, where 𝑎 is a scaling factor (smaller 
values of 𝑎 result in higher values of social heterosis). The black region represents parameters that favour 
drifting by indirect reciprocity when targeting non-relatives (𝑟2 = 0). The grey region represents targeting 
related colonies (𝑟2 = 0.23): the extension from the black region arises from standard indirect fitness benefits 
of helping kin, rather than social heterosis. 𝑟1 = 0.52. 
 
For acts of cooperation to be rewarded by indirect-reciprocator third parties (𝑞 > 0), third parties 
must have access to reliable information about actor behaviour (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Santos et 
al., 2018), based either on reputation or honest tags (Milinski et al., 2001). If cooperators are unable to 
direct costly cooperation to other cooperators at the exclusion of others, cooperation will be unable to 
outcompete free-riders. In the context of wasp drifting, free-rider colonies would accept foreign 
cooperative drifters without contributing drifters to neighbour colonies. Indeed, the potential existence 
of ‘parasitic’ satellite nests, strategically positioned close to large nests in order to absorb drifters, has 
been proposed in Polistes fuscatus (Page et al., 1989). To explain how indirect reciprocity could evolve 
against free-riding, Nonacs (2017) suggests that an honest tag exists for cooperative (i.e., drifter-
emitting) colonies: 
‘…the tag in this case is simple and honest: a willingness to accept drifters. Reciprocating nests 
would be evident in the population by their relaxed acceptance threshold levels… There would 
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be no need to evolve specific phenotypic markers, learn to recognize reciprocators, or to punish 
cheaters.’ (Nonacs, 2017) 
However, contrary to Nonacs (2017), ‘willingness to accept drifters’ is not an honest signal that a 
colony is a drifter-emitter. By definition, free-riding colonies will also have ‘relaxed acceptance 
thresholds’, because they will readily accept foreign help without reciprocating. The opportunity to 
free-ride drives 𝑞 to zero, as there is no longer an expectation of reciprocal help. The failure of free-
riders to evolve in Nonacs (2017) may instead be due to elements of the simulation: the two relevant 
traits in question – namely, (1) willingness to drift and (2) willingness to accept drifters – may be unable 
to evolve independently in the model.  
Contrary to the quotation above – but in line with a large literature on the stringent conditions for 
indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Bshary and Raihani, 
2017) – it is not possible for drifting to evolve by indirect reciprocity without invoking complex 
stabilising mechanisms for which there is currently no evidence in any social insect. These include 
colony-level reputation, honest colony phenotypic markers, or punishment of defector colonies by 
cooperator colonies. The proposed assortment process underlying the indirect reciprocity hypothesis, 
which does not invoke these mechanisms, does not allow for the evolution of drifting in P. canadensis. 
Equivalent objections would apply to a ‘generalised reciprocity’ explanation (in which recipients of 
cooperation ‘pay it forward’ by cooperating with a random third party; van Doorn et al., 2011). In the 
context of drifting wasps, there is no stable mechanism by which reciprocators will assort with one 
another to the exclusion of non-reciprocators. 
6.6 Question 4: How might bet-hedging (Sumner et al., 2007) explain drifting? 
The bet-hedging hypothesis for drifting, proposed by Sumner et al. (2007), argues that non-
reproductive workers diversify their helping effort across multiple related queens on different colonies 
to minimise the risk that their inclusive fitness portfolio is destroyed by the chance destruction of their 
home colony. Neotropical Polistes colonies inhabit a volatile environment, with extreme aggregation-
wide brood loss to army ants (Young, 1979), sudden colony destruction by birds (McCann et al., 2014), 
and assaults by lepidopteran, dipteran, and hymenopteran parasites (Jeanne, 1979). 
Here, I show that the key premise of the Sumner et al. (2007) hypothesis is correct – inclusive fitness 
maximisation does involve an overlooked mean-variance trade-off – but that the hypothesis may not 
offer a general solution to between-colony cooperation in P. canadensis. From the selection covariance 
of the Price equation under uncertainty (Equation 5 in Grafen, 2006b), we can write: 
163 
 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = ℂ𝑖 (𝐺𝑖, 𝔼𝜋 [





where 𝐺𝑖  denotes the breeding value of the 𝑖th individual, 𝑐𝜋 denotes the additive effect of individual 
𝑖 on its own reproductive success in environmental-demographic state 𝜋 and ∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑏𝑗,𝜋
𝐽
𝑗=1  denotes the 
sum of the additive effects on the reproductive success of each recipient 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 in environmental-
demographic state 𝜋 (weighted by relatedness 𝑟𝑗). Population average reproductive success ?̅? is free 
to fluctuate between states. The expectation covarying with breeding value is referred to as ‘expected 
relative inclusive fitness’ by (Grafen, 2006b). 
Following a similar step in Chapter 3, I take the first-order Taylor approximation of expected relative 
inclusive fitness, and rearrange Equation 6.1 to extract the coefficient of variation in ?̅? (denoted 𝑣) and 
the correlations (denoted 𝜌𝑐  and 𝜌𝑏 respectively) between population average reproductive success ?̅? 
and 𝑐𝜇 and 𝐼 = ∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑏𝑗,𝜋
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Grafen (2006b) and Batty et al. (2014) argue that the maximand of selection at the level of individual 
organisms is the quantity covarying with breeding value in the selection covariance. The extent to which 
this is generally true is currently under debate (Ewens, 2014; Birch, 2016b; see Chapter 1, this thesis). 
However, the bet-hedging hypothesis of Sumner et al. (2007) does not invoke synergistic fitness effects, 
heterozygote advantage, transmission biases, or other effects that are likely to restrict the generality 
of the maximand view, so I extract the hypothesised maximand with the caveat that I assume fitness 
effects to be strictly additive or (more plausibly) selection to be 𝛿-weak (during selection for propensity 
to drift, mutants and wild-type differ only marginally; Birch 2017). 
Sumner et al. (2007) argue for no direct fitness effects of between-colony cooperation (𝔼𝜋[𝑐𝜋] = 0). 














Multiplying a maximand by a constant does not change the optimum strategy, so we multiply the 
whole maximand by 𝔼𝜋[?̅?𝜋]. Denote the expected absolute inclusive fitness payoff (expected number 
of surviving offspring equivalents) 𝜇 = 𝔼𝜋[∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑏𝑗,𝜋
𝐽
𝑗=1 ] and the standard deviation in absolute inclusive 
fitness payoff 𝜎 = 𝜎𝜋[∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑏𝑗,𝜋
𝐽
𝑗=1 ]: 
max𝜇 − 𝑣𝜌𝐼,?̅?𝜎 (6.13) 
This trade-off in inclusive fitness is analogous to the mean-variance trade-off in investment portfolios 
familiar to economists and investment bankers as the ‘Markowitz programme’ (Markowitz, 1952; Way 
et al., 2017): 
max𝜇′ − 𝑣′𝜎′ (6.14) 
where 𝜇′ is the expected profit of an investment portfolio, 𝜎′ is its risk (standard deviation) and 𝑣′ is the 
subjective risk-aversion of the investor. For an inclusive fitness maximiser, risk-aversion is exactly equal 
to the product 𝑣𝜌𝐼,?̅?, which captures the intuition that an inclusive fitness portfolio that is resilient to 
downside fluctuations (occurring when population average reproductive success is poor) gains a bet-
hedging benefit. Following the approach standard in economics (Zivot, 2011), we can express Equation 
6.13 in matrix form: 
max 𝐠𝖳𝔼[𝐪] − 𝑣 ⋅ 𝜌𝐼,?̅? ⋅ 𝐠
𝖳𝐂𝐠 (6.15) 
𝑠. 𝑡.        𝐠𝖳𝟏 = 1 
where 𝐠 is the vector of investment weights (helping efforts) placed on the various recipients (including 
itself), 𝐪 is the vector of payoff rates (number of offspring-equivalents produced per unit invested), 𝟏 
is a vector of 1s, and 𝐂 is the variance-covariance matrix for the payoff rates of the various investments. 
The bet-hedging hypothesis therefore implies that an optimisation trade-off exists within 𝐠, balancing 
the expectation and the variance in inclusive fitness profit (measured in the number of offspring-
equivalents produced).  
Environmental stochasticity is the most powerful source of high-𝑣 fluctuations (Chapter 3, this thesis). 
For instance, a wasp who invests equally in two distinct classes of recipient or two distinct categories 
of behaviour – 𝑋 and 𝑌 –, in the knowledge that, due to fluctuating external factors, either 𝑋 or 𝑌 will 
prove to be a good investment but not both, hedges her inclusive fitness by minimising 𝜎. Equation 
6.15 shows that, counter-intuitively, maximising the total expected number of offspring-equivalents is 
not always the optimum strategy: in fluctuating environments (high 𝑣), it pays to minimise fluctuations 
in the production of offspring-equivalents, even at the partial expense of expected success. However, 
Equation 6.15 also shows that the bet-hedging hypothesis may be unable to explain the specific case of 
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drifting in P. canadensis without complex ecological effects, due to the appearance of 𝑣 and 𝜌𝐼,?̅? in the 
maximand. I describe each term separately. 
First, the scenario proposed by the bet-hedging hypothesis may be unlikely to generate high 𝑣. The 
source of stochasticity is demographic rather than environmental: workers are proposed to hedge 
against chance failures of the home colony (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne et al., 2012; Lengronne, 
2013). Accordingly, unless wasps compete against a very small competitive population (intense local 
competition), 𝑣 will show only negligible fluctuation (𝑣 ≈ 0, due to the law of large numbers). This 
occurs even if the risk of complete failure is extremely high for any colony. Now, recalibrating 𝐠 to 
secure even a major reduction in 𝜎 cannot increase the value of the maximand: selection cannot favour 
accepting even a slight reduction in relatedness in order to diversify helping effort across recipients in 
a normal (i.e., not extremely small or subdivided) population, even if it provides a huge reduction in the 
risk 𝜎 associated with the actor’s inclusive fitness portfolio. Unlike environmental stochasticity (Chapter 
3), demographic stochasticity is a weak force in the evolution of bet-hedging8.  
Second, even if the population does show 𝑣 > 0, diversification of altruism to distant relatives is only 
favoured if competitors (non-drifting wasps) suffer poor absolute indirect fitness returns 𝐼 in states in 
which ?̅? is low. In other words, there must be a pre-existing correlation 𝜌𝐼,?̅? between 𝐼 and ?̅? as they 
each fluctuate across states. However, if colony loss to natural enemies occurs randomly, this 
correlation is already zero even for a non-drifting allele: in any one state, some workers gain a high 𝐼 by 
chance, others a low 𝐼, so there is no aggregate fluctuation. Accordingly, drifters may reduce their 
individual 𝜎, but gain no benefit from doing so: their competitors have – by default – already hedged 
the risk (𝑣𝜌𝐼,?̅? = 0).  
I confirmed this effect with an asexual individual-based simulation in MATLAB. I let obligately-
reproductive recipients inhabit a square lattice in a fixed-size population undergoing a Moran process. 
At each time step, each reproductive 𝑖 produces 𝑛𝑖 obligately-nonreproductive altruists, sampled 
independently from an identical normal distribution. Altruists ‘drift’ with probability 𝑑𝑖  specified by the 
focal allele: a proportion 1 − 𝑑𝑖  of altruists remain with the focal recipient 𝑖. With probability 𝛼, drifting 
altruists encounter recipients who are identical to themselves at the focal locus. The remaining 1 − 𝛼 
                                                          
8In general, demographic stochasticity only generates meaningfully nonzero 𝑣 values if the population is either (a) 
subdivided into miniature demes with intense local competition and high individual-level stochastic failure (Chapter 4) or (b) 
punctuated by selectively-intense bottlenecks that favour risk-minimisation. Both scenarios reduce 𝑁𝑑 (effective population 
size of focal deme 𝑑). For high 𝑣𝑑, 𝑁𝑑 must be sufficiently small that chance colony-level destruction can lead to non-negligible 
fluctuation in ?̅?𝑑 (intra-demic average reproductive success). Effective population size is small for eusocial organisms, because 
reproductives represent a very small proportion of the total population (Nomura and Takahashi, 2012). Nonetheless, even for 





recipients are distributed at random across recipients, such that relatedness 𝑟 = 𝛼 (Gardner et al., 
2011). Offspring inherit the parent phenotype clonally. Stochastic colony failures mean that individual 
drifters have lower variances 𝜎 in their absolute inclusive fitness portfolios, but the lack of correlations 
𝜌 and whole-population fluctuation 𝑣 means this reduction offers no selective advantage, and drifters 
fail to invade. 
In principle, one form of bet-hedging is possible as a driver of drifting. In this case, two conditions 
result in high 𝑣 and high pre-existing 𝜌𝐼,?̅?: (1) stochasticity is driven by an unpredictable environmental 
source (and so the whole population fluctuates in risk exposure) and (2) the non-drifter genotype is not 
already diversified across investments by default. To see this, let colonies be split into two or more 
hypothetical ‘types’ (e.g. 𝐴 versus 𝐵). These might be ‘large’ versus ‘small’, or ‘foraging-specialist’ 
versus ‘nursing-specialist’, etc. Let colonies of each type perform best in different states, where 
different generations may experience different states. If the non-drifter genotype tends to invest a 
larger proportion of its work effort in one type over the other (i.e., it is not diversified across types by 
default), the genotype will experience intergenerational fluctuations in whole-genotype reproductive 
success. In contrast, by spreading workers more equitably across colony types (at the cost of 
accidentally diverting a proportion of help to nonrelatives), the drifter genotype can avoid these 
fluctuations, and so gain a bet-hedging benefit by securing a disproportionately higher relative fitness 
when the non-drifter genotype suffers bad years. There is no reason, however, to predict that a non-
drifter genotype would invest more heavily in a certain colony ‘type’ – and, if it did so, equilibrating the 
genotype’s investment between colony types may easily be achieved by simply founding different 
types, without the necessity of wasting a proportion of work effort on weakly-related neighbours by 
drifting. 
6.7 Discussion 
Can indirect fitness explain Polistes drifting? Between-colony cooperation in Polistes has posed an 
outstanding problem in social evolution since Hamilton (1964b). Three indirect fitness hypotheses have 
so far been proposed. In this chapter, I have argued that although the two most recently-proposed 
hypotheses – bet-hedging (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013) and indirect reciprocity (Nonacs 
2017) – offer clever solutions, they may be unlikely to explain between-colony cooperation without 
invoking complex ecological scenarios. The remaining hypothesis – diminishing returns to cooperation 
(Hamilton, 1964b) – makes two predictions that I test empirically: (1) colonies show sufficiently 
saturating productivity with worker group size to justify switching to a lower-relatedness recipient and 
(2) wasps move in the direction predicted by this payoff gradient. 
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I show that prediction (1) is met in P. canadensis. Specifically, drawing on a large longitudinal dataset 
of 20,000 developing brood, I demonstrate that the relationship between the slope of productivity with 
respect to worker number varies strongly and systematically across the parameter space characterising 
P. canadensis colonies (Figure 6.8) – quantifying Michener’s (1964) paradox using longitudinal data. 
Remarkably, this partial derivative shows a several-fold increase over some routes through the 
parameter space inhabited by P. canadensis: the marginal benefit of an additional worker drops 
substantially as the worker-to-brood ratio rises. Accordingly, Figure 6.8b quantifies the indirect fitness 
returns accruing to workers on mature (i.e., post-emergence) colonies, and suggests that wasps can – 
in principle – increase their indirect fitness by diverting help to related colonies with lower worker-to-
brood ratios. 
However, I do not find support for prediction (2). Using RFID data from multiple populations, I find no 
evidence that wasps move in the direction predicted to maximise indirect fitness. Instead, only 
between-colony distance is a reliable predictor of between-colony cooperation (Table 6.3). Importantly, 
the proportion of variance explained was extremely low in all populations, suggesting that – at least 
with respect to obvious predictors – wasps move near-randomly between local colonies. P. canadensis 
workers invest large amounts of helping effort in neighbour colonies (up to 56% of the population’s 
workforce drifts; Sumner et al. 2007). The results presented here imply that, rather than targeting high-
payoff colonies, these large numbers of drifting workers appear to neglect a lucrative inclusive fitness 
opportunity by diffusing from the natal colony to neighbours close to randomly (Figure 6.11; Table 6.3). 
The near-random movement of wasps amongst colonies (Question 3) should be taken as a provisional 
result: it will be crucial to analyse additional variables that may explain wasp movement by altering the 
payoff rate on different colonies. For instance, the presence of parasites or disease in the colony 
(Strassmann and Thomas, 1980) may make further helping effort redundant at home. Similarly, a 
detectable decline in the queen’s fecundity (through behaviour or chemical cues; Dapporto et al., 2007) 
may allow workers to anticipate the imminent onset of social crisis (challenges to the queen) or the 
declining phase of the colony’s life, in which frequent cannibalism of the larvae and subordinate egg-
laying are likely to reduce the expected indirect payoff of continued cooperation.  
RFID tagging reveals large and unexplained variation in drifting rates between P. canadensis 
aggregations (Figure 6.9). As the RFID system performs similarly in different populations (see Chapter 
5), this suggests that there may be genuine differences in drifting rates between populations. Detailed 
monitoring of a large number of aggregations will be necessary to explore correlates of this variation. 
Drifting rate might conceivably be affected by season, average relatedness, average between-colony 
distance, average parasite load, between-colony variation in parasite load, between-colony synchrony 
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in worker and brood number, El Niño cycles, nesting substrate, the spatial structure of colony networks, 
latitudinal differences in nest architecture (e.g., Jeanne, 1979), aggregation disturbance level, the 
number of flight paths from the aggregation to main foraging grounds, food availability, and nest 
predation frequency, amongst other ecological factors. Since P. canadensis extends over a large tropical 
and subtropical latitudinal range, progress in understanding variation in drifting rates might be made 
by replicating RFID monitoring on a large number of P. canadensis aggregations distributed along large-
scale ecological gradients. 
Progress will be made by imminent advances in technology: At present, a constraint in RFID analyses of 
drifter movement is the potential confounding effect of ‘prospecting’ behaviour (sensu Pöysä, 2006), 
in which individuals survey the population to identify the best investment opportunities. A ‘prospecting’ 
wasp would visit colonies only to assess whether recipients are high-payoff opportunities, but would 
appear on RFID records as apparently making investments in the colony. Although passive RFID tags 
can provide remarkable insights into Polistes behaviour (Sumner et al., 2007), it may be necessary to 
move beyond passive RFID tags to make progress on quantifying drifting. Passive tags have a small 
detection radius (Nunes-Silva et al., 2018) and antennae typically can only detect wasps one at a time 
as they pass through the flight path to the nest. Instead, it will be advantageous to move towards 
methods that provide complete and unbroken censuses of the colony at all points in time. These 
techniques are now on the horizon: RFID tags with anti-collision technology (which allow multiple tags 
to be read simultaneously) are almost small enough to replace current passive RFID tags for use on 
free-flying insects. Likewise, ongoing developments in RFID antennae (Jones and Chung, 2016) will soon 
allow large detection radii that cover the entire nest comb, rather than just covering flight paths. In 
Polistes, where wasps can approach and enter the colony from any trajectory, this will be a substantial 
advance. 
Longitudinal data allow us to quantify the payoffs of cooperation: In this chapter, I have used a purely 
observational approach to quantify productivity. Key parameters of brood-rearing can be quantified 
effectively in unmanipulated colonies, including natural rates of stochastic failure, predation, 
parasitism, queen turnover, workforce fluctuation, and male production. In principle, two forms of 
experimental intervention might be used to quantify the relationship between worker-to-brood ratio 
and brood rearing success: remove workers or remove brood. However, in both cases, manipulation 
risks introducing (rather than controlling) a series of confounding variables, which can be largely 
avoided by taking an observational approach: (1) drifting within aggregations mean that experimental 
manipulations on a single colony may ramify between colonies, so colony-level interventions are not 
independent (Croft et al., 2011) and therefore of ambiguous scope; (2) worker removal is likely to 
trigger the activation of auxiliary ‘lazy workers’ (Lengronne, 2013; Charbonneau et al., 2017), leading 
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to short-term masking of per-worker effects; (3) worker removal may trigger switching of inactive high-
ranking wasps to helping behaviour (Cant and Field, 2005), changing both on-nest dynamics and leading 
to similar masking effects; (4) if workers respond to colony state, worker removal may trigger inflow (or 
outflow) of workers to elsewhere within the aggregation, masking or amplifying the per-worker effect; 
(5) brood removal can be perceived by workers as a decline in queen fecundity (Liebig et al., 2005), or 
may be mistaken for brood death (and the potential presence of parasites or disease), and so change 
workers’ inclusive fitness priorities (Jandt et al., 2013); (6) fluctuations in colony membership (due to 
drifting and pupation) mean that worker-to-brood ratios cannot be held at a fixed experimental level 
without continued manipulation. In contrast, a fully observational (un-manipulated) longitudinal 
dataset, as used here, more directly captures the unconfounded association between workforce size 
and productivity rate, and thus provides a direct approach to quantifying the payoffs of cooperation. 
Can bet-hedging and indirect reciprocity be tested empirically? Although I have argued in this chapter 
that the bet-hedging hypothesis and indirect reciprocity hypotheses may be unlikely as general 
explanations of cooperative drifting (Question 4 and Question 5, above), they are still both testable 
empirically. To test the bet-hedging hypothesis, it will be necessary to quantify the parameter 𝑣 (the 
level of stochasticity in average reproductive success experienced by the whole population), ideally 
using long-term datasets. I argue above that inclusive fitness diversification bet-hedging will only pay 
when the entities being diversified across (i.e., investments in different colonies) fluctuate in 
uncorrelated or anticorrelated ways. In principle, this suggests a testable prediction: identify colony 
types that do best under different environmental conditions. A variable of interest might be colony size: 
large colonies might do better than small colonies in years of high parasite load (they are potentially 
‘too big to fail’) but do worse than small colonies in years of low food availability, and so on. In this case, 
a cooperative drifter might hedge her bets by investing in both small and large colonies. In short, the 
bet-hedging hypothesis may in principle be made to work by environmental rather than demographic 
stochasticity. 
The indirect reciprocity hypothesis (Nonacs, 2017) requires a number of strict conditions to hold, each 
of which can be tested empirically. The two most important are: (1) whether social heterosis exists 
within P. canadensis colonies and (2) whether a stable mechanism by which reciprocating nests can 
associate can be observed. Although I have presented a sceptical argument for the existence of indirect 
reciprocity amongst P. canadensis drifters, I am less sceptical about social heterosis. Social heterosis 
may be a potentially important effect in understanding Polistes societies more generally (beyond the 




In this Chapter, I have critically examined proposed hypotheses for high levels of between-colony 
cooperation in in P. canadensis. By quantifying the benefit term 𝐵 in Hamilton’s rule, I show that 
diminishing returns to cooperation are fundamental to P. canadensis societies, which suggests an 
adaptive context in which between-colony cooperation can evolve to maximise indirect fitness. 
However, using RFID data from 1,828 wasps over several studies, I find no evidence that drifters 
strategically target colonies predicted to have the highest indirect fitness payoffs; instead, wasps 
appear to diffuse near-randomly within local colony networks. Confirming this possibility will now 
require detailed analysis of drifting rates in relation to additional colony variables, including parasitism, 
queen fecundity, foraging rate, and the extent to which would-be drifters can anticipate the imminent 
failure of the nest. Future studies of P. canadensis drifting will benefit from a new wave of technological 















 Drifting in Polistes satan: the host colony response 
7.1 Chapter Summary 
In many social insect species, infiltration of the colony by non-nestmates can be severely 
deleterious, leaving host colonies vulnerable to parasitism, usurpation, theft, and disease. 
Paradoxically, however, some social insects show high rates of between-colony movement 
(known as ‘drifting’). Are colonies in these species prevented from repelling intruders by an 
inability to recognise non-nestmates? Drifting has been detected in various Polistes wasp 
species. In Neotropical Polistes paper wasps, drifting has been detected at extreme levels, 
suggesting that colony boundaries may be more permeable than in any other social insect 
outside of the supercolonial ants. However, the nestmate recognition abilities of Neotropical 
Polistes remain almost completely unknown. In this chapter, I use radio-tagging to show for the 
first time that drifting occurs in the Neotropical paper wasp Polistes satan, and that the rates of 
drifting are relatively high (17.7% of workers). Most drifters lacked active ovaries, but drifters 
were more likely than non-drifters to have active ovaries. I then show that members of P. satan 
colonies can recognise non-nestmates from neighbour colonies, treating them differently in 
recognition assays from nestmates and non-nestmates from further afield. Despite this ability 
to recognise non-nestmates, P. satan colonies showed high levels of non-nestmate acceptance. 
Moreover, recent drifters were no more likely to be accepted than recent non-drifters. 
Unusually amongst social insects, deliberately accepting non-nestmates may be strategically 
advantageous: the benefits of augmenting the workforce may outweigh any elevated risks of 







Social insects should – and generally do – exhibit intense aggression towards conspecific intruders 
(Reeve, 1989; Couvillon et al., 2008). Preserving the integrity of the nest against threats from outsiders 
may often be crucial to maintaining the benefits of cooperation (Queller and Strassmann, 2009; Sturgis 
and Gordon, 2012). Successful infiltration can undermine the fitness interests of resident workers: 
intruders may lay parasitic ‘cuckoo’ eggs (Blacher, Yagound, et al., 2013), challenge or usurp the queen 
(Klahn, 1988), steal resources (Couvillon et al., 2008), or seize the egg-laying position after the death of 
the resident queen (Monnin et al., 2009). These risks suggest that there should be strong selection 
against a permeable nest boundary in social insect societies (Johnson et al., 2011). 
Despite the clear prediction that intruders should be resisted, between-nest movement (‘drifting’) is 
now known to occur at high levels in some social insect species. ‘Drifters’ are individuals who 
(temporarily or permanently) leave their natal colony’s nest and enter foreign nests (Blacher et al., 
2013; Nonacs, 2017). Drifting is especially prevalent amongst ‘unicolonial’ ants (Helanterä, 2009) and 
simple eusocial wasps (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013); in one large nest aggregation of the 
Neotropical paper wasp Polistes canadensis, over half the worker population was observed drifting 
(Sumner et al., 2007). Whilst the surprisingly high levels of drifting in Neotropical paper wasps have 
been noted by multiple authors over the past five decades (Hamilton, 1964b; Pickering, 1980; Sumner 
et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013), these studies have generally focused on just the single best-studied 
species (Polistes canadensis) and on potential motivations of the drifters themselves. Our 
understanding of the extent of drifting behaviour and the host colony response is therefore limited. 
To distinguish between different hypotheses for drifting behaviour, empirical work on recognition of 
non-nestmates and levels of non-nestmate acceptance by members of host nests is needed. If high 
levels of drifting are associated with a lack of effective nestmate recognition, two potential explanations 
for drifting may be plausible: (1) drifting may be a simple result of recognition errors (by both drifters 
and members of the nests they visit); or (2) drifting may evolve as an adaptive strategy by selfish drifters 
to exploit the inability of nest members to detect non-nestmates. In Chapter 5, I showed that some 
drifters in P. canadensis can and do compete for nest inheritance on foreign nests, implying that at least 
some drifters pose a potential threat to the indirect fitness interests of non-reproductive resident 
subordinates and the direct fitness interests of high-ranking resident subordinates (who would 
otherwise have been next in line to inherit the position as egg-layer). Conversely, if high levels of drifting 
occur in species with the capacity to discriminate effectively between nestmates and non-nestmates, 
members of the host nest may be interpreted as making a choice to accept drifters. In this case, foreign 
drifters may be accepted because (1) evicting them would simply be too costly or (2) incoming drifters 
are, on average, beneficial to nest members (at least at some points in the nest’s life) (Chapter 6; Mora-
Kepfer, 2014).  
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Careful experimentation is needed to separate non-nestmate recognition and non-nestmate 
acceptance. Members of the nest may be aware that a new arrival is a non-nestmate (showing 
recognition) but fail to reject her from the nest (showing acceptance). An observation of differential 
aggression towards nestmates and non-nestmates when, for instance, presented on forceps does not 
necessarily imply an attempt at non-nestmate rejection. Although presentation trials in which wasps 
are introduced on forceps are widely used in Polistes recognition tests (e.g., Signorotti et al., 2014) 
forceps introductions represent an unusual social context: social behaviours directed at forceps-
presented wasps do not necessarily reflect social behaviours that would be observed were the wasp to 
arrive naturally and interact freely with residents. This is not a problem for inferring recognition, which 
requires only a clear differential response directed to nestmates versus non-nestmates. However, it 
would pose a problem for inferring non-nestmate acceptance. Acceptance can be tested by freely 
releasing focal wasps onto host nests, permitting them to interact freely with resident wasps without 
restraint, and confirming after a period of time that focal wasps are permitted to remain without 
eviction or harassment. By using separate assays for recognition and acceptance, we can detect 
recognition without mistaking it for rejection. 
Existing work suggests the potential for both differential recognition and acceptance in Neotropical 
Polistes species, but empirical testing is rare. Sophisticated knowledge about the social and chemical 
mechanisms of recognition in Polistes comes from experimental tests in seven temperate species 
(Fishwild and Gamboa, 1992; Gamboa, 2004; Bruschini et al., 2011; Signorotti et al., 2014). However, 
only 3.5% of Polistes species are found in temperate zones, and the highest detected rates of drifting 
in paper wasps occur in the tropics (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013). Since a landmark review by 
Gamboa (2004) highlighted that Polistes nestmate recognition remained to be studied in any tropical 
member of the genus, only one study has looked for and found evidence of nestmate recognition in the 
Neotropics (Polistes lanio in Brazil; Braun et al., 2008), but those conclusions were based on a sample 
of only three nests at unspecified stages in the nest cycle. Clarity as to nest stage is valuable as foundress 
nests may be more or less discriminatory than post-emergence nests. Testing whether nestmate 
recognition and discrimination occurs in tropical Polistes is therefore a crucial next step in solving the 
paradox of drifting behaviour. 
In this chapter, I  examine drifting behaviour in the Neotropical paper wasp Polistes satan, broadening 
knowledge of polistine drifting beyond the well-studied Polistes canadensis, and experimentally test 
recognition and acceptance of non-nestmates on post-emergence nests. Combining radio-frequency 




(1) Does drifting occur in P. satan? 
(2) Do drifters and non-drifters in P. satan differ in behaviour and ovary development level?  Non-
nestmates in pursuit of direct fitness should show active ovaries, and potentially less 
cooperative behaviour than nestmates.  
(3) Does P. satan have the capacity for nestmate recognition? 
(4) Does P. satan show non-nestmate acceptance? 
(5) Does P. satan preferentially accept drifters over non-drifters? 
Answering Questions 1 and 2 provides preliminary characterisations of drifters (in terms of behaviour 
and reproductive status) in a second Neotropical Polistes species, complementing previous work on P. 
canadensis. Cuticular hydrocarbons show a nest-specific signal in Polistes satan (Tannure-Nascimento 
et al., 2007) suggesting that informational cues are hypothetically available for resident wasps to 
discriminate nestmates from non-nestmates. To distinguish between recognition (Question 3) and 
acceptance (Question 4), I use two different assays. First, to test recognition, I present wasps restricted 
on forceps, and ask whether focal nests show differential behavioural responses to nestmates versus 
non-nestmates. Second, to test acceptance, I release wasps freely onto the nest, and monitor whether 
resident wasps attempt to evict the new arrival. To answer Question 5, I first identify drifters using RFID-
tagging and then monitor whether resident wasps attempt to evict drifters and non-drifters that have 
been freely released onto focal nests. 
7.2 Materials and Methods 
7.2.1 Species background 
Polistes satan Bequaert is an independent-founding simple eusocial wasp, with a distribution 
restricted to central subtropical Brazil (Carpenter, 1996; Raw, 2018). P. satan nests are typically found 
in shaded places, including the interior of buildings (Raw, 1998; Kudô et al., 2013). Nest foundation is 
more likely at the end of the dry season (early September), and dry season female aggregations are 
known to occur during colder periods (Tannure-Nascimento et al., 2005). Nest architecture in P. satan 
resembles that of the southern range of P. canadensis described in Chapter 5: each nest is split into 
multiple brood-carrying combs. Combs lack a covering envelope, which allows non-invasive 
observation. P. satan nests are generally dominated by one singly-mated egg-layer (a monogynous 
‘queen’), with evidence of some supplementary egg-laying by inseminated subordinates (Gaspar et al., 
2007). Facial colour varies widely between individuals (black colour has been linked to dominance 
status, at least in the foundress stage; Tannure-Nascimento et al., 2008).  
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7.2.2 Study site 
This study took place in the Pedregulho-Rifaina area of São Paulo State, which contains ‘floristically 
distinct’ remnants of the fragmented cerrado biome (Durigan et al., 2007; Sasaki and De Mello-Silva, 
2008) interspersed with coffee plantations and grazed pasture. I studied all 46 nests of a P. satan 
population in the Pedregulho valley at the start of the wet season (November 2016). The population 
consisted of two aggregations 0.73 km apart (Figure 7.1a), interspersed predominantly by open 
farmland (Figure 7.1b) and a small forest fragment. Aggregation 1 comprised 14 post-emergence nests 
in an abandoned farmhouse (20°09'45.8"S 47°30'02.5"W); Aggregation 2 comprised 32 pre- and post-
emergence nests on a working farm (Fazenda Pimenta, 20°09'54.0"S 47°29'38.1"W). All nests were 
founded on anthropogenic substrates (walls, wooden beams, and wooden frames; Figure 7.1c). 
Previous surveys suggest a density of 1–1.6 P. satan nests per hectare in the cerrado (Santos et al., 
2007). Aggregations of P. satan in northern São Paulo State are sparse (F. Nascimento, pers. comm.), 
and cerrado remnants in the Pedregulho-Rifaina region may provide valuable habitat both for P. satan 
and social wasps in general (Zucchi et al., 1995). 
 
Figure 7.1 | Study site and species. (a) Nests used in this study were from neighbour aggregations in the 
Pedregulho valley (São Paulo State, Brazil). (b) The valley floor is a mosaic of grazed pasture and forest 
fragments. (c) A single P. satan nest suspended from a wooden beam in the Aggregation 1 farmhouse. This 
nest consisted of seven independent combs with brood at different stages. 
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7.2.3 Question 1: Does drifting occur in P. satan? 
I used a combination of RFID tagging and visual observation (as described in Chapter 5) on all wasps 
in Aggregation 1. A total of 515 wasps were both RFID tagged and colour coded (using Posca pens; 
Yagound et al., 2017); an additional 33 wasps were colour coded without RFID tags. For RFID tagging, I 
used low-frequency passive tags (GiS BeeTags, 2 x 6 mm, 18 mg; Figure 7.2). Tags were attached to the 
thorax using Loctite cyanoacrylate glue. I applied a three-colour nest-specific code (i.e., the code of the 
nest on which the wasp was initially collected for tagging) to the upper half of the left wing and a three-
colour wasp-specific code to the upper half of the right wing, which enabled individual wasps to be 
quickly identifiable in the field. To minimise disturbance of nests during the tagging procedure, each 
wasp was removed from their nest individually with forceps, tagged and paint marked, placed in a small 
plastic container for a few minutes to allow the glue to fix, and then individually returned to the nest 
with forceps. Because face colour has been associated with dominance in P. satan (Tannure-
Nascimento et al., 2008), wasps were categorised according to face colour based on the predominant 
colour determined by a single observer (black versus red), and eye colour (newly-emerged wasps have 
black eyes, which turn red with maturity). 
To provide approximately equal RFID coverage by edge area across nests, each nest received 2–7 in 
situ RFID-antennae (GiS TS-A37, 3 cm diameter). Antennae were connected to antenna-specific readers 
(GiS TS-R64), which were powered by 12-volt car batteries (Moura) via electrical cords. I arranged RFID 
antennae in a circular array around the comb cluster. Where possible, I attached readers to solid 
material (walls of the farmhouse) using Velcro pads glued to the substrate; where this was not possible, 
I suspended readers by metal wires from the farmhouse ceiling. Mesh nets channelled flight paths over 
the antennal detection range. I monitored the nest network using RFID for 11 h per day (8.30 am – 7.30 
pm) for six days, and collated data each evening from readers onto a field laptop. Ad libitum visual 
observations of drifting during the RFID period were also recorded: drifters could be readily identified 
in the field by their nest-specific colour codes. The number of active brood (eggs, larvae, and pupae) 
were counted on all nests at the end of the RFID monitoring period, and all observable brood parasites 





Figure 7.2 | RFID-tags (indicated by arrow) provide a 
small and lightweight method of tracking P. satan 
movement. 
 
Figure 7.3 | Parasitic larvae (Sarcophagidae) in 
a P. satan nest experiencing ongoing brood loss 
in Aggregation 1. The loss of brood to parasites 
may compromise the indirect fitness returns of 
continued cooperation, providing a 
‘diminishing returns’ justification for drifting 
(see Chapter 6). 
 
7.2.4 Classifying drifters and non-drifters 
To answer Questions 2 and 6 above, the combination of RFID monitoring and visual records were used 
to allocate wasps to either the ‘drifter’ or the ‘non-drifter’ category. Some individuals may have drifted 
before the six-day RFID monitoring phase and then never drifted within the RFID-monitoring period. 
These wasps would then be categorised as non-drifters for the purposes of this experiment (i.e., 
‘drifters’ are individuals who had recently drifted). In addition, some individuals may have avoided 
detection during the RFID monitoring phase, and thus been categorised as false negatives (‘non-
drifters’ who are drifters). However, the high resolution of RFID-tagging (Sumner et al., 2007) combined 
with visual observations means that false negatives are likely to be rare.  
7.2.5 Question 2: Do drifters differ from non-drifters in behaviour and ovary development 
level? 
Behaviour: To provide a preliminary picture of drifter behaviour and compare that behaviour with non-
drifters, I observed a random sample of eight post-emergence nests in Aggregation 1 (n = 293 wasps). 
Behavioural data were collected in 34 hour-long observation sessions (mean = 4.25 h per nest, range 
1–7 h) during the six-day RFID monitoring period (n = 2,082 behavioural observations) using the 
ethogram in Table 7.1. This short and unequal sampling was not intended to be comprehensive, but 
rather to provide a preliminary measure of drifter activity. Of the behaviourally-observed wasps, 21.8% 
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(64/293) were known drifters, identified according to the methods described in Question 1. The 
behaviours for a subset of known drifters (n = 19) were observed on more than one nest.  
I classified drifters as ‘in-drifters’ to a focal nest if they were initially tagged on a different nest, and 
‘out-drifters’ from a given focal nest if the focal nest was the tagging nest and they visit different nests 
during the monitoring period. Here, I make the broad assumption that tagging nests are natal nests. 
Some wasps may have been drifting when initially tagged, meaning that a minority of wasps categorised 
as in-drifters may in fact be returning to the natal nest. However, drifting Neotropical Polistes have 
previously been shown to (1) invest the most effort in the natal nest and (2) typically be nestmates on 
the nest they were tagged on (Sumner et al., 2007). 
As drifter behaviour may differ across nests, I parsed the data into rates per hour at which each 
behaviour was initiated by each wasp on each separate nest (n = 312 wasp-on-nest combinations across 
n = 293 wasps). I used principal components analysis (PCA) on the standardised variables to extract the 
main axes of variation from the wasp-on-nest dataset, using the R package FactoMineR (Lê et al., 2008), 
and visualised PCA plots using the R package factoextra (Kassambara and Mundt, 2017). I treated the 
first principal component of the PCA as the response variable, with focal nest and wasp as random 
effects, and drifter status (i.e., non-drifter, in-drifter, or out-drifter) and face colour (i.e., red, black, or 
unrecorded) as categorical fixed effects. Unless otherwise stated, all models in this chapter used Gibbs 
sampling Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC); Gibbs chains were run for a minimum of 100,000 
iterations. I confirmed convergence via trace plots. Following the standard approach in WinBUGS, I 
present posterior predictions for error terms using the precision (i.e., the reciprocal of the variance). 
The term ‘credible’ is used to denote parameters whose 95% credible intervals do not overlap zero. For 
model selection, I follow the same methods as in Chapters 5 and 6 by using binary indicator variables 
𝑔𝑖 for indicator variable selection (Ntzoufras, 2002), and present the posterior inclusion probability for 
effects. 
Ovary development level: To ask whether drifters differ from non-drifters in ovary development level, 
I collected all available drifters present on nests (n = 32 drifters, 33% of detected drifters), and an 
associated sample of non-drifters (n = 39), one day after completion of RFID monitoring; collected 
wasps were placed in 80% ethanol. Aggregations of P. satan are rare and difficult to locate in Sao Paulo 
State (A. de Souza, pers. comm.); therefore, to preserve this aggregation for future research by the 
University of São Paulo (Prof. F. Nascimento) and protect a viable wasp population in the Pedregulho 
valley, I collected a subset of the population for ovary dissection as opposed to killing all wasps on all 
nests. I dissected out and photographed ovaries via a Leica IC80 HD camera on a Leica M165C 
stereomicroscope and measured the largest oocyte to the nearest hundredth of a millimetre in ImageJ. 
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Ovaries were categorised according to the four visual development categories (A–D) described in 
Chapter 4, following Gobbi et al. (2006). All dissections and measurements were conducted blind to 
drifter status. 
To analyse the ovary data, I used two multiple membership (MM) mixed models, in which (1) egg size 
and (2) total egg number were predicted by two random effects (tagging nest and foreign nest), given 
MM weightings that sum to 1 (Durrant et al., 2018), and one fixed effect (the dummy variable ‘drifter’ 
or ‘non-drifter’). To accommodate the multiple nest membership of drifters, I used equal weightings 
(0.5) for the two nests visited by each drifter and a full weighting (1) for the single nest visited by non-
drifters, following a similar procedure in Durrant et al. (2018). To ask whether drifters differ in ovary 
activation, I used a logistic mixed model of ‘active’ (‘C’ or ‘D’ grade) versus ‘inactive’ (‘A’ or ‘B’ grade). 
Categorical independent variables were ‘drifter’ and ‘non-drifter’, with weighted random effects 
specifying the natal nest (for non-drifters) and visited nest (for drifters). 
Table 7.1 | Ethogram of key monitored behaviours 
Interaction Code Description 
Antennation ANT Antennal inspection of a social partner 
Receive trophallaxis/give 
trophallaxis 
REC T/GIVE T Transfer of liquid food by regurgitation  
Receive food/give food REC F/GIVE F Transfer of solid food from large food ball 
Bite BITE Bite to wings, legs, head, or thorax of a social partner. To quantify 
escalation in the behavioural trials, bites are split into ‘small bite’ 
and ‘sustained biting’: the former is a quick bite, immediately 
released; the latter is a continued bite or a series of continued 
bites without immediate release. 
Lunge LUNGE Sudden fast approach towards a social partner without walking 
or moving tarsi placement 
Chase CHASE Fast pursuit of a social partner across the comb surface 
Sting STING Attempted sting of a social partner, accompanied by abdomen 
twisted underneath thorax  
Dominate DOMINATE Submission posture (flattened body, pressed to nest surface) 
adopted post-antennation or due to the close approach of a 
social partner 
Falling fight FALLING 
FIGHT 
Jointly falling from the nest during a struggle, with one or both 
individuals grasping the other 
Behaviour Code Description 
Check cells CC Inspection of multiple cells (brood-containing or empty) 
Feed brood FB Transferring water or foodstuff to larva; head fully within a 
brood-containing cell for a minimum of 5 s 
Build cells BUILD Layering pulp to build a new cell or add to an existing cell 
Process food PROC F Manipulation of a solid food ball by mandibles 
Abdominal wagging AW Rapid horizontal vibration of abdomen 
Arrival/departure ARRIVE/LEAVE Arrival or departure from the nest 
Arrive with food ARRIVE F Arrival at the nest carrying a food ball (insect prey) 
Larval cannibalism EAT LARVA Consuming live brood 
Egg-laying LAY EGG Production of a new egg in an empty cell 
Fan FAN Rapid wing movements whilst stationary to cool down the nest 
Parasite alarm PARASITE 
ALARM 
Frenetic, abrupt movement across the comb surface, occurring 
as a group behaviour 
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7.2.6 Question 3: Does P. satan have the capacity for nestmate recognition? 
To investigate whether P. satan can distinguish nestmates from non-nestmates, I conducted a 
presentation experiment. I followed established methods (presentation of wasps on forceps) used 
extensively in temperate Polistes (Signorotti et al., 2014). In Aggregation 2, nests were grouped 
together into nine ‘clusters’, defined as a closely-packed nests within the wider aggregation; clusters 
were a minimum of 7 m apart. Twenty-five free-living undisturbed focal nests in Aggregation 2 each 
received four treatments in a repeated-measures design: presentation of (1) a nestmate wasp, (2) a 
‘local’ non-nestmate (from within the same cluster), (3) a ‘distant’ non-nestmate (from a different 
cluster in the same general aggregation), and (4) a ‘complete foreigner’ non-nestmate from 
Aggregation 1. Wasps used in presentations were from 42 source nests across the two aggregations. 
Each wasp was only used in one trial. 
 
Figure 7.4 | Aggregation 2 was a single farm; within the aggregation were nine nest clusters (marked by circles). 
Non-nestmates from the same cluster are denoted ‘local’; non-nestmates from other clusters are denoted 
‘distant’; and non-nestmates from the other aggregation (Aggregation 1; see Figure 7.1a) are denoted 
‘complete’ foreigners. 
 
Focal wasps were removed from their nests and isolated in small plastic containers for a minimum of 
2 h. Black-eyed wasps (newly emerged) were not used as focal wasps in behavioural trials. All containers 
were cleaned with hexane to ensure that no hydrocarbon residues from the previous occupant were 
present. In each trial (n = 100), a wasp was removed from the container and held close to the focal nest, 
1.5–2 cm from residents, on forceps for 2 m. By being held on the forceps, the presented wasp was 
unable to move freely, to avoid interactants, or to depart the nest. I recorded all interactions with the 
presented wasp during each two-minute trial, blind to treatment: I dictated all observed behaviours to 
a second observer, who transcribed the behaviours in writing. To prevent interference between trials, 
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each nest was only used once per day. I used a fully counterbalanced allocation of treatment order to 
nests. The second observer used the counterbalancing list to identify which trial to perform next in 
sequence, so that the primary observer (observing the nest and dictating behaviours) was completely 
blind to treatment. Each wasp interaction was weighted according to intensity on a five-step scale (0: 
antennation; 1: lunge; 2: small bite; 3: sustained bite; 4: sting). This provided an ‘aggression score’ (sum 
of all aggressive acts received by the presented wasp) and an ‘escalation score’ (the weight of the most 
aggressive act received by the presented wasp). I recorded both the facial colour and head width of all 
presented wasps (measurements were made using digital callipers to the nearest 0.1 mm). 
To test the effect of treatment on aggression score, I used a linear mixed model with the following 
covariates characterising each trial: focal nest group size, head size of the presented wasp, and adult-
to-brood ratio of the focal nest. I included the ratio of adults to brood (i.e., number of small to large 
sized larvae) because, in principle, nests may invest less effort in identifying non-nestmates when the 
nest is in greater need of additional workers (Mora-Kepfer, 2013). Only six wasps had black facial 
colours as opposed to non-black, so face colour was not analysed. Lastly, I included focal nest and 
source nest (defined as a nest from which the focal wasp was taken) as random effects with vague (wide 
variance) priors centred on zero. 
Since escalation score is an ordinal variable, I used a Bayesian ordered logit model to test for a 
treatment effect on escalation, implemented in RStan via the package brms (Burkner, 2015). As the 
syntax and capabilities of brms differ from WinBUGS, I used leave-one-out cross-validation (LOO) for 
model selection instead of indicator variable selection; the model that minimised the LOO score is 
presented. As RStan uses a more efficient MCMC sampler than WinBUGS, I followed the default 
(Burkner, 2015) of using four chains each with only 2,000 iterations. I confirmed convergence by ?̂? = 1. 
7.2.7 Question 4: Does P. satan show non-nestmate acceptance? 
To investigate whether nests are more likely to evict non-nestmates than nestmates when exposed to 
wasps arriving at the nest, I used an ‘acceptance’ experiment. This second experiment involved gently 
placing wasps on post-emergence nests directly using forceps, observing whether wasps are evicted by 
individuals from the home nest, and comparing the acceptance of non-nestmates (derived from the 
same aggregation) and nestmates. Acceptance may be context dependent: in principle, foreigners that 
have made an expensive investment in nest productivity may be more trustworthy (‘partner screening’; 
Archetti et al., 2011). To simulate the arrival of food-bearing foreigners, I therefore introduced a third 
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treatment by providing a subset of local foreigners with carbohydrate resources (honey), which was 
dabbed onto the mandibles immediately before presentation. 
Focal wasps were removed from their nests and stored overnight in plastic containers with a small 
quantity of sugar-water. This procedure was for two reasons: (1) separation guarantees that wasps did 
not have recent familiarity with the target nest by same-day drifting that might have already established 
acceptance levels; and (2) pilot tests had confirmed that confinement renders wasps placid, passive 
and prepared to remain on foreign nests without leaving. This minimises the likelihood that 
experimental wasps reject the foreign nest, as opposed to vice versa, and allows a focus on the 
behaviour of the focal nest’s individuals. Each nest (n = 23) was used as both source and focal nest. 
Releasing trials (n = 64) were conducted in a counterbalanced order by an observer blind to treatment 
(n = 21 non-nestmates without honey, n = 23 non-nestmates with honey, n = 20 nestmates); note that 
five trials were not possible due to logistical constraints. All focal wasps were placed on combs where 
resident wasps were present. I recorded three outcomes: ‘acceptance’ (present on the nest after two 
minutes without harassment), ‘rejection’ (evicted from the nest by aggression from resident wasps), 
and ‘self-exit’ (wasp left without aggressive harassment). For all releasing trials, aggressive acts were 
scored as in Question 2 (0: antennation; 1: lunge; 2: small bite; 3: sustained biting; 4: sting), and an 
aggression score and an escalation score were generated for each trial. I also recorded all aggressive 
acts performed by the focal wasp, which provided a focal-wasp specific aggression score. If the focal 
wasp walked off the nest onto the surrounding substrate after being introduced/released, the trial was 
repeated by replacing the wasp back on the focal nest.  
For analysis of the releasing trials, I used three tests: (1) logistic regression on the probability that 
wasps were accepted into the focal nest at the end of the two-minute period; (2) a mixed model on 
aggression score received; and (3) an ordered logit mixed model on escalation score received.  Source 
nest and focal nest were included as random effects. Fixed effects were: focal nest group size, 
aggression score of the focal wasp (i.e., how the introduced wasp treats the residents it encounters), 
and facial colour (coded as predominantly black or predominantly not black following a visual 
categorisation in the field).  The ordered logit model was conducted in brms as described for the 
ordered logit model in the previous section. 
7.2.8 Question 5: Does P. satan preferentially accept drifters over non-drifters? 
To investigate whether nests are more likely to admit foreign wasps who have recently drifted, I 
conducted a third repeated-measures experiment. I first used the RFID data to identify which nests 
were included in the drifting network of each individual. Twenty-seven focal nests were then each 
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presented with three treatments, in random order, at the completion of the RFID-monitoring period: 
(1) an RFID-detected non-nestmate drifter; (2) an RFID-confirmed non-nestmate non-drifter (wasps 
never detected drifting in the RFID monitoring period) from the same source nest as each RFID-
detected drifter; and (3) a nestmate (control) wasp from the focal nest. Focal wasps were removed 
from their nest and gently released directly onto a brood-carrying comb of the focal nest. I recorded 
the outcome of the release (acceptance, rejection, self-exit, as in Question 4) at the end of two minutes, 
and also the frequency of each aggressive interaction experienced by the focal wasp (interactions 
received and interactions given) during that period, by dictating to a second observer.  
For analysis of drifter releasing trials I used three tests as in Question 4: (1) logistic regression on the 
probability that wasps were accepted into the focal nest at the end of the two-minute period; (2) a 
mixed model on aggression score received; and (3) an ordered logits mixed model (in brms) on 
escalation score received. All three analyses used treatment type (drifter, non-drifter, or nestmate), 
focal nest group size and aggression score of the presented wasp as fixed effects, with focal nest and 
source nest as random effects. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Question 1: Does drifting occur in P. satan? 
Using both methods combined (RFID and visual observation), 17.7% (97/548) of the marked wasps 
were identified as drifting. Of the RFID-tagged wasps, 61.7% (318/515) were detected at least once by 
the antennae (Figure 7.5). Of these, 11.3% (36/318) were recorded by RFID-antennae on two or more 
nests (including the one on which they had been tagged) during the monitoring phase; a further 25 
wasps were detected by RFID visiting a nest other than the nest they had been tagged on, and were 
also classified as ‘drifters’. Of the identified drifters, 23.7% (23/97) moved between two nests that were 
under visible stress (Figure 7.5): one nest was suffering apparent queen succession fights (behavioural 
data revealed high levels of aggression between multiple high dominants) and the other was suffering 
ongoing brood destruction by parasitic sarcophagid larvae. Drifters were active across the social 
network used for subsequent analysis (Figure 7.6). Nests differed in the total wasp populations revealed 





Figure 7.5 | RFID-tag-generated spatial drifter network for wasps (n = 318) visiting nests (n = 14) over a six-day period. Nest layout reflects approximate spatial 
relationships. Nests are marked by blue circles. Drifters are shown in red. RFID-detected wasps only visiting a single nest are shown in white. RFID-detected wasps 
known to be drifting based on visual observations (including at tagging) on nests other than their RFID-detected targets are included in red: for these wasps, the 
visually-observed nest is indicated by dashed edges. The nest marked ‘*’ was in a natural state of queen indeterminacy (multiple aggressive dominants); the 





Figure 7.6 | Drifters participate in colony behavioural social networks. Cross-nest behavioural social network showing all recorded behaviours on the focal subset 
of eight colonies in Aggregation 1. Drifters (red circles) interact with residents (white circles) on separate nests. Wasps are scaled in size by their number of 
connections to other wasps (out-degree). Inferred queens (the dominant individual on each nest) are highlighted as green-edged squares for all nests except 
one nest (marked by ‘*’) that was in a natural state of queen indeterminacy (multiple aggressive dominants). A nest with sarcophagid parasites is marked by ‘†’. 
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7.3.2 Question 2: Do drifters differ from non-drifters in behaviour and ovary development 
level?  
Behaviour: PCA on the total social network (Figure 7.6) found that individual principal components of 
P. satan behaviour explained relatively small percentages of behavioural variation (Figure 7.7–Figure 
7.9). Inter-behaviour correlation was low: the first component, which can loosely be interpreted as 
general level of within-nest activity, explains only 12.2% of the variance. There was a weak clustering 
of behaviours typically interpreted as dominant (bite, sting, lunge) and behaviours typically interpreted 
as cooperative (foraging and processing food) on the second principal component (Figure 7.8), but this 
axis of variation explains only 8.7% of the total variance. This echoes similar results in P. canadensis 
(Chapter 5; Bell, 2014): most individuals performed a wide range of behaviours. 
There was no evidence that drifters differ from non-drifters in behaviour. There was full overlap in the 
95% confidence ellipses of non-drifters, in-drifters, and out-drifters (Figure 7.9). Likewise, in the 
corresponding mixed model, there was no effect of drifter status or facial colour on the first or second 
principal component: 95% credible intervals for each category overlapped zero (Table 7.2; Table 7.3). 
 
 
Figure 7.7 | Percentage of variation explained by different principal components in standardised PCA. The low 
percentages of variation explained by the principal components implies that P. satan individuals do not show 




Figure 7.8 | The contributions of individual behaviour to standardised PCA. The first and second components (‘Dim1’ 
and ‘Dim2’) are shown. See Table 7.1 for description of behaviours.  
 
Figure 7.9 | Individual principal components scores. Each point (n = 312) represents a set of behavioural 
observations for a specific wasp on a specific nest. Points are scaled in proportion to cos2 scores (the contribution 
of the point to the principal components categorisation). Ellipses show the 95% confidence regions for each wasp 
type (non-drifters, in-drifters, and out-drifters). Points and associated confidence ellipses are categorised by colour: 




Table 7.2 | Posterior estimates for model of first principal component of P. satan behaviour. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Status: Non-drifter (g = 0.010) -0.003 3.158 0.009 -6.213 0.015 6.200 
Status: In-drifter (g = 0.010) -0.007 3.152 0.010 -6.165 -0.021 6.211 
Status: Out-drifter (g = 0.010) -0.002 3.160 0.010 -6.176 -0.003 6.214 
Face colour (g = 0.083) 7.3E-4 3.028 0.010 -6.092 0.086 6.055 
Intercept 0.128 0.359 0.006 -0.500 0.114 0.855 
Total model precision 0.598 0.290 0.030 0.369 0.454 1.376 
Focal nest random effect (g = 1.000) precision 2.464 1.942 0.053 0.436 1.955 7.569 
Wasp random effect (g = 0.422) precision 15.31 34.38 3.616 0.488 2.646 130.7 
Bayesian R2 0.222 0.194 0.009 -0.020 0.161 0.710 




Table 7.3 | Posterior estimates for model of second principal component of P. satan behaviour. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Status: Non-drifter (g = 0.005) -0.006 3.168 0.009 -6.216 0.012 6.209 
Status: In-drifter (g = 0.005) -0.005 3.160 0.009 -6.194 -0.014 6.211 
Status: Out-drifter (g = 0.005) -5.5E-4 3.163 0.010 -6.181 0.003 6.214 
Face colour (g = 0.056) -0.013 3.071 0.009 -6.139 0.004 6.098 
Intercept 0.148 0.295 0.006 -0.285 0.090 0.835 
Total model precision 0.555 0.061 0.002 0.461 0.550 0.670 
Focal nest random effect (g = 0.740) precision 5.427 15.88 0.216 2.7E-15 1.831 35.99 
Wasp random effect (g = 0.068) precision 3.496 16.57 0.725 1.4E-11 4.9E-6 42.80 
Bayesian R2 0.049 0.093 0.002 -0.134 0.050 0.220 




Ovary development level: Developed ovaries were found among both drifters and non-drifters. 
Drifters (9/32 wasps, 28.1%) were credibly more likely than non-drifters (3/39 wasps, 7.7%) to possess 
active (‘C’ or ‘D’) grade ovaries (Table 7.4) over inactive (‘A’ or ‘B’ grade), although no dissected wasps 
had ‘D’ stage (i.e., maximally active (egg-layer)) ovaries (Figure 7.10a). There was no credible effect of 
nest on the probability of ovary activation: all nests effects showed 95% credible intervals overlapping 
zero. Excluding all ‘A’ stage wasps (i.e., focusing only on wasps with oocytes, n = 50), the multiple 
membership model for egg size showed that, although egg size ranged widely from 0.24 mm to 2.40 
mm, sampled drifters had larger eggs on average than non-drifters (Table 7.5; Figure 7.10b). The 
random effects terms (home and foreign nest) all had 95% credible intervals for nest-specific parameter 
estimates overlapping zero. Drifters and non-drifters did not differ in the multiple membership model 
for total egg number, and the relevant coefficient of determination was very low (𝑅2 = 0.026; Table 
7.6; Figure 7.10c).  
 
 
Figure 7.10 | P. satan drifters show higher rates of ovary activation than non-drifters. (a) Ovary grade categories. 
(b) Egg size. (c) Total egg number. Medians shown by mid-bars; means shown by crosses; individual tests show 





Table 7.4 | Posterior estimates for logistic mixed model of ovary activation. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Wasp: drifter 3.711 3.153 0.172 0.574 2.618 13.02 
Intercept -4.534 3.000 0.162 -13.62 -3.503 -1.568 
Foreign nest random effect precision 25.28 44.68 1.634 0.086 7.484 158.5 
Home nest random effect precision 10.84 38.07 1.780 0.007 0.390 113.0 
 
 
Table 7.5 | Posterior estimates for model of egg size. 100,000 iterations MCMC. Effects with 95% credible intervals not overlapping zero are 
highlighted in bold. 




Wasp: drifter 0.497 0.220 0.002 0.077 0.494 0.937 
Intercept 0.826 0.144 9.4E-4 0.538 0.827 1.107 
Total model precision 3.652 0.833 0.005 2.238 3.580 5.479 
Foreign nest random effect precision 14.53 32.94 0.439 0.389 3.613 106.2 
Home nest random effect precision 43.47 52.48 0.530 3.283 25.46 192.2 
Bayesian R2 0.198 0.190 0.001 -0.241 0.224 0.492 
Posterior predictive p-value 0.506 0.500 0.002 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
Table 7.6 | Posterior estimates for model of egg number. 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Wasp: drifter 4.212 2.688 0.016 -1.174 4.246 9.400 
Intercept 9.466 1.880 0.009 5.790 9.459 13.18 
Total model precision 0.009 0.002 1.1E-5 0.006 0.009 0.013 
Foreign nest random effect precision 81.92 262.4 6.007 0.006 1.649 820.5 
Home nest random effect precision 92.17 297.6 6.026 0.023 2.272 889.9 
Bayesian R2 0.026 0.175 0.001 -0.371 0.045 0.314 
Posterior predictive p-value 0.502 0.500 0.002 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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7.3.3 Question 3: Does P. satan have the capacity for nestmate recognition? 
All presented wasps received interactions from resident wasps: 14.7 ± 7.9 (mean ± S.D.) interactions 
per trial. The mixed model for aggression score showed that wasps on the focal nest were most strongly 
aggressive towards ‘local’ non-nestmates (i.e., non-nestmates from the same cluster as the focal nest), 
with a credibly greater level of aggression elicited by these individuals than nestmates of the resident 
wasps (Table 7.7; Figure 7.11a). ‘Distant’ non-nestmates (non-nestmates from other clusters within the 
same aggregation) and ‘complete foreigners’ (non-nestmates from the other aggregation, 0.73 km 
away) did not receive credibly different levels of aggression compared with resident wasps, but did 
receive credibly less aggression than ‘local’ non-nestmates (Table 7.7; Figure 7.11a). 
The mixed model for escalation score showed that nestmates were less likely than all three categories 
of non-nestmate to experience high escalation scores (Figure 7.11b-c). The fitted model after leave-





Figure 7.11 | P. satan nests showed differential responses towards nestmates and non-nestmates. (a) Aggression scores observed; there is a credible difference between 
treatments highlighted ‘A’ and the treatment highlighted ‘B’. Medians shown by mid-bars; means shown by crosses; individual tests show by circles; interquartile ranges 
shown by boxes. (b) Escalation scores observed. (c) Probability of each escalation score for each treatment, as identified by the fitted model for escalation score. High 
escalation scores (scores 3 and 4) occurred with low probability (dark purple) for nestmates but with higher probability (green) for non-nestmates (local, distant, and 




Table 7.7 | Posterior estimates for mixed model of aggression score (forceps-based recognition trials). 100,000 iterations MCMC. Pairwise comparisons are 
labelled ‘Contrast’. Effects with 95% credible intervals not overlapping zero are highlighted in bold. 




Wasp: Nestmate (g = 0.998) -5.087 2.395 0.017 -9.705 -5.105 -0.312 
Wasp: Local non-nestmate (g = 0.998) 7.104 2.425 0.021 2.269 7.135 11.77 
Wasp: Distant non-nestmate (g = 0.998) -0.383 2.334 0.008 -4.982 -0.385 4.183 
Wasp: Complete foreigner non-nestmate (g = 0.998) -0.349 2.377 0.008 -5.030 -0.352 4.293 
Focal nest group size (g = 0.027) 0.012 9.841 0.032 -19.44 0.092 19.54 
Head size (g = 0.123) -0.012 9.395 0.028 -19.07 -0.001 19.07 
Intercept 12.91 2.344 0.015 8.140 12.96 17.34 
Focal nest worker-to-brood ratio (g = 0.221) -0.411 8.905 0.029 -18.57 -1.127 18.52 
Total model precision 0.006 8.7E-4 1.2E-5 0.004 0.006 0.008 
Focal nest random effect (g = 0.489) precision 2.7E-20 1.0E-10 1.4E-12 9.4E-35 2.5E-27 2.2E-19 
Source nest random effect (g = 0.284) precision 129.6 334.8 30.72 0.032 9.709 1204 
Bayesian R2 0.269 0.159 0.005 -0.062 0.274 0.544 
Contrast: Complete versus Distant 0.045 2.993 0.039 -5.825 -0.003 6.014 
Contrast: Local versus Complete 7.074 3.036 0.048 0.961 7.100 12.96 
Contrast: Local versus Distant 7.119 3.005 0.046 1.164 7.145 12.92 
Contrast: Local versus Resident 11.56 3.077 0.053 5.565 11.59 17.37 
Contrast: Resident versus Complete -4.490 2.931 0.040 -10.14 -4.493 1.304 
Contrast: Resident versus Distant -4.445 2.949 0.041 -10.18 -4.476 1.366 










Table 7.8 | Posterior estimates for ordered logit model of escalation score (forceps-based recognition trials). 
4 chains of 2,000 iterations NUTS-MCMC. 
 Effect μ σ 
q2.5 q97.5 
Intercept: Escalation Score 0 -2.81 0.62 -4.04 -1.63 
Intercept: Escalation Score 1 -2.24 0.60 -3.42 -1.07 
Intercept: Escalation Score 2 -0.15 0.54 -1.18 0.92 
Intercept: Escalation Score 3 1.46 0.56 0.39 2.61 
Intercept: Escalation Score 4 is the reference category.    
Treatment: Nestmate -2.13 0.61 -3.34 -0.97 
Treatment: Local non-nestmate 0.55 0.59 -0.58 1.68 
Treatment: Distant non-nestmate -0.41 0.59 -1.57 0.76 
Treatment: Complete foreigner is the reference category    




7.3.4 Question 4: Does P. satan show non-nestmate acceptance? 
P. satan showed a high degree of non-nestmate acceptance. Acceptance of wasps freely released onto 
nests was high in all treatment groups: at the end of each two-minute trial, 85% of nestmates (17/20), 
66.7% (14/21) of non-nestmates without honey, and 60.9% (14/23) of non-nestmates with honey 
resources were accepted on the nest. Bayesian logistic regression found no credible differences 
between treatment groups in the probability of acceptance (Table 7.9). Aggression score of the released 
wasp had a positive effect on probability of acceptance (median regression slope on logit = 22.36, g = 
1.000; Table 7.9). This last effect should be interpreted cautiously, as a wasp is inevitably more able to 
aggress the host nest if permitted to remain for the whole trial. 
Mixed models showed that neither total aggression score (Table 7.10) nor escalation score (Table 
7.11) were credibly affected by treatment type (nestmate, non-nestmate without honey, and non-
nestmate with honey resources; Figure 7.12a), face colour, focal nest group size, or mean aggression 
score shown by the released wasp, which were removed by indicator variable selection in the model 
for aggression score and leave-one-out cross validation in the model for escalation score. 
Only six wasps were aggressively rejected by individuals on the focal nest (zero nestmates, four non-
nestmates without honey, and two non-nestmates with honey resources); the remaining thirteen 
wasps who were absent at the end of the two-minute trial left voluntarily without obvious eviction. 
Accepted wasps received 10.7 ± 6.2 (mean ± S.D.) interactions during the two minutes (Figure 7.12b); 





Figure 7.12 | Wasps freely released onto nests. (a) An apparently lower aggression directed towards recipients 
was not credibly different (see Table 7.10). (b) High levels of acceptance were not due to an absence of 
interactions; only one accepted wasp received no interactions. Medians shown by mid-bars; means shown by 













Table 7.9 | Posterior estimates for logistic mixed model of probability of being stably on the nest after two minutes (wasps released onto nests). 
100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Wasp: Nestmate (g = 0.000) -0.397 31.60 0.235 -61.82 -0.351 60.89 
Wasp: Non-nestmate with honey (g = 0.000) 0.423 31.52 0.204 -61.61 0.506 61.79 
Wasp: Non-nestmate without honey (g = 0.000) 0.259 31.98 0.233 -61.83 0.321 62.66 
Focal wasp’s aggression score (g = 1.000) 26.40 18.92 0.169 2.330 22.36 71.35 
Facial colour (g = 0.875) 23.60 22.69 0.230 -26.86 21.57 71.82 
Focal nest group size (g = 0.000) 0.127 31.38 0.222 -61.30 0.050 61.96 
Intercept 0.278 0.788 0.026 -1.223 0.256 1.818 
Focal nest random effect (g = 0.629) precision 217.5 950.4 50.66 6.5E-4 0.520 2388 
Source nest random effect (g = 0.153) precision 0.062 0.150 0.008 4.0E-8 0.002 0.389 
 
Table 7.10 | Posterior estimates for aggression score received by introduced wasps (wasps released onto nests). 100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Wasp: Nestmate (g = 0.382) -0.699 2.942 0.016 -6.158 -0.856 5.507 
Wasp: Non-nestmate with honey (g = 0.382) 0.237 2.817 0.013 -5.560 0.297 5.649 
Wasp: Non-nestmate without honey (g = 0.382) 0.365 2.851 0.014 -5.582 0.463 5.726 
Focal wasp’s aggression score (g = 0.113) -0.027 2.974 0.009 -6.000 -0.139 6.030 
Facial colour (g = 0.518) -1.039 2.865 0.010 -6.185 -1.235 5.179 
Focal nest group size (g = 0.016) 0.003 3.122 0.010 -6.157 0.0106 6.154 
Intercept 5.172 1.439 0.012 2.069 5.170 8.269 
Total model precision 0.022 0.004 1.8E-5 0.015 0.022 0.030 
Focal nest random effect (g = 0.046) precision 29.77 363.7 10.63 0.000 8.1E-29 89.19 
Source nest (g = 0.121) random effect precision 210.3 1385 40.43 4.2E-45 2.8E-9 2123 








Table 7.11 | Posterior estimates for ordered logit model of escalation score (wasps released onto nests). 
Four chains of 2,000 iterations NUTS-MCMC. 
 Effect μ σ 
q2.5 q97.5 
Intercept: Escalation Score 0 -1.27 0.69 -2.75 -0.01 
Intercept: Escalation Score 1 -1.00 0.69 -2.44 0.28 
Intercept: Escalation Score 2 1.05 0.69 -0.26 2.24 
Intercept: Escalation Score 3 2.96 0.83 1.49 4.70 
Intercept: Escalation Score 4 3.72 0.93 2.09 5.77 
Intercept: Escalation Score 5 (falling fight) is the reference category 
Treatment: Nestmate -0.91 0.64 -2.21 0.37 
Treatment: Non-nestmate without honey 0.31 0.62 -0.93 1.52 
Treatment: Non-nestmate with honey is the reference category 
Host colony (random effect) standard deviation 2.15 0.65 1.08 3.63 
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7.3.5 Question 5: Does P. satan preferentially accept drifters over non-drifters? 
There was no evidence that nests preferentially accepted recent non-nestmate drifters over recent 
non-nestmate non-drifters. First, logistic regression showed no evidence that nestmates were more 
likely that non-nestmates to still be on the nest after two minutes (Table 7.12). In the acceptance 
experiment (releasing drifters, non-drifters and nestmates freely onto the focal nest), very few wasps 
(5/81; one drifter, three non-drifters and one nestmate) were aggressively evicted during the two 
minutes of interaction after experimental introduction. Nine wasps left voluntarily (‘self-exit’) during 
the two-minute period without being aggressively evicted (six drifters and three non-drifters); 
conversely, 75.0% of presented drifters (21/28), 77.8% of presented non-drifters (21/27), and 96.2% of 
nestmates (25/26) were integrated with the nest after two minutes of interactions (interpreted as 
‘acceptance’). One presented drifter absconded the nest immediately, before behavioural interactions, 
and was therefore removed from all subsequent analyses. Neither aggression score (Table 7.13) nor 
escalation score (Table 7.14) received by introduced wasps were predicted by treatment (drifter, non-
drifter, or nestmate): all released wasps received similar levels of aggression (Figure 7.13a). Accepted 
wasps received 9.3 ± 6.0 (mean ± S.D.) interactions during the two minutes (Figure 7.13b); two accepted 
wasps (both non-nestmate non-drifters) received no interactions. Six wasps (two drifters, one non-
drifter and three nestmates) interacted with the brood during the two minutes, either by cell checking 
or brood feeding. 
 
Figure 7.13 | No credible difference in aggression between nestmates, RFID-detected drifters, and non-drifters. 
(a) Aggression score (see Table 7.13). (b) High levels of acceptance were not due to an absence of interactions. 
Two accepted wasps received no interactions. Medians shown by mid-bars; means shown by crosses; individual 
tests show by circles; interquartile ranges shown by boxes. 
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Table 7.12 | Posterior estimates for mixed model logistic regression for probability of being stably on the nest after two minutes (wasps released onto 
nests). 100,000 iterations MCMC. 




Wasp: Nestmate (g = 0.001) -0.362 31.59 0.244 -62.07 -0.213 61.71 
Wasp: Non-nestmate drifter (g = 0.001) 0.141 31.55 0.235 -61.51 0.397 62.17 
Wasp: Non-nestmate non-drifter (g = 0.001) 0.195 31.46 0.226 -61.01 -0.079 62.51 
Focal wasp’s aggression score (g = 0.003) 0.171 31.69 0.233 -61.80 -0.017 62.25 
Focal nest group size (g = 0.001) 0.152 31.55 0.214 -61.51 0.069 62.61 
Intercept 1.397 0.324 0.003 0.787 1.389 2.050 
Focal nest random effect (g = 0.162) precision 456.5 2154. 65.93 9.4E-4 0.021 5108 




Table 7.13 | Posterior estimates for aggression score received by introduced wasps (wasps released onto nests). 100,000 iterations MCMC.  




Wasp: Nestmate (g = 0.037) -0.068 9.892 0.038 -19.57 -0.140 19.57 
Wasp: Non-nestmate drifter (g = 0.037) -0.040 9.843 0.039 -19.57 -0.072 19.31 
Wasp: Non-nestmate non-drifter (g = 0.037) 0.032 9.857 0.037 -19.68 0.091 19.44 
Focal’s aggression score (g = 0.045) 0.041 9.747 0.032 -19.29 0.179 19.32 
Focal nest group size (g = 0.005) 0.035 9.971 0.030 -19.44 0.030 19.64 
Intercept 4.493 0.963 0.020 2.963 4.469 6.005 
Total model precision 0.030 0.005 1.5E-5 0.022 0.030 0.040 
Focal nest random effect (g = 0.015) precision 33.23 581.4 11.55 0.000 0.000 4.859 
Tagging nest random effect (g = 0.007) precision 4.605 146.3 2.435 0.000 0.000 7.2E-5 









Table 7.14 | Posterior estimates for ordered logit model of escalation score (wasps released onto nest).  
Four chains of 2,000 iterations NUTS-MCMC. 
 Effect μ σ 
q2.5 q97.5 
Intercept: Escalation Score 0 -0.40 0.43 -1.28 0.43 
Intercept: Escalation Score 1 -0.29 0.43 -1.15 0.53 
Intercept: Escalation Score 2 1.32 0.45 0.44 2.21 
Intercept: Escalation Score 3 2.85 0.57 1.77 4.03 
Intercept: Escalation Score 4 4.72 0.91 3.10 6.67 
Intercept: Escalation Score 5 (falling fight) is the reference category 
Treatment: Non-nestmate non-drifter 0.83 0.52 -0.18 1.82 
Treatment: Resident -0.59 0.53 -1.64 0.45 
Treatment: Non-nestmate drifter is the reference category 








Drifting in Polistes is a paradoxical behaviour in which workers divest from their natal colony and appear 
on foreign colonies, seemingly reducing their indirect fitness by doing so (Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et 
al., 2007). So far, drifting in Neotropical Polistes has been investigated only in the well-studied species 
P. canadensis, and the responses of host colony members to drifting remains unknown. In this chapter, 
I show high levels of drifting (17.7% of individuals) in a second paper wasp in the Neotropics, and find 
high levels of non-nestmate acceptance by host colonies despite non-nestmate recognition.  
Why does drifting occur in Polistes satan? Drifters pursuing a direct fitness strategy on foreign nests 
are expected to have developed ovaries (Sumner et al., 2007; Blacher et al., 2013). Here, the majority 
of drifters lacked developed ovaries, suggesting that direct fitness is not the main motivation for drifting 
for the majority of wasps. Instead, indirect fitness may motivate the majority of P. satan drifters, and 
genotyping is an important next step. In the previous chapter, I showed strong diminishing returns to 
cooperation in P. canadensis: likewise, a crucial next step will be addressing the scope for diminishing 
returns to cooperation in P. satan. However, contrary to previous findings in P. canadensis (Sumner et 
al., 2007; this thesis, Chapter 5), ovary dissections showed that some drifters can and do up-regulate 
ovary development level in P. satan. This may be ‘opportunistic’ up-regulation (Birmingham et al., 2004) 
following accidental drifting or a coherent strategy of deliberate drifting to maximise direct fitness 
(whether by egg-dumping or nest inheritance). The possibility of opportunistic drifter behaviour 
highlights that classifying individuals according to whether or not they actually drifted does not reflect 
an assumption that binary categories (‘drifter’ and ‘non-drifter’) exist: drifting may occur with a fixed 
probability in the lives of all wasps. Queen removal experiments on a large sample of nests should now 
be performed to establish whether drifters in P. satan attempt to secure foreign queen positions, and 
egg genotyping will be needed to assess whether drifters attempt egg-dumping. Preliminary data (see 
Question 2) suggest that drifters and non-drifters do not differ behaviourally (consistent with the results 
of Chapter 5 in P. canadensis): drifting is likely to be a behaviour occurring across the subordinate 
dominance hierarchy. Drifting may be a mixed direct and indirect fitness strategy: direct fitness 
maximisers may seek egg-laying opportunities on neighbour nests, but do so by entering dominance 
hierarchies on nests with related brood that will benefit from their helping effort.  
How does drifting occur in Polistes satan? In principle, the presence of at least some ovary-developed 
non-nestmates in the nest poses a threat to the indirect fitness interests of the resident workers and 
the direct fitness interests of the resident queen and her likely successor. Is it possible that non-
nestmates are indeed undesirable, but cannot be repelled due to an ineffective nestmate 
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discrimination system? In this chapter, I provide a rare test of nestmate recognition in a tropical Polistes 
species; although the polistine wasps evolved in the tropics (Carvalho et al., 2015), previous tests of 
nestmate recognition have almost universally focused on temperate Polistes species (Gamboa et al., 
1986; Gamboa, 2004). The results allow us to exclude the possibility that drifting in P. satan occurs due 
to a lack of nestmate recognition: in forceps recognition trials, nestmates receive credibly less 
aggression than non-nestmates. Surprisingly, aggression scores to non-nestmates from far-away nests 
were not credibly different from aggression to residents (a pattern that did not hold for escalation 
score). Taken on its own, this pattern is seemingly consistent with a ‘nasty neighbour’ response 
(Christensen and Radford, 2018), which is expected if nest-members are more likely to encounter 
threats to inclusive fitness from closer neighbours. If drifting occurs locally over short ranges, this is 
likely to be case. Residents may be primed to detect the most frequently encountered foreign cuticular 
hydrocarbons: repeat exposure to a foreign hydrocarbon profile may establish a chemical ‘search 
image’ for intruders. Distant nests, whose drifters will rarely appear on the focal nest, would not 
contribute to the development of the search image. 
Since nestmates and non-nestmates received differential treatment in recognition trials, resident 
wasps seem capable of categorising each type of arrival differently. Accordingly, I conclude that 
informational constraints do not impose a barrier to selection in favour of differential acceptance of 
nestmates over non-nestmates; widespread acceptance of non-nestmates on the nest can be 
interpreted as a ‘choice’ rather than a mistake due to uncertainty. Whilst forceps-based recognition 
trials showed differential treatment of non-nestmates, freely-interacting acceptance trials found that 
both nestmates and non-nestmates were typically accepted. There was no evidence of preferential 
acceptance of nestmates, and no evidence of preferential acceptance of known recent drifters over 
individuals without a history of recent drifting (over a six-day period). There was no preferential 
acceptance of foreigners carrying resources (honey), although it would be valuable to perform a similar 
assay with foreigners carrying large protein forage (a more natural situation) that is demonstrably of 
value. Together, these results imply that residents make a ‘knowing choice’ to tolerate individuals who 
they are capable of perceiving as foreign. Resolving whether this choice is made is because foreign 
wasps are, on average, beneficial for the nest – or, alternatively, whether the costs of escalating risky 
conflicts with intruders are too expensive – should now be the priority.  
In principle, acceptance may be a two-step process: first, wasps arriving at the nest may be assessed 
for nest membership; second, any identified foreigners may be inspected for signs of reproductive 
activity (chemical cues of fertility). Screening of intruders according to detectable fertility has, for 
instance, been shown in Bombus terrestris (Blacher et al., 2013). Such a two-step process may explain 
why wasps were generally accepted after a period of aggressive inspection: in general, most wasps may 
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have passed any hypothetical second-step inspection because they may have been detectably low-risk 
as direct fitness maximisers. It may be valuable to track the long-term process of drifter integration into 
host nests following first arrival. Indeed, since dominance status in Polistes is established through 
aggression (Jandt et al., 2014), aggression directed towards newcomers to colonies may not always be 
an eviction mechanism but rather a process of assimilating and establishing the new group member’s 
position in the nest. 
Drifting in Neotropical Polistes wasps has posed a challenge to inclusive fitness theory since Hamilton 
(1964b) first identified the phenomenon in Brazil. The recognition test results in this chapter provide 
evidence that, whatever the (adaptive or accidental) drivers of drifting from the perspective of 
individual drifters, individuals on P. satan recipient nests possess a clear ability to distinguish nestmates 
from non-nestmates. Consequently, the subsequent acceptance of non-nestmates (acceptance test 
results) implies an adaptive choice in favour of integrating foreign arrivals, and suggests that P. satan 



















































 General discussion 
8.1 Chapter Summary 
I began this thesis by asking two connected questions: 
1. Does cooperation evolve differently in unpredictable environments? 
2. What explains the evolution of drifting between paper wasp colonies in the Neotropics? 
In this discussion, I address each of these questions in turn. 
8.2 Question 1: Does cooperation evolve differently in unpredictable environments? 
In Chapter 3, I addressed the link between altruism and bet-hedging by deriving an explicitly stochastic 
version of Hamilton’s rule. This addressed speculation by Stevens et al. (2007), Rubenstein (2011), and 
Griesser et al. (2017), who have each proposed empirical situations in which altruism is favoured by 
reducing the exposure of recipients to a fluctuating environment at a cost to expected reproductive 
success. Specifically, Chapter 3 explored a neglected route to sociality in which altruists buffer relatives 
from unpredictable fluctuations in fitness despite failing to provide their relatives with a sufficiently 
large increase in expected reproductive success to justify cooperation alone (‘altruistic bet-hedging’). 
This led to an answer to the first question of this thesis above: in unpredictable environments, there 
are cryptic benefits and costs that are omitted from Hamilton’s rule as it is standardly used in empirical 
studies. Because these effects only arise in unpredictable environments, unpredictable environments 
provide a qualitatively different context for the evolution of cooperation. 
The benefits of bet-hedging arise because bet-hedgers stabilise reproduction against a fluctuating 
background of competitors (Grafen, 1999; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). There are two questions arising 
from this statement: how ‘fluctuating’ is the background, and what exactly is the ‘background’? In the 
stochastic version of Hamilton’s rule derived in Chapter 3, I measured the extent of fluctuation in a 
single ‘stochasticity coefficient’ (𝑣, the coefficient of variation in population average reproductive 
success). However, if a focal organism inhabits a large population that shows radical fluctuations locally 
but weak fluctuations globally, 𝑣 would be high if measured locally but low if measured globally. In this 
case, the extent to which bet-hedging can evolve depends on how much the focal’s individual’s 
‘background of competitors’ is comprised of other local individual versus other individuals from the 
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global population. Local fluctuations can only sustain bet-hedging if the focal organism’s competitors 
are also drawn from the local area; otherwise, there is no fluctuating background against which bet-
hedgers can stabilise their reproduction. I explored this principle in Chapter 4 by expanding the 
stochastic version of Hamilton’s rule to include explicit terms for local and global fluctuation and local 
and global competition, which I consider as two key aspects of a population’s ‘demography’. The upshot 
of Chapter 4 elaborated the answer to the first question of this thesis: the form in which cooperation 
evolves in unpredictable environments depends crucially on demography. This also alerts us to the 
possibility that a population that appears completely stable (with 𝑣 ≈ 0 when measured at a global 
scale) may be an effective arena for the evolution of altruistic bet-hedging if fluctuation and 
competition both occur locally. 
It is important to emphasise that altruistic effects on expected reproductive success (Bourke, 2014a) 
remain the primary forces in social evolution: volatility-suppressing effects require fluctuating 
populations, and can be overwhelmed by moderate costs to expected reproductive success when 
fluctuations are insufficiently strong. The strongest altruistic effects will arise when increases to the 
expected reproductive success of recipients (𝑏𝜇 > 0) occur together with decreases to recipients’ 
reproductive volatilities (𝑏𝜎 > 0). At a global scale, cooperative breeding is associated with 
unpredictable environments (Jetz and Rubenstein, 2011; Griesser et al., 2017); a natural possibility is 
that 𝑏𝜎 effects provide an additional boost to altruism in these environments above 𝑏𝜇, leading to a 
global correlation between unpredictability and cooperation (Cockburn and Russell, 2011). 
There are several future directions that it may be useful to pursue, including the following: 
1. Are endogenous sources of stochasticity capable of driving altruistic bet-hedging? I have focused 
on exogenous drivers of environmental stochasticity (i.e., factors external to the population, such 
as famine, El Niño, parasite pressure, and drought). Could endogenous biotic fluctuations (i.e., 
factors within the population, such as rock-paper-scissors dynamics, chaos, and limit cycles) have 
the same effect? Recently, Takeuchi et al. (2016) have outlined a hypothetical scenario during the 
origin of early cells comprising perpetually changing populations that appear superficially stable. 
In the Takeuchi scenario, lineages undergo independent internal fluctuations. The logic of Chapter 
3 suggests that similar fluctuations may impose negative frequency-dependent selection on 
separate lineages. 
2. Could there be a link between altruistic bet-hedging and the subfertility hypothesis? The 
‘subfertility hypothesis’ (Craig, 1983) suggests that individuals with lower-than-average fertility 
are favoured by selection to become indirect fitness maximising helpers, as they have ‘less to lose’ 
from forgoing reproduction. Evidence of subfertility is lacking (Field and Foster, 1999; Rehan et 
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al., 2014). In principle, however, subfertility may be more likely to arise in periods of 
environmental stress. Simultaneously, altruistic bet-hedging predicts that helping in these periods 
is disproportionately valuable. Accordingly, future theoretical and empirical work might address 
the extent to which subfertility and bet-hedging might work synergistically to select for altruism. 
An extension of this idea is state-dependent parental manipulation for subfertility: in principle, a 
mother may withhold resources from her developing brood when environmental stress may be 
imminent, manipulating a proportion of her offspring into subfertility to ensure a supply of 
volatility-suppressing altruists. 
3. How does group size affect altruistic bet-hedging? The strength of altruistic bet-hedging may be 
affected by threshold effects: small groups (below an optimum size) may be unable to suppress 
volatility effectively, whereas larger groups (above an optimum size) may be unable to secure 
further reductions in volatility. Are there diminishing returns to volatility suppression, in which 
each additional altruist has a less effective impact on the recipient’s volatility? 
4. Could ‘spiteful bet-hedging’ exist? In Chapter 4, I argued that very small demes with intense local 
competition can sustain altruistic bet-hedging in the absence of environmental fluctuations. For 
many biologists, the link between social behaviour and local competition is ‘spite’: harm inflicted 
on negatively related recipients (𝑟 < 0) at a cost to the actor (Hamilton, 1970; Gardner and West, 
2004; Lehmann, Bargum, et al., 2006). When competition is extremely local, an actor can 
reasonably interact with individuals who are negatively related, because the breeding value of an 
average competitor is shifted towards the actor’s own breeding value. Accordingly, Gardner and 
West (2004) emphasise miniature demes (low 𝑁𝑑) with intense intra-demic competition (high 𝑎) 
as plausible contexts for the evolution of spite. This suggests a potential link between spite and 
bet-hedging (against demographic stochasticity): since both are favoured by increasing values of 
𝑎
𝑁𝑑
 in metapopulations, spite and bet-hedging could potentially interact if 𝑟 < 0, 𝑏𝜎2 < 0 and 𝑐𝜇 <
0. In this situation, the actor pays a cost to its expected fecundity to increase the recipient’s 
reproductive volatility, spitefully exposing the non-relative to deleterious chance fluctuations in 
fitness. Equation 4.25 of Chapter 4 provides the conditions under which such ‘spiteful bet-
hedging’ would evolve. However, ecological scenarios of spiteful bet-hedging are harder to 
imagine than realistic ecological scenarios of altruistic bet-hedging: I suggest it would be far rarer 
than altruistic bet-hedging. Nonetheless, it may be useful to explore whether opportunities to 
spitefully increase a recipient’s volatility genuinely arise (potentially amongst deme-structured 
social microbes). 
5. Is altruistic bet-hedging more or less likely than non-social bet-hedging? The ‘monogamy 
hypothesis’ (Boomsma, 2009) argues that strict lifetime monogamy effectively removes 
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relatedness (𝑟) from Hamilton’s rule: under strict lifetime monogamy, selection favours altruism 
whenever 𝐵 > 𝐶. This is because the offspring of a monogamous mother are equally related to 
their own offspring and to siblings, so should be indifferent between reproducing or helping raise 
siblings. In support of the hypothesis, all transitions to eusociality are now widely thought to have 
arisen in the context of strict lifetime monogamy (Hughes et al., 2008; Duffy and Macdonald, 
2010; Smith et al., 2018). By extension, strict lifetime monogamy means that altruistic bet-hedging 
(𝐵 > 𝐶 in monogamous species) and non-social bet-hedging (−𝐶 > 0) are equally powerful 
evolutionarily: in both cases, 𝑟 vanishes from the stochastic version of Hamilton’s rule, and 
variance reduction (−𝑐𝜎 or 𝑏𝜎) must simply be larger than the loss of expected reproduction (−𝑐𝜇 
or 𝑏𝜇).  
Because altruistic bet-hedging depends on social behaviour, it may be easier for altruists to 
achieve volatility suppression than it is for non-social individuals to achieve volatility suppression. 
This is because cooperation by multiple individuals can generate non-additive benefits (Hauert et 
al., 2006), in which individuals are ‘more than the sum of their parts’. More concretely, a 
collaborative nest of sociable weavers might be buffered from the fluctuating environment 
disproportionately more effectively than a single solitary weaver’s nest – or a small foundress 
association of Polistes or Liostenogaster might be buffered from the environment to a degree that 
would be impossible for a single foundress. I suggest, therefore, that – under conditions of lifetime 
monogamy – altruistic bet-hedging will be a more powerful driver of bet-hedging than non-social 
bet-hedging. This is a testable hypothesis, both theoretically and empirically: studies might, for 
instance, (a) assess effect size variation between contexts and (b) quantify the per-individual 
reduction in uncertainty for social versus non-social scenarios. 
6. What is the most realistic demography for the early evolution of eusociality? In Chapter 4, I 
discussed demographic influences on altruistic bet-hedging. To test the viability of the altruistic 
bet-hedging hypothesis empirically, it will be crucial to identify plausible population structures in 
which sociality emerges. A first step, for instance, might be to quantify the extent of local density-
dependent regulation (Figure 8.1) in facultatively social insects, for which long term data will be 
essential. 
7. Would a ‘stationary Hamilton’s rule’ be more useful than a ‘stochastic Hamilton’s rule’? Allen and 
Tarnita (2012) derive a ‘stationary Price equation’ for asexual populations without fluctuations in 
population size (the stationary distribution of a Markov chain is its unchanging probability 
distribution through time). The parameters of the ‘stationary Price equation’ are the parameters 
of the stationary distribution of the Markov chain representing the entire evolutionary process, 
rather than a single generation of change (the normal Price equation). Although Allen and Tarnita 
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(2012) express scepticism of both the value of Price-equation-style results and (elsewhere) 
inclusive fitness theory (Nowak et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2013), their approach of deriving 
expectations over the entire stationary distribution of the evolutionary process may be a 
productive route for formalising individual-level optimisation of inclusive fitness over the entire 
selective process. This step would require confirming that the ‘stationary Price equation’ 
generalises to fluctuating population sizes and sexual reproduction; indeed, Allen and Tarnita 
(2012) remark that generalising to fluctuations is an immediate priority. Like the normal 
Hamilton’s rule, the explicitly stochastic Hamilton’s rule in Chapters 3 and 4 focuses on the 
expectation over just a single generation of change. In contrast, if Allen and Tarnita’s (2012) 
stationary Price equation generalises beyond non-fluctuating asexual populations, it may be 
valuable to derive a ‘stationary Hamilton’s rule’ to capture the whole evolutionary process of 
social behaviour under stochasticity. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 | Local density-dependent effects influence the absolute fitness 
of the focal individual (central node). In this scenario, the focal individual’s 
reproductive success is modulated in proportion to the average 
reproductive success in its competitive neighbourhood, which includes 
individuals (other nodes) at varying distances from the focal. Node colour 
reflects the extent to which individual neighbours feature in the focal’s 
competitive neighbourhood: offspring of warmer nodes are more directly 
in competition with offspring of the focal node. 
8.3 Question 2: What explains the evolution of drifting between Neotropical paper 
wasp colonies? 
Polistes populations in the Neotropics often form dense aggregations, nesting both on artificial 
substrates (Figure 8.2) and in natural habitats (Figure 8.3–Figure 8.4). Previous research on P. 
canadensis has shown that workers ‘drift’ between colonies within these aggregations (Sumner et al., 
212 
 
2007; Lengronne, 2013), leading to a paradox: why would a worker divest from the most closely related 
recipient (the home queen) to aid less related recipients (neighbour queens)? 
In Chapters 5–6, I explored drifting behaviour within P. canadensis aggregations in Panama and French 
Guiana, and in Chapter 7 I used RFID tagging to show for the first time high levels of drifting between 
post-emergence colonies in a second paper wasp species (P. satan in Brazil). Previous studies of drifting 
in Polistes have invoked indirect fitness (Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013); in contrast, one review 
has interpreted Sumner et al.’s (2007) results as workers simply ‘accidently shift[ing] between colonies’ 
(Hughes, 2012). 54 years after Hamilton first highlighted drifting in P. canadensis as an ‘anomaly’ to 
inclusive fitness theory, can we answer the question: what drives drifting? 
In this thesis, I have argued the following: 
1. Drifters and non-drifters are behaviourally indistinguishable (Chapters 5 and 7); 
2. Foreign drifters can obtain high dominance ranks in P. canadensis (Chapter 5); 
3. The diversification bet-hedging hypothesis does not explain drifting in P. canadensis (Chapter 6); 
4. The indirect reciprocity hypothesis does not explain drifting in P. canadensis (Chapter 6); 
5. P. canadensis colonies show diminishing returns at a level that is sufficient to explain drifting 
(Chapter 6); 
6. Contrary to point 5, there is currently no support for the prediction that drifters move from 
saturated to unsaturated colonies, but future tests of this will need to take account of parasitism 
and other drivers of nest quality (Chapter 6); 
7. Drifting occurs at reasonably high levels (17.7% of wasps) in Polistes satan (Chapter 7); 
8. Most drifters have undeveloped ovaries (Chapters 5 and 7); some drifters in P. satan have 
developed ovaries (Chapter 7); 
9. Non-nestmates are accepted in P. satan despite being detectably foreign (Chapter 7); 
10. Non-nestmate aggression in P. satan shows a pattern consistent with a ‘nasty neighbour’ response 
(Chapter 7). 
8.3.1 How important are indirect fitness and direct fitness? 
There are three published indirect fitness hypotheses for Polistes drifting: (1) diminishing returns 
(Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et al., 2007; Lengronne, 2013), (2) bet-hedging (Sumner et al., 2007; 
Lengronne, 2013), and (3) indirect reciprocity (Nonacs, 2017). An extensive discussion of each is found 
in Chapter 6, which concluded that diminishing returns to cooperation (Hamilton, 1964b; Sumner et al., 
2007) provides the most plausible indirect fitness hypothesis for drifting. However, in Chapter 5, I 
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showed that a minority of drifting wasps do fight during the nest inheritance struggle on foreign nests, 
suggesting that drifting can plausibly lead to nest inheritance (direct fitness), even if limited to a small 
number of drifters. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 | P. canadensis colonies are often found on anthropogenic structures. Here, one of the post-




Figure 8.3 | Dense aggregations of post-emergence colonies also occur naturally in P. canadensis. Here, an 
aggregation of large post-emergence colonies nests on a tree on Barro Colorado Island (Smithsonian Tropical 
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Research Institute, Panama). Photograph: Dr John Pickering (1976) © www.discoverlife.org. I show a similar 
tree-nesting aggregation in the Panamanian population studied in Chapter 6 (see Figure 6.1). 
  
Figure 8.4 | A large nest aggregation on a cliff-face in Cuba, believed to be Polistes cubensis. A number of 




The direct fitness payoff of successfully inheriting a foreign colony is undoubtedly vast (Monnin et al., 
2009; Leadbeater et al., 2011). When the foreign nest is a post-emergence colony, the enormous payoff 
– inheriting a complete workforce, without a high-risk foundress period – may exert such a profound 
influence over selection that even extremely rare successes may justify high levels of drifting. In other 
words, even if the probability of success is vanishingly low for each individual drifter, it may be rational 
for a lineage to emit large numbers of wasps into the wider population to gain these occasional 
additional nests. The nest inheritance hypothesis may also explain why extreme drifting has been 
largely found in tropical Polistes. Although nest inheritance does occur in temperate Polistes (Monnin 
et al., 2009), fixed nesting seasons in temperate populations (Leadbeater et al., 2011) most likely make 
queenless post-emergence colonies rarer, and so temperate high-rankers may be less likely than 
tropical high-rankers to encounter queen struggles on foreign post-emergence colonies. Likewise, in 
the temperate zone but not in the tropics, there may not be enough time for a new queen’s brood to 
develop before the end of the season. 
Problematic for the nest inheritance hypothesis, however, is the fact that most drifters perform 
standard worker tasks (Sumner et al., 2007; Chapter 5). These are often high-risk activities (including 
foraging) typically associated with low dominance ranks and indirect fitness maximisation (Cant and 
Field, 2005). Even after queen removal, only a minority of wasps investing in multiple colonies entered 
the nest inheritance struggle (Chapter 5), and most drifters lacked active ovaries (Chapters 5 and 7). By 
implication, most drifters are not direct fitness maximisers.  




1. Multiple strategies: High-ranking drifters may pursue nest inheritance whilst low-ranking drifters 
pursue indirect fitness. In this case, drifting is not a single strategy, but a behaviour employed by 
different classes of individual for different motives. 
2. Plasticity: High plasticity may allow ovary-inactive workers to up-regulate ovary activation rapidly 
when exposed to queenlessness.  
3. Pay-to-stay: Helping effort may be a ‘pay to stay’ mechanism tailored towards direct fitness, 
explaining why drifters perform cooperative tasks on foreign nests (Blacher et al., 2013). 
4. Spandrels (sensu Gould and Lewontin, 1979; see also Houston et al., 2007): the non-reproductive 
majority of drifters may be dismissed as functionless by-products of selection on nest-inheriting 
drifters driven by rare nest inheritance events with huge payoffs. It may be optimal for the 
genotype to accept a degree of seemingly irrational behaviour by non-reproductive workers as 
the price of emitting reproductive drifters: allowing all individuals to diffuse from the natal nest 
at a fixed probability may be cheaper than a conditional decision rule (‘Drift only if you are an 
aggressive direct fitness maximiser; minimise navigational errors if you are an indirect fitness 
maximiser.’) 
Testing each of these hypotheses should now be a priority. 
8.3.2 Uncertainty, errors, and trade-offs 
Each of the proposed adaptive hypotheses for drifting can be criticised as implausible (Table 8.1). It is 
tempting, therefore, to conclude that Polistes drifting is just a widespread mistake – or at least a 
tolerable navigation error (Free, 1956) arising from cognitive trade-offs (Kasuya, 1981). This ‘error’ 
hypothesis requires the following three statements to be true: 
1. Wasps possess poor navigational abilities (Kasuya, 1981); 
2. Wasps cannot always detect when they are on a foreign colony; 
3. Wasps cannot always detect or reject foreigners arriving on the home colony. 
Hamilton (1964b) discussed the possibility that P. canadensis drifters inappropriately invest in 
suboptimal nests, but that doing so is only mildly deleterious: relatedness to neighbour nests is 
sufficiently high that the loss of some work effort imposes little selective pressure on tighter navigation. 
Page et al. (1989) discussed a similar hypothesis for drifting in P. fuscatus, although here the proposed 
explanation is that relatedness is in general already low on the home colony (which is polygynous), so 
the loss of inclusive fitness is minimal. Although positively related neighbour nests may relax selection 
on navigation errors, this hypothesis would require the costs of improved navigation to be greater than 
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the squandered work effort produced by helping suboptimal recipients: P. canadensis drifters pay an 
approximately two-fold cost in relatedness to recipients (Sumner et al., 2007), so this is not a negligible 
opportunity cost. 
Table 8.1 | Proposed adaptive hypotheses and objections 
Motive Hypothesis Objection 
Direct 
fitness 
Nest inheritance All drifters have inactive ovaries in P. canadensis 
(Sumner et al., 2007; Chapter 5); most drifters 
have inactive ovaries in P. satan (Chapter 7) 
Most drifters perform standard worker tasks 
(Sumner et al., 2007; Chapter 5). 
 
 Egg-dumping All drifters have inactive ovaries in P. canadensis 
(Sumner et al., 2007; Chapter 5); most drifters 






No evidence that wasps move from ‘diminished’ 
to ‘undiminished’ colonies (Chapter 6). 
 
 Bet-hedging Demographic stochasticity is unable to generate 




No mechanism for outcompeting non-
reciprocators (Chapter 6). 
 
 
An implication of the error hypothesis is that we may see P. canadensis and P. satan helping effort as 
a diffusible public good: cognitive trade-offs mean that it is too expensive to ensure that all helping 
effort is directed solely on the natal colony, so wasps target their helping effort on the natal nest as 
precisely as possible under constraints. Inevitably, some helping effort diffuses to neighbours. Help 
therefore has a spatial ‘diffusion rate’ (Allen, Gore, et al., 2013)  around each focal colony. The adaptive 
problem for the genotype is optimising the diffusion radius: too generous a radius squanders helping 
effort on distant relatives; too small a radius comes at the cost of cognitive and behavioural trade-offs.  
In Chapter 7, I showed that P. satan nests can and do identify non-nestmates, which challenges Point 
3 of the error hypothesis. Nonetheless, nestmate discrimination will always involve a degree of 
uncertainty, and colonies are expected to optimise their acceptance thresholds under informational 
constraints to strike a balance between excessive acceptance and excessive rejection (Couvillon et al., 
2008). This is the central insight of signal-detection theory (Reeve, 1989; Figure 8.5): zealous rejection 
of all undesirable arrivals (here, exploitative drifters) may lead to collateral rejection of desirable arrivals 
(here, cooperative drifters and nestmates). In principle, the diffusion of unwittingly cooperative 
neighbour workers into the population may cause acceptance thresholds to relax, as a higher ratio of 
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cooperative to exploitative drifters will reduce the cost to benefit ratio of accepting non-nestmates. To 
summarise, drifting may involve two trade-offs by different parties: 
1. Drifter’s perspective: each individual drifting event would be an accident, tolerated by drifters as 
the unavoidable outcome of trading off navigational acuity against cognitive costs; 
2. Host colony residents’ perspective: the acceptance threshold is optimised to absorb accidentally 
incoming drifters (as useful workers) whilst minimising exposure to exploitation. 
Social insect colonies can often modify their acceptance thresholds quickly in response to changing 
contexts (Couvillon et al., 2008; Mora-Kepfer, 2013). Accordingly, a potential test of the role of 
acceptance trade-offs might ask whether experimentally changing the population-level frequency of 
ovary-active drifters (which pose a potential threat to host colonies) leads to a population-wide shift 
towards less tolerant acceptance thresholds. A similar experiment, focusing on helping effort rather 
than acceptance thresholds, has been performed by Grinsted and Field (2017) in pre-emergence P. 
dominula colonies. Experimental removal of all foundress nest combs, in the spirit of Grinsted and Field 
(2017), may force post-emergence colonies to raise their barriers to entry. Such experiments may be 
aided substantially by the imminent development of active RFID in insect monitoring (see Chapter 6 
Discussion): anti-collision RFID antennae covering entry routes and the nest comb itself will allow the 
ratio of attempted entry to successful integration to be quantified precisely. 
In Chapter 6, I argued that the diminishing returns hypothesis predicts that wasps should show a bias 
to drift from colonies with too many workers to colonies in need of workers. RFID data do not show 
such a bias (although additional variables, including parasitism rates and colony age, should be a focus 
of next steps). Wasps appeared to move near-randomly within aggregations. It is possible, however, 
that random diffusion does provide a mild diminishing returns benefit when averaged over all drifting 
events, because colonies with too many workers will tend to fall in size whilst colonies with too few 
workers will tend to rise in size by simple ‘osmosis’ (Figure 8.6). A next step might be modelling the 
extent to which random diffusion can provide a diminishing returns benefit, varying the cognitive costs 
of assessing the indirect fitness payoff rate on each nest. It will also be crucial to genotype further 




Figure 8.5 | The optimal acceptance threshold model (Reeve, 1989) predicts that the best acceptance threshold 
may involve admitting some undesirable partners if there is overlap in the phenotypic signal presented by 
desirables and undesirables. Diagram adapted from Figure 1 of Reeve (1989). Frequency of ‘desirable’ partners 
(cooperative drifters) is shown in green; frequency of ‘undesirable’ partners (exploitative drifters) is shown in 
blue. (a) If there is strong overlap, almost any chosen threshold will lead to false positives (rejecting cooperative 
drifters) and false negatives (accepting exploitative drifters). Only a threshold on the far left would exclude all 
exploitative drifters, but would admit very few cooperative drifters. (b) A scenario in which cooperative and 
exploitative drifters show identical signals, preventing discrimination. (c) A near-ideal scenario for resident 
wasps, in which exploitative drifters can be identified without incurring a high rate of false positive rejections. 
 
Figure 8.6 | Random movement of wasps between colonies will tend to equalise workforces across colonies. 
In small natural clusters involving only a limited number of large colonies, diffusion down the group size 





8.3.3 Caution in interpreting adaptation 
The triumph of social evolution is largely due to its uncompromisingly adaptive perspective (Dawkins, 
1976; Segerstråle, 2000; Abbot et al., 2011; Welch, 2016). However, the convincing appearance of 
adaptation in social evolution can occasionally be explained as an artefact (Jamieson, 1989), at least in 
principle. A large part of our interpretation will be due to the prior probability we place on adaptive 
versus non-adaptive explanations. This is itself an ‘acceptance threshold’ problem (Figure 8.5): 
presuming adaptation will inevitably lead to the misinterpretation of a fraction of neutral traits as 
adaptive, and vice versa. 
For instance, if we discover Polistes drifters favouring closely related nests (controlling for any 
confounding effects of distance), it would be natural to conclude that drifters favour relatives to 
maximise indirect fitness. Yet there is at least one neutral explanation: accidentally drifting wasps may 
be more likely to ‘stick’ to closer kin, because closer kin are harder to distinguish from one another than 
kin from non-kin (since hydrocarbon profiles are generally thought to be heritable; van Zweden et al., 
2009). As a result, drifters will accumulate accidentally at more closely related nests by survivorship 
bias (Wald, 1943). Conversely, seemingly clear evidence of non-adaptation is rarely decisive: even if 
wasps can be shown to drift entirely due to navigational errors, this does not necessarily imply that 
drifting is nonadaptive. An allele’s fitness interest may be best served by generating some degree of 
diffusion into the local population, for whichever indirect (or direct) fitness reason, and this might be 
achieved cheaply and directly by ‘fuzzy’ information use by individuals. Apparently irrational behaviour 
at the individual level may be rational for the genotype (e.g., McNamara, 1995). 
There are additional reasons for caution in interpreting adaptation. In Chapter 1, I described the 
central role of weak selection in evolutionary biology, including inclusive fitness theory. Weak selection 
is often invoked for convenience (Mullon and Lehmann, 2014), but the convenience is often justified 
by its apparent ubiquity in the real world (Lu and Wu, 2005; Birch, 2017). This means that adaptive 
pressures may often be extremely subtle, and nearly invisible to an observer: averaged across countless 
generations of (1) infinitesimal effects and (2) random fluctuations, selection may involve nothing 
stronger than a faint but persistent trend. This has been problematic since the origins of the study of 
evolutionary biology. Defending the power of selection, Weismann (1893) acknowledged that it is, for 
example, hard to imagine that ‘any person succumbed in the struggle for existence because he had a 
less sensitive tongue-tip than others’ (Weismann, 1893, p. 320). Yet bearers of less sensitive tongues 
must have succumbed, for today’s tongues are highly sensitive. The relevance here is that, for 
ambiguous traits like Polistes drifting, the effect sizes of adaptation may be subtle, and so fitness effects 
may be statistically undetectable in a necessarily limited sample. By analogy, an experimenter who 
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shaves the eyelashes of two hundred wildebeest may see no effect of the treatment on survival or 
reproduction; and yet, wildebeest presumably have their reasons for possessing long eyelashes. 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I began by arguing that inclusive fitness theory and Hamilton’s rule provide a powerful 
toolkit in social evolution (Chapter 1). I then explored links between this toolkit and bet-hedging, 
arguing that progress on understanding early eusociality and cooperative breeding may be made by a 
renewed empirical focus on variance components of fitness (Chapter 3) and demography (Chapter 4). 
In Chapter 2, I introduced drifting behaviour, and highlighted an enigma – the existence of cooperative 
drifting in Neotropical Polistes – that has been paradoxical since the origins of inclusive fitness theory 
(Hamilton, 1964b). Using a field manipulation of 1,450 RFID-tagged wasps in French Guiana, I found 
that drifters are behaviourally indistinguishable from non-drifters (Chapter 5), suggesting that drifting 
is not part of a specialist set of correlated behaviours but rather occurs across the subordinate 
dominance hierarchy. I then argued (Chapter 6) that drifting is unlikely to be explained by either indirect 
reciprocity (Nonacs, 2017) or bet-hedging (Sumner et al., 2007), and that most drifters are not direct 
fitness maximisers (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6, I undertook a longitudinal study of developing Polistes 
canadensis brood in Panama. This suggested that P. canadensis workers face strong diminishing returns 
to cooperation, which may provide an adaptive context for the evolution of drifting – one that should 
be a focus of next steps. In Chapter 7, I showed drifting for the first time in the Neotropical wasp Polistes 
satan in Brazil, and used recognition tests to show that non-nestmates are accepted by colonies at high 
rates despite being detectably foreign. Last, in the general discussion, I have suggested caution in 
quickly inferring either adaptation or non-adaptation when faced with subtle social traits. In summary, 
I have argued that understanding the evolution of altruism may be advanced by exploring cryptic social 
effects – effects that may be easily overlooked and yet may exert profound influences on animal 
societies. Amongst these cryptic effects on social evolution, volatility-suppressing benefits (Chapters 3–
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Appendices A–C are Supplementary Information for Chapter 3 (published as Supplementary 
Information to Kennedy et al., 2018). Appendix D provides a short explanation of the multilevel Price 
equation as background for Chapter 4. 
10.1 Appendix A: Derivation of results in Chapter 3  
A1 | General stochastic Hamilton’s rule 
This Appendix provides a derivation of Inequality 3.1 in the main text. We start with the general 
condition for evolutionary change, the Price equation (Price, 1970). Note that the bet-hedging literature 
often makes use of the geometric mean approximation (which we derive from the stochastic Hamilton’s 
rule in section A3 below); unless otherwise stated, when we use the unqualified term ‘mean’ we refer 
to the arithmetic mean. 
The change in the mean value 𝑧̅ of a trait in a population is a function of the reproductive success 𝑤𝑥 
associated with the trait value 𝑧𝑥 (across individuals 𝑥 ∈ 𝑁) and the average reproductive success ?̅? 
across the population: 
Δ𝑧̅ = ℂ𝑥 [𝑧𝑥,
𝑤𝑥
?̅?











 within this covariance is individual 𝑥’s relative fitness, which captures the intuition that 




)Δ𝑧𝑥] deals with non-selective contributions to evolutionary change (such as biased 
transmission of alleles between parents and offspring). We are interested in the action of selection, so 
we will focus on the first term.  
The Price equation in its form in Equation (A1) is retrospective: it looks back over the change that has 
happened and provides a convenient way of dividing it into its contributory components. A prospective 
(forward-looking) Price equation, on the other hand, would be an expectation of Δ𝑧̅ over the possible 
states of nature into which the population may enter. Δ𝑧̅ might be very different in a drought than in a 
year of plenty. Let the current environmental conditions be denoted 𝜋, of a set of possible 
environmental conditions 𝛱 into which the population may enter. Grafen (2000) and later Rice (2008) 
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have noted that the expectation over 𝛱 of the selection covariance provides the information required 
for the expectation of Δ𝑧̅: 
𝔼𝜋[Δ𝑧̅] = ℂ𝑥 [𝑧𝑥 , 𝔼𝜋 [
𝑤𝑥
?̅?
]] (𝐴2)   
We are interested in the fate of genes in the population. The ‘trait’ we address is the organism’s 
genetic value, 𝐺𝑥, a quantity that captures the alleles that an individual carries (allele frequency within 
the individual). Accordingly, 𝑧𝑥 = 𝐺𝑥. See Extended Data Table E1 for a list of all parameters used in the 
model. 
Both 𝑤𝑥 and ?̅? are random variables with their own probability distributions across environmental 
states. Equation (A2) states that the expected change in ?̅? in the population will depend on how closely 
genetic values covary with the expectation of relative fitness. This fraction is the expectation of a ratio 
of random variables, which is not equal to the ratio of the expectations of each variable when 𝑤𝑥 and 








The expectation of a ratio of random variables can be expressed using the Taylor series (Rice, 2008; 
Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012), where the notation ≪𝑘 ?̅? ≫ denotes the 𝑘th central moment of ?̅? across 
𝛱 and ≪ 𝑤𝑥 ,















As Queller (1992a) does for relative fitness in a non-stochastic environment, we express the 
individual’s expected reproductive success (number of surviving offspring) in a stochastic environment, 
𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥], in the form of a multiple regression equation. Part of an individual’s reproductive success will 
be due to the genes it carries itself: thus, one partial regression slope must relate the individual’s 
genetic value 𝐺𝑥 to its expected reproductive success (𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥). Another part of its reproductive 
success will be due to the genetic value 𝐺𝑦 of actors serving as social partners (𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦). The expected 
reproductive success of individual 𝑥 is: 
𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] = 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] (𝐴5) 
The intercept of the regression slope (𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]) is the ‘baseline’ expected reproductive success the 
organism expects before taking into account its own genotype and that of its social partners. 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] 
captures noise around the regression line. 
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Equation (A4) contains the central moments characterising the probability distribution of the average 
reproductive success in the population (?̅?) across environmental states: 
≪𝑘 ?̅? ≫ = 𝔼𝜋[(?̅? − 𝔼𝜋[?̅?])
𝑘] (𝐴6) 
The shape of the distribution from which a focal individual samples its reproductive success appears 
in Equation (A4) within the mixed moments: 
≪ 𝑤𝑥 ,
𝑘 ?̅? ≫= 𝔼𝜋[(𝑤𝑥 − 𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥])(?̅? − 𝔼𝜋[?̅?])
𝑘] (𝐴7) 
The most familiar of the mixed moments is the covariance, ℂ𝜋[𝑤𝑥, ?̅?], which arises when 𝑘 = 1. 
Higher mixed moments, such as the coskewness and cokurtosis, appear at higher values of 𝑘. Because 
each mixed moment can potentially be influenced by the organism’s own genotype and its social 
partners, we can describe each one using linear regression equations: 
≪ 𝑤𝑥 ,
𝑘 ?̅? ≫= 𝛼≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫ + 𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫ (𝐴8) 
We now substitute these regression slopes into selection covariance of the Price equation (Equation 
A2): 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?]
= ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, (
𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
+∑(−1)𝑘
(𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]) ≪







The expected value of the population average reproductive success across states of nature is a 
constant (i.e., for all individuals 𝑥 ∈ 𝑁, it is identical). As a constant, it does not covary with the genetic 
values of individuals, so can be moved outside of the selection covariance (a covariance with a constant 
is by definition 0). By the linearity rule for covariances ℂ[𝑋, 𝑌 + 𝑍] = ℂ[𝑋, 𝑌] + ℂ[𝑋, 𝑍], we also expand 






(ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ] + ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 ] + ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 ]










+ ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦  ≪
𝑘 ?̅? ≫] + ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ≪
𝑘 ?̅? ≫] + ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛼≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫ ]
+ ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 ] + ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 ] + ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝜖≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫ ]))   
(𝐴10) 
ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ], ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ≪
𝑘 ?̅? ≫] and ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛼≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫ ] can all be dropped from the 
equation, because they involve the covariances of the variable 𝐺𝑥 with a constant. Similarly, we follow 
Queller (1992a) and Birch and Marshall (2014) in assuming that there  is no covariance between 
individual genetic value and (in our case) the three residual error terms: ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ] =
ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] ≪
𝑘 ?̅? ≫] = ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝜖≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫ ] = 0. 
The partial regression slopes are constants so can be moved outside of their respective covariances 
with 𝐺𝑥. We can now express the condition for an expected increase in ?̅? (i.e., 𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] > 0) as follows: 
1
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]






≪𝑘 ?̅? ≫ 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑥] + ≪
𝑘 ?̅? ≫ 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑦 ]
+𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥ℂ𝑥





> 0  
(𝐴11) 
 Dividing both sides of Inequality (A11) by the variance in genetic value across individuals, 𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥], 
















) > 0  
(𝐴12) 




















For clarity, we denote the regression slopes of the individual’s genetic value 𝐺𝑥 and the genetic value 
of its social partner 𝐺𝑦 on the different parameters of the individual’s probability distribution for 
reproductive success as follows: 
𝑏𝜇 ≡ 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦 = 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑦],𝐺𝑥  (𝐴14𝑎) 
𝑏𝑘 ≡ 𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑦 = 𝛽≪𝑤𝑦,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥 (𝐴14𝑏) 
𝑐𝜇 ≡ −𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 (𝐴14𝑐) 
𝑐𝑘 ≡ −𝛽≪𝑤𝑥,𝑘?̅?≫,𝐺𝑥
(𝐴14𝑑) 





𝑘 ?̅? ≫ 𝑏𝜇 + 𝑏𝑘)
∞
𝑘=1








which is Inequality 3.1 in the main text. 
 
A2 | Approximation for the first two moments 
A bet-hedging genotype reduces the variance in fitness at the expense of reducing arithmetic mean 
fitness. We obtain the stochastic approximation of Hamilton’s rule suitable for bet-hedging effects by 
ignoring 𝑘 > 1 in Equation (A4) (e.g. skew) to focus only on the arithmetic mean and variance effects. 
This allows us to approximate the selection covariance of the Price equation as follows: 






2 )] (𝐴16) 
The covariance between individual fitness 𝑤𝑥 and population average fitness ?̅? in Equation (A16) can 
be alternatively expressed as: 
ℂ𝜋[𝑤𝑥, ?̅?] = 𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥]𝜎𝜋[?̅?] (𝐴17) 
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where 𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] is the standard deviation of the individual’s reproductive success, 𝜎𝜋[?̅?] is the standard 
deviation of the population’s average reproductive success over 𝛱, and 𝜌𝑥 is the product-moment 
correlation coefficient for 𝑤𝑥 and ?̅? as they fluctuate over 𝛱. Substituting these terms into the 




ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, (𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] − 𝜈𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥])] (𝐴18) 





𝜈 is independent of the organism’s decisions, and quantifies the degree to which the environment is 
stochastic. 
The condition for expected increase in ?̅? (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] > 0) is then: 
ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, (𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] − 𝜈𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥])] > 0 (𝐴20) 
Above (Equation (A5)), we have already defined 𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] using multiple linear regression. We follow a 
similar approach with standard deviation, weighted by the degree to which it correlates (𝜌𝑥) with the 
fluctuating average reproductive success ?̅? in the population: 
𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] = 𝛼𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] (𝐴21) 
Substituting Equation (A5) and Equation (A21) into the condition for selection (Inequality (A20)), we 
obtain: 
ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, (𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]
− 𝜈 (𝛼𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥]))] > 0 
(𝐴22) 
As before, the covariances of 𝐺𝑥 with the constants equal 0 (i.e., ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]] =
 ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝑣𝛼𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥]] =  0), and the covariances with the error terms are assumed to be zero (i.e., 
ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]] = ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝑣𝜖𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥]] = 0). For clarity, we denote the effects on the correlated 
variation of the recipient’s reproductive success as follows: 
𝑏𝜎 ≡ −𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦 = −𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑦],𝐺𝑥 (𝐴23𝑎) 
𝑐𝜎 ≡ 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 (𝐴23𝑏) 
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Substituting Equations (A23a) and (A23b) into (A22) gives: 
𝑏𝜇ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑦] − 𝑐𝜇ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑥] − 𝑣(𝑐𝜎ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑥] − 𝑏𝜎ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑦]) > 0 (𝐴24) 
Dividing both sides of Inequality (A24) by 𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥] to obtain relatedness (𝑟 ≡
ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑦,𝐺𝑥]
𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥]
), we can rewrite 
the condition for selection as follows: 
𝑟(𝑏𝜇 + 𝜈𝑏𝜎) > 𝑐𝜇 + 𝜈𝑐𝜎 (𝐴25) 
which is Inequality 3.2 in the main text. 
Note that a positive benefit 𝑏𝜎 (beneficial for the recipient) will be a negative regression slope, since 
it will be reducing the volatility of the recipient’s reproduction. Likewise, a positive cost 𝑐𝜎 (deleterious 
for the actor) will be a positive regression slope, since it will be increasing the volatility of the actor’s 
reproduction. If the actor can succeed in reducing its own reproductive volatility, 𝑐𝜎 will be negative 
(i.e., a ‘negative cost’). 
Accordingly, the benefit term 𝐵 to expected relative fitness is: 
𝐵 ≈ 𝑏𝜇 + 𝜈𝑏𝜎 (𝐴26) 
The cost term 𝐶 to expected relative fitness is: 
𝐶 ≈ 𝑐𝜇 + 𝜈𝑐𝜎 (𝐴27) 
These are approximations of the exact benefit and cost terms captured in the general expression for 
Hamilton’s rule (Inequality 3.1 in the main text), showing that selection can favour paying a cost to 
expected reproductive success (𝑐𝜇 > 0, 𝑐𝜎 = 0) to reduce the ?̅?-correlated variation of a relative’s 
reproductive success (𝑏𝜎 > 0) even in the absence of any effect on the expected reproductive success 
of the recipient (𝑏𝜇 = 0). In this situation: 




The relative importance of mean effects (𝑏𝜇 and 𝑐𝜇) versus volatility effects (𝑏𝜎 and 𝑐𝜎) is determined 
by 𝑣. If we denote the importance of mean effects (i.e., their power to determine the outcome of 
selection) with the weight 𝑎𝜇 and the importance of volatility effects with the weight 𝑎𝜎, such that 
Inequality (A25) can be written as 𝑟(𝑎𝜇𝑏𝜇 + 𝑎𝜎𝑏𝜎) > 𝑎𝜇𝑐𝜇 + 𝑎𝜎𝑐𝜎, these weights are the numerator 
and denominator of 𝑣 (i.e., 𝑎𝜇 = 𝔼𝜋[?̅?] and 𝑎𝜎 = 𝜎𝜋[?̅?]). In short, we emphasise that the true benefits 
and costs in social evolution should be measured using the expectation of relative fitness (Gardner et 
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al., 2011), which we decompose here into mean fecundity and volatility effects, rather than mean 
fecundity effects alone. 
Under the definition of ‘bet-hedging’, a behaviour must incur a cost to arithmetic mean number of 
offspring whilst deriving a benefit by reducing the variance associated with the number of offspring 
(Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). The role of fitness variation reduction in social evolution has long attracted 
verbal speculation (Reed and Walters, 1996; Soucy et al., 2003; Stevens et al., 2007; Rehan et al., 2011; 
Rubenstein, 2011; Gonzalez et al., 2013; Koenig and Walters, 2015), but has evaded formalisation. We 
define ‘altruistic bet-hedging’ as occurring when the cost (a reduction in arithmetic mean number of 
offspring) is paid by the actor whilst a recipient derives the benefit (a reduction in the variance 
associated with the number of offspring). It is, of course, possible that the recipient may also experience 
either an increase or a decrease in arithmetic mean number of offspring (a 𝑏𝜇 effect). For clarity, we 
include such cases as ‘altruistic bet-hedging’ only if the 𝑏𝜇 effect if insufficient to overcome the costs 
paid by the actor without the additional 𝑏𝜎 effect. A behaviour is altruistic bet-hedging if it (i) involves 
a cost 𝑐𝜇 paid by the actor and (ii) would not evolve without a socially mediated reduction in the 
variation of a recipient’s reproductive success (a 𝑏𝜎 effect).  
In short, each state has a mean fitness ?̅?, and a distribution of realised fitnesses for every individual. 
Unlike environmental stochasticity, within-genotype demographic stochasticity (inter-individual 
variation in fitness within the same environmental state) is shown by Inequality 3.2 (main text) not to 
matter to the outcome of selection in large populations, because the regression slopes cut through this 
variation to obtain the relationship between alleles and fitness visible to natural selection. The one 
condition in which inter-individual variation in fitness within the same environment state does matter 
is when population sizes (the scale of the competitive population) are tiny, a well-known result in the 
bet-hedging literature that we generalise for social interactions in section A5 below (Inequality 3.3 in 
the main text).  
Note that when the ‘natural’ distribution for reproductive success is sufficiently skewed (i.e., either 
good years or bad years are rare), Hamilton’s rule will need to be approximated to higher moments 
(e.g. 𝑘 =  2), using Inequality 3.1 in the main text, to capture effects on the asymmetry of the 
probability distributions from which the social partners are sampling their reproductive success 
(although under such conditions, organisms will tend to be specialised to the common environmental 
state). 
 
A3 | Non-social bet-hedging and Hamilton’s rule 
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In this section, we show how the stochastic Hamilton’s rule (Inequality (A25)) captures familiar forms 
of bet-hedging as special cases. In the absence of social interaction (𝑟𝐵 = 0), the rule is simply: 
𝑐𝜇 + 𝑣𝑐𝜎 < 0 (𝐴29) 
Note that 𝑐𝜇 = −𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 (Equation (A14c)), so a reduction in the reproductive success of the actor 
(𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 < 0) represents a positive cost 𝑐𝜇. In terms of regression effects, therefore, the stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule shows the condition for non-social bet-hedging to be as follows, where 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 < 0 
and 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 < 0: 
𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 > 𝑣𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 (𝐴30) 
To see how these results recover previous results in the non-social bet-hedging literature, consider a 
non-social haploid population consisting of two rival alleles, denoted 𝐴1 and 𝐴2. To identify whether 
selection is expected to favour the 𝐴1 allele (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] > 0), we ask whether there will be a change in 
genetic value for 𝐴1 (individuals with the allele of interest 𝐴1 have a genetic value 𝐺𝑥 = 1, whilst those 
lacking it have a genetic value of 𝐺𝑥 = 0).  
Each individual 𝑥 has an expected number of offspring 𝜇𝑥 and a standard deviation in number of 
offspring 𝜎𝑥. Following Frank & Slatkin (1990) and Starrfelt & Kokko (2012), set 𝜇𝑥 equal to the value 
𝜇1 for all carriers of allele 1 (and equal to 𝜇2 for all carriers of allele 2) and 𝜎𝑥 equal to the value 𝜎1 for 
all carriers of allele 1 (and equal to 𝜎2 for all carriers of allele 2). In other words, members of a genotype 
sample their fitness 𝑤𝑥 from a probability distribution shared by all members of the genotype, but they 
may in principle do so in an uncorrelated fashion with other members of the genotype. The degree to 
which an individual’s fitness 𝑤𝑥 correlates with fluctuations in population average reproductive success 
?̅? is given by 𝜌𝑤𝑥,?̅?. 
To obtain the exact expected change in gene frequency, Hamilton’s rule can be expressed in the 
following format: 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] =
𝑟(𝑏𝜇 + 𝑣𝑏𝜎) − 𝑐𝜇 − 𝑣𝑐𝜎
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
⋅ 𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥] (𝐴31) 
In Equation (A31), we derive Hamilton’s rule without dividing by the variance 𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥] in genetic value; 
see Equation (2.3) in Okasha & Martens (2016). 
We now set 𝑏𝜇 and 𝑏𝜎 in Equation (A31) to zero to focus on non-social cases. Fitting the stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule (Inequality (A25)) obtains the following non-social components 𝑐𝜇 and 𝑐𝜎: 
𝑐𝜇 = 𝜇2 − 𝜇1 (𝐴32𝑎) 
255 
 
𝑐𝜎 = 𝜌1,?̅?𝜎1 − 𝜌2,?̅?𝜎2 (𝐴32𝑏) 
In other words, there are two horizontal positions (0 and 1) on a graph of 𝜇 against genetic value 𝐺𝑥; 
the two vertical positions are 𝜇1 and 𝜇2. The slope 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 of 𝜇 against 𝐺𝑥 is then simply 𝜇1 − 𝜇2. 
The cost term 𝑐𝜇 is −𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥, i.e., 𝜇2 − 𝜇1. Likewise, on the graph of ?̅?-correlated volatility against 
genetic value 𝐺𝑥, there are two vertical positions 𝜌1,?̅?𝜎1 and 𝜌2,?̅?𝜎2, so the slope 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 of ?̅?-
correlated volatility against 𝐺𝑥 is 𝜌1,?̅?𝜎1 − 𝜌2,?̅?𝜎2. The coefficient 𝑐𝜎 is equal to 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥  (Equation 
(A23b)). 




(A19)). The variance in breeding value, 𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥], is equal to 𝑞1𝑞2, as it represents a two-point distribution 
(i.e., 𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥] = 𝑞1𝑞2(1 − 0)
2 = 𝑞1𝑞2). Equation (A31) can now be written: 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] =







As there are only two genetic values in a haploid world (0 and 1), 𝜌1,?̅?𝜎1 and 𝜌2,?̅?𝜎2 are the expected 
values of  𝜌𝑤𝑥,?̅?𝜎𝑥 for members of each genotype, obtained as a predicted value in a least-squares 
regression (Inequality (A25)). We denote individuals with the index 𝑖: 














The summation term in Equation (A34a) contains the correlation between individual 𝑖’s reproductive 
success 𝑤𝑖 and the average reproductive success ?̅? in the population. Since a correlation can be 
expressed in the form 𝜌𝑍,𝑌 =
ℂ[𝑍,𝑌]
𝜎[𝑍]𝜎[𝑌]





































𝑖=1  is the average reproductive success for carriers of allele 𝐴1. To match notation 


















Likewise, since ?̅? = 𝑞1𝑅1 + 𝑞2𝑅2, we substitute this formula for ?̅? into Equation (A38) and expand 








2 + 𝑞2ℂ𝜋[𝑅1, 𝑅2] 
𝜎1𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
(𝐴39) 
As Starrfelt and Kokko (2012) note in their Equations (7–9), ℂ𝜋[𝑅1, 𝑅2] = 𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2, and 𝜎𝜋[𝑅1]
2 =
𝜌1𝜎1
2, letting 𝜎1 denote the standard deviation in reproductive success of an individual carrying allele 1 








2 + 𝑞2𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2 
𝜎1𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
(𝐴40) 








2 + 𝑞1𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2 
𝜎2𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
(𝐴41) 
Substituted into Hamilton’s rule (Equation (A33)), this obtains: 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] =









If the population is neither rising nor falling in size, 𝔼𝜋[?̅?] = 1: 
𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 𝑞1𝑞2 (𝜇1 − 𝜇2 + (𝑞2𝜌2𝜎2
2 − 𝑞1𝜌1𝜎1
2 + (𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2)) (𝐴43) 
Equation (A43) recovers Frank and Slatkin’s (1990) Equation (7) and Starrfelt and Kokko’s (2012) 
Equation (10) for the canonical bet-hedging model familiarly used in the literature (i.e., two alleles in a 
fixed-size population at a haploid locus in a fluctuating environment of two or more states).  
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From Equation (A43), we can recover the geometric mean heuristic (which provides a prediction of 
which allele will fixate) by assuming(Frank and Slatkin, 1990) that there is no correlation between 
genotypes (𝜌12 = 0) and setting the population to equal frequencies(Frank and Slatkin, 1990) of each 
allele (𝑞1 = 𝑞2 =
1
2
). These conditions provide the well-known geometric-mean approximation 
(Equation (12) in Frank and Slatkin (1990); note that, as heuristic approximations, there are at least five 












A4 | Uncertain relatedness 
The potential effects of stochasticity on relatedness have been raised by Goodnight (1992) and 
Lehmann & Balloux (2007). In this section, we explore how uncertainty over relatedness influences the 
outcome of selection. We show that the mean relatedness of recipients is sufficient to predict the 
outcome of selection when there is no strong correlation (across environmental states) between the 
relatedness 𝑟 of social partners and the average reproductive success in the population (?̅?). We denote 
this correlation as 𝜌𝑟,?̅?. However, if the relatedness of interactants and average reproductive success 
are negatively correlated (𝜌𝑟,?̅? < 0), investments in social partners become more valuable as 
environmental stochasticity increases (i.e., at high values of 𝑣). Conversely, investments in social 
partners become less valuable in a stochastic environment if this correlation is positive (𝜌𝑟,?̅? > 0).  
To illustrate this result, we denote the reproductive success of individual 𝑥 in state 𝜋 as 𝑤𝑥(𝜋), and 
express this quantity as a function of its own genetic value 𝐺𝑥 and the genetic value 𝐺𝑦 of its social 
partner: 
𝑤𝑥(𝜋) = 𝛼𝑤𝑥(𝜋) + 𝛽𝑤𝑥(𝜋),𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝑤𝑥(𝜋),𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦(𝜋) + 𝜖𝑤𝑥(𝜋) (𝐴44) 
We substitute this regression formula into the Price equation (Equation (A2)) to express the condition 
for selection (𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] > 0) as: 
𝔼𝜋 [ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥,
𝛼𝑤𝑥 + 𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝑤𝑥
?̅?
]] > 0 (𝐴45) 
For a given environmental state 𝜋, ?̅? is a constant with respect to 𝐺𝑥, so we move it outside the 
covariance, which is defined only for the environmental state 𝜋. By the linearity of covariances 




(ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛼𝑤𝑥] + ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥] + ℂ𝑥 [𝐺𝑥, 𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦] + ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝜖𝑤𝑥])
?̅?
] > 0 (𝐴46) 
ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝛼𝑤𝑥] = 0 (since 𝛼𝑤𝑥 is a constant) and we assume ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝜖𝑤𝑥] = 0. Then: 
𝔼𝜋 [
(𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑥] + 𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑦ℂ𝑥[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑦])
?̅?
] > 0 (𝐴47) 
We now divide both sides of Inequality (A47) by the variance in genetic value (𝕍𝑥[𝐺𝑥]) to obtain state-







] > 0 (𝐴48) 
Retaining the first two terms of the Taylor series expansion of Inequality (A48) gives: 
𝔼𝜋[𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥] + 𝔼𝜋 [𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑦𝑟]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
−
ℂ𝜋[𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥 , ?̅?] + ℂ𝜋 [𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑦𝑟, ?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
2
> 0 (𝐴49) 
We now consider the case in which the benefit conferred on a recipient and the cost paid by the actor 
are the same in all environmental states (𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑦 = 𝑏 and 𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥 = −𝑐 for all 𝜋). However, we allow 
relatedness to the recipient to vary among states 𝜋. This captures the possibility that actors associate 
with either closer or more distant relatives when the conditions change. The covariance of cost and 
population average fitness is zero, because cost is now a constant across states (ℂ𝜋[𝛽𝑤𝑥,𝐺𝑥 , ?̅?] =
ℂ𝜋[𝑐, ?̅?] = 0). Multiplying both sides by 𝔼𝜋[?̅?], Inequality (A49) can be simplified to: 
𝑏 ⋅ 𝔼𝜋[𝑟] − 𝑏 ⋅
ℂ𝜋[𝑟, ?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
− 𝑐 > 0 (𝐴50) 
We now rearrange Inequality (A50) by expanding the covariance. The covariance between relatedness 
and population average fitness (ℂ𝜋[𝑟𝑦, ?̅?]) can be written as 𝜌𝑟,?̅?𝜎𝜋[𝑟]𝜎𝜋[?̅?], where 𝜌 denotes 
correlation and 𝜎𝜋 denotes standard deviation across environmental states. We introduce 𝑣 as the 
stochasticity coefficient (the coefficient of variation in population average reproductive success, 𝑣 =
𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
, which we introduced earlier in Equation (A19)). We also use the following notation for clarity: we 
denote the expectation of relatedness across environmental states as 𝑟𝜇, and we denote the standard 
deviation of relatedness across environmental states as 𝑟𝜎: 
𝑟𝜇 = 𝔼𝜋[𝑟] (𝐴51𝑎) 
𝑟𝜎 = 𝜎𝜋[𝑟] (𝐴51𝑏) 
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Accordingly, Inequality (A50) can be expressed as: 
(𝑟𝜇 − 𝜌𝑟,?̅?𝑣𝑟𝜎)𝑏 > 𝑐 (𝐴52) 
Inequality (A52) shows that uncertainty over relatedness (𝑟𝜎) only influences selection if relatedness 
fluctuates strongly in either a positively or negatively correlated fashion with population average 
reproductive success. A negative correlation, across environmental states, between relatedness and 
average reproductive success (𝜌𝑟,?̅? < 0) results in an actor’s most valuable investments being focused 
on closer relatives. These investments are the ‘most valuable’ because an increase in recipient fecundity 
of a given size 𝑏 is more valuable when competitors are underperforming (low ?̅?): the recipient will 
enjoy a proportionally greater market share of reproduction than if the increase had occurred when 
competitors were overperforming (high ?̅?). Mean relatedness 𝑟𝜇 is sufficient to capture the outcome 
of selection when population mean reproductive success does not fluctuate (𝑣 ≈ 0), even if actors face 
high levels of uncertainty 𝑟𝜎 about the kinship of recipients.  
 
A5 | Demographic stochasticity 
We now consider the role of risk in a ‘static’ environment, for which the environment does not 
fluctuate between states (the influence of the environment is identical across the set 𝛱). In a population 
of size 𝑁 in which organisms sample their reproductive success independently (ℂ𝜋[𝑤𝑥, 𝑤𝑗≠𝑥] = 0), the 
covariance (defined across possible fitness outcomes) between the focal individual’s reproductive 
success (𝑤𝑥) and the average reproductive success in the population (?̅?) is: 


























We substitute this into the selection covariance of the Price equation (and multiply out 𝔼𝜋[?̅?]): 




)] > 0 (𝐴54) 
Applying Queller’s (1992a) regression method (as in Appendix A2) to this equation, we obtain 
Inequality (3) in the main text (where 𝑏𝜎2  is the effect of the partner’s genotype on the organism’s 
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within-generation variance in reproductive success (−𝛽𝕍𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦), and 𝑐𝜎2 is the effect of the 
organism’s genotype on its own variance in reproductive success (𝛽𝕍𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥): 
 𝑟 (𝑏𝜇 +
   𝑏𝜎2
𝑁𝔼𝜋[?̅?]





10.2 Appendix B: Deriving regression effects 
Here, we describe how the benefit and cost terms are obtained in a specific model (implemented as 
a simulation in MATLAB, for which code is given in Appendix D of Kennedy et al., 2018). 
 
B1 | Discrete environment states 
Let a haploid asexual population consist of two genotypes, with genetic values 0 and 1, at a single 
locus. Genotype 0 is non-cooperative, whilst genotype 1 pays a cost 𝑐 to reduce the volatility of its 
recipients’ reproductive success to a proportion 𝜂 of its natural level. The frequency of genotype 1 in 
the population is 𝑝 (and so the frequency of genotype 0 is 1 − 𝑝). The environment fluctuates between 
two states (‘good’ and ‘bad’). 
Following the assortment rules in the first model in Gardner et al. (2011, p. 1030), we assume that 
individuals preferentially pair with same type (cooperators or noncooperators) with the probabilities in 
Table B1.  
Without cooperation, individuals have a fecundity of 𝑧1 in a good year and 𝑧2 in a bad year. Good 
years occur with probability 𝑑 and bad years with probability 1 − 𝑑. The standard deviation of a 
genotype 0 individual with a genotype 0 social partner is then: 
𝜎00 = √(1 − 𝑑)𝑑(𝑧1 − 𝑧2)
2 (𝐵1) 
 
Supplementary Table B1 | Mean and variation of reproductive success as a function of social 
partners in a world fluctuating unpredictably between two states 
 
Genotypes Probability of interaction Mean reproductive success 
(𝜇𝑥𝑦) 
Volatility of reproductive success 
(𝜎𝑥𝑦) 






1 1 𝑝2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑑(𝑧1 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑑)(𝑧2 − 𝑐) 






1 0 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑑(𝑧1 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑑)(𝑧2 − 𝑐) 




0 1 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑑𝑧1 + (1 − 𝑑)𝑧2 𝜂√𝑑(1 − 𝑑)(𝑧1 − 𝑧2)
2 1 
0 0 (1 − 𝑝)2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑑𝑧1 + (1 − 𝑑)𝑧2 √𝑑(1 − 𝑑)(𝑧1 − 𝑧2)
2 1 
Assortment rules follow the first model in Gardner et al. (2011), leading to 𝑟 = 𝛼. 
 
A focal individual encountering a genotype 1 social partner experiences a reduction in its fecundity 
variation by the coefficient 𝜂.  
From Inequality (A25), Hamilton’s rule (approximated to the first two central moments) is: 
𝑟(𝑏𝜇 + 𝑣𝑏𝜎) > 𝑐𝜇 + 𝑣𝑐𝜎 (𝐵2) 
To find the four partial regression slopes (𝑏𝜇 , 𝑏𝜎 , 𝑐𝜇 , 𝑐𝜎), we fit the following equations to 
Supplementary Table B1: 
𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] = 𝛼𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥] (𝐵3) 
𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] = 𝛼𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] + 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥𝐺𝑥 + 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦𝐺𝑦 + 𝜖𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥] (𝐵4) 
Thus, we solve two linear regression equations: one for expected reproductive success (𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥]) and 
one for the correlated variation of reproductive success (𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥]). The partial regression slopes 𝑚1 
and 𝑚2 in a multiple regression with two predictors ℎ1 and ℎ2 of 𝑙 can be found by solving the following 






























The components of Equations (B7) and (B8) fitted to Table B1 are: 
ℂ[𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥], 𝐺𝑥]
𝕍[𝐺𝑥]





= 𝛼 (𝐵10) 
ℂ[𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥], 𝐺𝑦]
𝕍[𝐺𝑦]
= −𝑐𝛼 (𝐵11) 
ℂ[𝐺𝑥, 𝐺𝑦]
𝕍[𝐺𝑦]
= 𝛼 (𝐵12) 
We therefore simultaneously solve: 
𝑚1 = −𝑐 −𝑚2𝛼 (𝐵13) 
𝑚2 = −(𝑚1 + 𝑐)𝛼 (𝐵14) 
This obtains 𝑚1 = −𝑐 and 𝑚2 = 0, which are the partial regression slopes 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥 and 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦 , 
respectively. Since the components 𝑐𝜇 and 𝑏𝜇 in Inequality (A25) are 𝑐𝜇 = −𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥  and 𝑏𝜇 =
𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦, these components are therefore: 
𝑐𝜇 = 𝑐 (𝐵15) 
𝑏𝜇 = 0 (𝐵16) 















Simultaneously solving Equations (B17) and (B18) obtains: 
𝑚3 = 0 (𝐵19) 
𝑚4 = (𝜂 − 1)𝜎𝑜𝑜 (𝐵20) 
𝑚3 is the partial regression slope 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑥, which provides the component 𝑐𝜎 in Inequality (A25). 
𝑚4 is the partial regression slope 𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦 . The component 𝑏𝜎 in Inequality (A25) is equal to 
−𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝐺𝑦. Accordingly, these two components are: 
𝑐𝜎 = 0 (𝐵21) 
𝑏𝜎 = (1 − 𝜂)𝜎00 (𝐵22) 







(𝑝𝜂 + (1 − 𝑝))𝜎00
𝜇00 − 𝑝𝑐
(𝐵23) 
This is an intuitive measure of stochasticity in this environment fluctuating unpredictably between 
two states: the numerator is the standard deviation of two completely correlated random variables 
(i.e., the sum of 𝜂𝜎00 and 𝜎00, weighted by the frequency of each allele), whilst the denominator is the 
average number of offspring across states (again, weighted by allele frequency). 
Since 𝑝 appears in the equation for 𝑣, 𝑣 is frequency-dependent. Differentiating stochasticity (𝑣) with 
respect to the frequency of altruistic bet-hedgers (𝑝), 𝑣 decreases with rising 𝑝 when: 




Accordingly, stochasticity 𝑣 falls as frequency 𝑝 rises (Figure 3.4) if the effect of variation reduction 




When this condition (Inequality (B24)) is met, as the frequency 𝑝 rises the bet-hedgers begin to render 
the environment effectively stable. At high frequency, the value of volatility-reducing altruism 𝑏𝜎 
therefore falls, because 𝜈 is low. The result is that the population can be reinvaded by familiar mean-
fecundity-maximisers, much as a ‘conspiracy of doves’ in the well-known hawk–dove game is vulnerable 
to invasion by hawks (Dawkins, 1976). (At low costs (𝑐), intermediate levels of variation reduction 𝜂 are 
less constrained from reaching fixation.) Connections between coexistence and bet-hedging have been 
analysed in non-social settings (Seger and Brockmann, 1987), although not interpreted in terms of 
frequency-dependent effects on whole-population stochasticity. 
 
B2 | Frequency at which expected change due to selection is zero 
We now have all the components of Hamilton’s rule (𝑟 = 𝛼, 𝑐𝜇 = 𝑐, 𝑏𝜇 = 0, 𝑐𝜎 = 0, 𝑏𝜎 =
−(𝜂 − 1)𝜎00,𝜈 =
(𝑝𝜂+(1−𝑝))𝜎00
𝜇00−𝑝𝑐
). Putting these components together, we solve for the frequency 𝑝∗ at 




𝑐2 − (𝜂 − 1)2𝜎00
2 𝛼
(𝐵25) 
When 0 < 𝑝∗ < 1, the expected frequency of the social bet-hedgers is intermediate. If 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶 for all 
𝑝, then the population is expected to tend to 𝑝∗ = 1. Likewise, if 𝑟𝐵 < 𝐶 for all 𝑝, the population is 




B3 | Individual-based simulation 
To ensure that gene frequency makes incremental changes through generations in numerical 
simulation for the system in Table B1, we let offspring production across the population be driven by 
social interactions, and then sample a random 1% of the adult population for replacement in proportion 
to the balance of genotypes amongst the offspring (i.e., each environmental state, 1% of the breeding 
spots become available for offspring produced that generation). 
𝑝∗ is the gene frequency at which 𝑟𝐵 − 𝐶 = 0 (Figure 3.3). The equilibrium frequency around which 
the population is expected to fluctuate over the long run, 𝑝′, is equal to 𝑝∗ when the changes in gene 
frequency that occur each generation are small and the sign changes from 𝑟𝐵 > 𝐶 below 𝑝∗ to 𝑟𝐵 < 𝐶 
above 𝑝∗ (Figure 3.3c). The first condition reduces displacement from equilibrium: when the population 
takes extreme leaps in gene frequency each generation, gene frequencies can enter random cycles for 
which 𝑝∗ is not the midpoint (𝑝∗ ≠ 𝑝′), as gene frequency moves between extremely different values 
at which the slope of selection differs. Under a regime of weak selection, 𝑝∗ = 𝑝′.  
 
B4 | Effects of chance and autocorrelation in the fluctuating environment 
Even if both states are equally probable, the environment may by chance have a run of several good 
or several bad states. At the predicted equilibrium 𝑝∗, the change Δ?̅? from a good state is exactly 
opposite to the change from a bad state, so the expected change in average genetic value is zero 
(𝔼𝜋[Δ?̅?] = 0). However, the magnitude of the effect is important. If the two types of change Δ?̅? have 
a very large effect, the frequency of altruists may alter rapidly due to a chance sequence of many of the 
same states: a chance run of five bad years, for instance, might cause one genotype to crash completely. 
Sustained runs of the same environmental state are more probable when the environment fluctuates 
in a temporally autocorrelated fashion. 




]] ≈ 0) and 𝑝∗ is convergence-stable (i.e., the frequency-dependent stochasticity 
coefficient 𝜈 favours altruists at frequencies 𝑝𝑡 below 𝑝
∗ but selects against it above). Since selection 
favours altruists when 𝑣(𝑏𝜎 − 𝑐𝜎) > 𝑐𝜇 − 𝑟𝑏𝜇, as long as (𝑏𝜎 − 𝑐𝜎) > 0 we can divide by (𝑏𝜎 − 𝑐𝜎) 
without changing the sign of the inequality to find the conditions for a globally convergence-stable 













In the individual-based simulation, we focus on weak selection, where only 1% of the population’s 
genotype frequencies are available to change each generation. Under weak selection, even high levels 
of temporal autocorrelation (leading to frequent runs of the same environmental states across years) 
do not necessarily deter the population from its convergence point. In general, we emphasise that the 
Price equation – and its derivation, Hamilton’s rule – focuses on generational changes: accordingly, 
both the non-stochastic version familiarly used in the literature and the stochastic version presented 
here can predict the frequency at which there is no change or no expected change (respectively) due 
to selection. Under appropriate conditions, including low-amplitude fluctuations in allele frequency 
between generations, this frequency will be realised as an equilibrium state for the population; outside 
these conditions, the frequency at which there is no expected change due to selection need not 
represent an equilibrium state.  
 
B5 | Inducible altruism  
An actor in a fluctuating environment does not necessarily need to produce a ‘constitutive’ strategy 
(e.g. help in all states or defect in all states). If the actor possesses information about the current state 
𝜋, it may be able to tailor its response to produce an optimal strategy for the given state. In principle, 
this form of phenotypic plasticity may produce ‘inducible’ altruism in a stochastic world: help relatives 
if you know that a drought is imminent, for instance. In this section, we show how the reliability of 
information in a stochastic world determines whether cooperation should be constitutive or inducible. 
We introduce to the population a plastic allele 𝐼, such that there are three alleles in competition: 
𝑆: ‘Selfish’: carriers never cooperate 
𝐶: ‘Constitutive cooperator’: carriers cooperate in all states 
𝐼: ‘Inducible cooperator’: carriers cooperate only when they believe they are in the ‘bad’ state 
These alleles have frequencies 𝑝𝑆, 𝑝𝐶, and 𝑝𝐼 respectively (i.e., 𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝐶 + 𝑝𝐼 = 1). 
Let an act of cooperation incur a cost 𝑐 to the actor’s fecundity. In ‘bad’ states (such as drought), 
receiving cooperation increases an individual’s fecundity by 𝛿+. In ‘good’ states, we allow the presence 
of a cooperator to be detrimental to the recipient’s fecundity: the cooperator reduces recipient 
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fecundity by 𝛿− (note that 𝛿− can equal zero, or even be negative if the co-operator always benefits 
the recipient). 
Let the plastic allele 𝐼 pay an additional cost (𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐) as the ‘cost of plasticity’, determined by both 
the costs of information gathering and utilisation and the costs of maintaining behavioural flexibility. 
The quality of the information available to carriers of the plastic allele is determined by its accuracy 𝐴: 
the environmental state 𝜋 is what the actor thinks it is with probability 𝐴. 
The frequency of each type of pairing is as follows (Supplementary Table B2): 
Supplementary Table B2 | Frequencies of interactions 
Genotype of focal 
individual 𝑥 
(allele carried) 






2 + 𝛼𝑝𝐼(1 − 𝑝𝐼) 
𝐼 𝑆 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐼𝑝𝑆 
𝐼 𝐶 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐼𝑝𝐶  
𝑆 𝐼 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑆𝑝𝐼  
𝑆 𝑆 𝑝𝑆
2 + 𝛼𝑝𝑆(1 − 𝑝𝑆) 
𝑆 𝐶 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑆𝑝𝐶  
𝐶 𝐼 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐶𝑝𝐼  
𝐶 𝑆 (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐶𝑝𝑆 
𝐶 𝐶 𝑝𝐶
2 + 𝛼𝑝𝐶(1 − 𝑝𝐶) 
 
We can define the fecundity of each of the types of focal individual described in Supplementary Table 
B2 as follows (Supplementary Table B3): 






Fecundity in good years 
 (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑥𝑦) 
Fecundity in bad years 
(𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑥𝑦) 
𝐼 𝐼 𝐴𝑧1 + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧1 − 𝑐 − 𝛿−) − 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝐴(𝑧2 − 𝑐 + 𝛿+) + (1 − 𝐴)𝑧2 − 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  
𝐼 𝑆 𝐴𝑧1 + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧1 − 𝑐) − 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝐴(𝑧2 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝐴)𝑧2 − 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  
𝐼 𝐶 𝐴(𝑧1 − 𝛿−) + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧1 − 𝑐 − 𝛿−)
− 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  
𝐴(𝑧2 + 𝛿+ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧2 + 𝛿+)
− 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  
𝑆 𝐼 𝐴𝑧1 + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧1 − 𝛿−) 𝐴(𝑧2 + 𝛿+) + (1 − 𝐴)𝑧2 
𝑆 𝑆 𝑧1 𝑧2 
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𝑆 𝐶 𝑧1 − 𝛿− 𝑧2 + 𝛿+ 
𝐶 𝐼 𝐴(𝑧1 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧1 − 𝑐 − 𝛿−) 𝐴(𝑧2 + 𝛿+ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝐴)(𝑧2 − 𝑐) 
𝐶 𝑆 𝑧1 − 𝑐 𝑧2 − 𝑐 
𝐶 𝐶 𝑧1 − 𝑐 − 𝛿− 𝑧2 − 𝑐 + 𝛿+ 
 
In Figure 3.7 of the main text, we plot the expected direction of change in allele frequency under 
selection for this population. Note that the stochastic Hamilton’s rule identifies the points in frequency 
space {𝑝𝑆, 𝑝𝐶 , 𝑝𝐼} at which each allele is expected to increase in frequency under selection. 
An instructive empirical example is found in the temperate paper wasp Polistes annularis: field data 
(Queller and Strassmann, 1988) for foundresses suggest that inclusive fitness is positive in a ‘bad’ state 
(characterised by drought) but negative in a ‘good’ state (when drought is absent). The existence of 
cooperative foundress groups in the ‘good’ state, when cooperation is predicted to be deleterious, 
implies that foundresses do not take up the theoretically-plausible option of being socially-plastic ‘bad-
year specialists’. In general, constitutive cooperation (cooperation in all states) can outcompete plastic 
cooperation (‘bad-year specialists’) when information is insufficiently reliable or the costs of plasticity 
are too high. 
10.3 Appendix C: Feasibility of 𝒃𝝈 > 𝟎 
Hamilton’s rule is predictive in the sense that it provides a falsifiable criterion to be applied to any 
specific hypothesis: a proposed combination of measured fitness effects must conform to the rule if 
they are to explain a given adaptation. In this section, we explore the potential for 𝑏𝜎 effects in social 
evolution. 
In the main text and Appendix A, we highlight that the magnitude of 𝑣 depends on the extent to which 
environmental fluctuations are correlated across patches in a matrix or metapopulation, and the extent 
to which temporal fluctuations within the organism’s reproductive lifespan are correlated. Our 
intention here is to highlight the feasibility of 𝑏𝜎-driven sociality, in principle, in the real world; at 
present, empirical data on the direct links between stochasticity and sociality are sparse. Direct 
empirical tests of the principle should aim to quantify the factors influencing 𝑣. 
 
C1 | Elimination of parasite pressure 
Recently, Rehan et al. (2014) have found that observed mean fecundity effects (𝑟𝑏𝜇 − 𝑐) are unable 
to explain the evolution of cooperation between sisters (𝑟 = 0.75) in a facultatively social bee (Ceratina 
268 
 
australensis). This species inhabits a fluctuating environment, and Rehan et al. (2011) have previously 
suggested that bet-hedging could drive the evolution of cooperation: parasite numbers rise and fall 
between generations, generating ‘periods of extreme parasite pressure’ (Rehan et al., 2011), but social 
nests are better able to evade brood loss to parasites. Bees may be effectively blind to environmental 
state (ambient level of brood loss to parasitism), since parasitoid activity (Rehan et al., 2011) occurs 
only once larvae and pupae are available for ovipositing. Whether pupae have been parasitized may be 
essentially unknowable, as they are sealed within the stem nest. 
In this section, we model the evolution of sister-to-sister cooperation in a fluctuating world. Although 
we necessarily remain agnostic about the drivers of cooperation in the particular species C. australensis, 
we show that, in principle, highly stochastic environments (high v) can be more hospitable than static 
environments for sister–sister cooperation in such species when sociality buffers parasite pressure. 
We obtain matching results through an individual-based haplodiploid simulation and an application 
of Inequality (A25) to the life-history parameters of Supplementary Table C1. To simplify the 
interpretation, we first consider a single diallelic haploid locus, with assortment following Gardner et 
al. (2011): individuals are matched with a social partner identical at the focal locus with probability 𝛼 
and a random partner with probability 1 − 𝛼. This obtains 𝑟 = 𝛼, which allows us to set 𝛼 = 0.75 to 
recover assortment levels between haplodiploid sisters. We let the environment fluctuate between 
high and low parasite states; a solitary individual has 𝑧𝐺 offspring in a ‘good year’ (low parasite pressure) 
and 𝑧𝐵 offspring in a ‘bad year’ (high parasite pressure, 𝑧𝐵 < 𝑧𝐺). We let the presence of social partners 
buffer the breeder from parasite pressure, so that breeders with helpers attain 𝑧𝐺 offspring regardless 
of environmental state. 
Supplementary Table C1| Life history 
𝐺𝑥 𝐺𝑦 Power Result Frequency in the 
population of this 
focal individual 
Mean fecundity (across 
environmental states) of 
focal individual 
Standard deviation (across environmental 
states) of focal individual’s fecundity 




(𝑝2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)) 𝑧𝐺  0 
1 1 Subordinate Worker 1
2
(𝑝2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)) 0 0 
1 0 Dominant  Solitary 1
2
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑑𝑧𝐺 + (1 − 𝑑)𝑧𝐵 √𝑑(1 − 𝑑)(𝑧𝐺 − 𝑧𝐵)
2 
1 0 Subordinate Worker 1
2
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 0 0 
0 1 Dominant Queen 1
2
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑧𝐺  0 
0 1 Subordinate Solitary 1
2
(1 − 𝛼)𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 𝑑𝑧𝐺 + (1 − 𝑑)𝑧𝐵 √𝑑(1 − 𝑑)(𝑧𝐺 − 𝑧𝐵)
2 
0 0 Dominant  Solitary 1
2
((1 − 𝑝)2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)) 𝑑𝑧𝐺 + (1 − 𝑑)𝑧𝐵 √𝑑(1 − 𝑑)(𝑧𝐺 − 𝑧𝐵)
2 
0 0 Subordinate Solitary 1
2




The frequencies are the sum of (1) direct pairings with genetically-identical individuals (occurring with probability 𝛼) and (2) random assortment 
with random members of the population (occurring with probability 1 − 𝛼), who may or may not be genetically identical. Thus, a 𝐺𝑥 = 1 and  𝐺𝑦 =
1 pairing occurs directly with probability 𝛼 (representing 𝛼𝑝 of the total pairings in the population, since the frequency of 𝐺 = 1  is 𝑝; equivalently, 
of the 𝛼 proportion of pairings that are directly with identical individuals, 𝑝 of them will be between 𝐺 = 1 individuals) and via random assortment 
with probability (1 − 𝛼)𝑝2 . Accordingly, the pairing frequency is 𝛼𝑝 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝2, or, equivalently, 𝑝2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝). In half of these pairings, the 
focal individual is the dominant, and so the frequency of the dominant type in such a pairing is 
1
2
(𝑝2 + 𝛼𝑝(1 − 𝑝)).  
 
Solving for the coefficients in Inequality (2) of the main text obtains the following, where 𝜇⦁ and 𝜎⦁ 
are the average and standard deviation respectively (across the two states) of a solitary individual’s 
number of offspring. Detail about obtaining regression coefficients for social effects is provided in 
Appendix B. 
𝑏𝜇 =















The means-based Hamilton’s rule implies that cooperation will not evolve by mean fecundity effects 
alone for this system. The condition for the evolution of altruism by mean fecundity effects is: 
𝑟(1 − 𝑑)(𝑧𝐺 − 𝑧𝐵) > 𝜇⦁ (𝐶2) 




) is negative: even with helpers conferring substantial gains in fecundity on breeders 
in high-parasite years (Table B1), cooperation cannot evolve by mean fecundity effects. When low-
parasite states occur in 40% of years (𝑑 = 0.4), cooperation only evolves due to mean fecundity effects 
if individuals have at least 21 times more offspring without parasites than with parasites.  
However, incorporating volatility effects increases the scope for cooperation when the environment 
is stochastic (high 𝑣):  
𝑟((1 − 𝑑)(𝑧𝐺 − 𝑧𝐵) + 𝑣 ⋅ 𝜎⦁) > 𝜇⦁ − 𝑣 ⋅ 𝜎⦁ (𝐶3) 
In Figure 3.6 of the main text, we illustrate this increased scope for the evolution of cooperation, both 
in terms of Inequality (A25) and individual-based simulation. For instance, whilst equal frequencies of 
high- and low-parasite years are unable to sustain cooperation by mean fecundity effects at any level 
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of 𝑧𝐺 and 𝑧𝐵, Figure 3.6a reveals a high-stochasticity region in which cooperation invades a solitary 
population due to volatility effects. The 21-fold difference in fecundity between high-parasite and low-
parasite states required for the evolution of cooperation by mean fecundity effects when low-parasite 
states occur in 40% of years shrinks to a 3-fold difference with the addition of volatility effects. Volatility 
effects can, accordingly, extend the region of the adaptive landscape in which social traits evolve, and 
in principle reduce the gap between 𝐵 and 𝐶 in paradoxical cases where Hamilton’s rule appears to fail. 
Not all social species evolve from solitary ancestors inhabiting a highly stochastic world, but those that 
do may in principle obtain hidden 𝑏𝜎 and 𝑐𝜎 effects that increase the payoff from cooperation. Note 
that when high-parasite states are very frequent, 𝑏𝜇 effects rise in power: when parasites constantly 
threaten the population, and helpers eliminate parasite pressure, mean fecundity is increased; in this 
situation, the environment is no longer stochastic (low 𝑣). Incorporating volatility effects means that 
cooperation can still evolve when high-parasite states are not extremely frequent.  
 
C2 | Galapagos mockingbirds 
Empirical data are sorely lacking for testing the effects of 𝑏𝜎. One encouraging dataset, however, 
comes from the cooperatively breeding Galapagos mockingbird (Mimus parvulus). Curry and Grant 
(1989) recorded demographic information over an 11-year period on Isla Genovesa (Ecuador). Helping 
is polymorphic in M. parvulus (occurring at 34% of nests), allowing a comparison of cooperative and 
non-cooperative nesting attempts.  
Using the relevant summary statistics in Curry and Grant (1989) (based on 153 helper-present nests 
and 297 helper-absent nests), we estimate partial regressions of expected recipient fecundity against 
actor phenotype (helper or non-helper). We play the ‘phenotypic gambit’, and adopt a phenotypic (as 
opposed to genotype) variant of the stochastic Hamilton’s rule. We therefore regress fitness 
components against the focal individual’s phenotype 𝑃𝑥 and the phenotype of a social partner 𝑃𝑦, and 
we assign the phenotypic values 0 and 1 for non-helping and helping respectively: 
𝑏𝜇 = 𝛽𝔼𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝑃𝑦 = 0.3 (𝐶6) 
Sample size varies considerably between years (from two helper-attended nests in 1984 to 33 in 
1987). We cannot calculate 𝑏𝜎 directly from the data, therefore, as we cannot distinguish ‘true’ 
population variance from sampling variance. Instead, our approach is to ask whether a 𝑏𝜎 component 
can significantly change the estimated benefits of cooperation.  
Galapagos mockingbirds inhabit a stochastic environment: Curry and Grant (1989) report a coefficient 
of variation in fledgling production of 0.92 across years, a proxy for the coefficient of variation in 
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average reproductive success (𝜈 =
𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
) across states of nature. We assume that helping has no 
effect on the volatility of the helper’s own reproductive success (𝑐𝜎 = 0), and we consider the payoff 
for a sibling helper-at-the-nest (𝑟 = 0.5): 
0.5(0.3 + 0.92𝑏𝜎) > 𝑐𝜇 (𝐶7) 
𝑏𝜎 > 2.2𝑐𝜇 − 0.33 (𝐶8) 
The cost of cooperation remains to be quantified in M. parvulus. If helpers suffer a loss of expected 
reproductive success exactly equal to the amount they increase the reproductive success of their 
recipients (i.e., 𝑐𝜇 = 𝑏𝜇 = 0.3), then: 
𝑏𝜎 > 0.33 (𝐶9) 
The regression of recipient fecundity volatility against actor phenotype (𝛽𝜌𝑥𝜎𝜋[𝑤𝑥],𝑃𝑦) must have a 
slope of at least −0.33 to justify altruism if 𝑏𝜇 − 𝑐𝜇 = 0. The upshot is that, in principle, 𝑏𝜎 can provide 
missing components of 𝐵 in a sufficiently stochastic environment. Conclusively demonstrating altruistic 
bet-hedging in Galapagos mockingbirds will require (as with any empirical test of such models) 
elucidating how mockingbird-specific demography and population structure determines the relation 
between phenotype and the separate components of fitness.  
Risk plays an important role in behavioural ecology. A stochastic approach is useful even if risk-
management strategies affect the mean reproductive successes (Frank and Slatkin, 1990) of actors or 
their social partners (𝑐𝜇 and 𝑏𝜇 respectively) without affecting the reproductive variation of either 
individual. In the social insects, for instance, the so-called ‘Wenzel-Pickering effect’ proposes that larger 
groups are able to reduce the variation in the supply of food for the brood, preventing shortfalls in 
which brood would otherwise die (Wenzel and Pickering, 1991; Poethke and Liebig, 2008). Whether 
the Wenzel-Pickering effect in real organisms derives its benefit from a consequent reduction in the 
variation of the production of offspring (Stevens et al., 2007) (𝑏𝜎 > 0), an increase in mean offspring 
production (Poethke and Liebig, 2008) (𝑏𝜇 > 0), or a combination of both (𝑏𝜇 > 0 and 𝑏𝜎 > 0) remains 
unknown. Similarly, in the mockingbirds, nesting attempts may be more ‘risky’ in a given state 𝜋: this 
risk may mean that only a proportion of nests will succeed. This more proximate form of ‘risk’ differing 
between years influences the payoffs from social behaviour in each type of year, and therefore can 
affect both expected fecundity and the volatility of fecundity across states. Classifying benefits accruing 
to different statistical parameters in the stochastic Hamilton’s rule offers a framework for diagnosing 











10.4 Appendix D: Multilevel Price equation 
The multilevel Price equation (Price, 1972) is normally derived from the familiar Price equation by the 
following few lines (Okasha, 2004; Frank, 2012; Gardner, 2015c), which I provide here as background 
for Chapter 4. The familiar Price equation (Price, 1970) is as follows (see Chapter 1 Equation 1.2): 
Δ?̅? = ℂ𝑥 (
𝑤𝑥
?̅?




Δ𝐺𝑥 can be expanded in its own Price equation. Thus, if the entity 𝑥 is composed of sub-entities 𝑗: 
Δ?̅? = ℂ𝑥 (
𝑤𝑥
?̅?










Although we could continue generating new layers of the Price equation (i.e., doing the same for Δ𝐺𝑗, 
and so on), we can stop here by assuming the term 𝔼𝑗 [(
𝑤𝑗
𝑤𝑗̅̅ ̅̅
) Δ𝐺𝑗] to be approximately zero. The result 
is the normal way in which the multilevel Price equation is written. Given that 𝑤𝑥 = 𝑤𝑗̅̅ ̅ and ?̅? = 𝑤𝑥̅̅̅̅  we 
end up with a partition into selection between groups (here, 𝑥) and selection within groups (here, 
amongst the within-group entities 𝑗): 
Δ?̅? = ℂ𝑥 (
𝑤𝑥
?̅?




In Chapter 4, the higher-level groups 𝑥 I consider are demes (denoted 𝑑) and the lower level groups 𝑗 






















“Natural selection is a mechanism for generating an 
exceedingly high degree of improbability.” 
R. A. Fisher, quoted in Edwards (2000) 
 
 
“Mundane events acquired the raiment of symbolism, 
and this is what I concluded from them: …that it is 
possible to spend a lifetime in a magellanic voyage 
around the trunk of a single tree. …Humanity is exalted 
not because we are so far above other living creatures, 
but because knowing them well elevates the very concept 
of life.” 
E. O. Wilson (1984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
